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Computational ontologies are a new type of emerging scientific media (Smith, 2016) that 
process large quantities of heterogeneous data about portions of reality. Applied 
computational ontologies are used for semantically integrating (Heiler, 1995; Pileggi & 
Fernandez-Llatas, 2012) divergent data to represent reality and in so doing applied 
computational ontologies alter conceptions of materiality and produce new realities based 
on levels of informational granularity and abstraction (Floridi, 2011), resulting in a new 
type of informational ontology (Iliadis, 2013) the critical analysis of which requires new 
methods and frameworks. Currently, there is a lack of literature addressing the 
theoretical, social, and critical dimensions of such informational ontologies, applied 
computational ontologies, and the interdisciplinary communities of practice (Brown & 
Duguid, 1991; Wenger, 1998) that produce them. This dissertation fills a lacuna in 
communicative work in an emerging subfield of Science and Technology Studies (Latour 
& Woolgar, 1979) known as Critical Data Studies (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Dalton & 
Thatcher, 2014; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014) by adopting a critical framework to analyze 
the systems of thought that inform applied computational ontology while offering insight 
into its realism-based methods and philosophical frameworks to gauge their ethical 
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import. Since the early 1990s, computational ontologies have been used to organize 
massive amounts of heterogeneous data by individuating reality into computable parts, 
attributes, and relations. This dissertation provides a theory of computational ontologies 
as technologies of individuation (Simondon, 2005) that translate disparate data to produce 
informational cohesion. By technologies of individuation I mean engineered artifacts 
whose purpose is to partition portions of reality into computable informational objects. I 
argue that data are metastable entities and that computational ontologies restrain 
heterogeneous data via a process of translation to produce semantic interoperability. In 
this way, I show that computational ontologies effectively re-ontologize (Floridi, 2013) 
and produce reality and thus that have ethical consequences, specifically in terms of their 
application to social reality and social ontology (Searle, 2006). I use the Basic Formal 
Ontology (Arp, Smith, & Spear, 2015) – the world’s most widely used upper-level 
ontology – as a case study and analyze its methods and ensuing ethical issues concerning 
its social application in the Military Ontology before recommending an ethical 
framework. “Ontology” is a term that is used in philosophy and computer science in 
related but different ways—philosophical ontology typically concerns metaphysics while 
computational ontology typically concerns databases. This dissertation provides a critical 
history and theory of ontology and the interdisciplinary teams of researchers that came to 
adopt methods from philosophical ontology to build, persuade, and reason with applied 
computational ontology. Following a critical communication approach, I define applied 
computational ontology construction as a solution to a communication problem among 
scientists who seek to create semantic interoperability among data and argue that applied 
ontology is philosophical, informational in nature, and communicatively constituted 
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(McPhee & Zaug, 2000). The primary aim is to explain how philosophy informs applied 
computational ontology while showing how such ontologies became instantiated in 
material organizations, how to study them, and describe their ethical implications.
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CHAPTER 1. THE TOWER OF BABEL PROBLEM 
1.1 Introduction 
Applied computational ontologies are quickly becoming one of the most complex 
and pervasive forms of emerging scientific media (Smith, 2016) in the world and stand to 
revolutionize entire industries and domains of social life (Staab & Studer, 2009). 
Invisible to the practices of everyday life (de Certeau, 1984), applied computational 
ontologies process the entities, attributes, and relations of portions of reality in various 
social, governmental, economic, and scientific contexts (Nissenbaum, 2011) into 
computable objects separated by invisible granular partitions, producing a new way of 
understanding materiality that can be called informational ontology (Iliadis, 2013). Such 
applied computational ontologies exert forms of power and control that affect everyday 
life yet applied computational ontologies are rarely studied outside of the domains of 
computer and information science and should be exposed to qualitative and ethical 
analysis stemming from work in fields such as Philosophy, Communication, Media 
Studies, and Science and Technology Studies. 
Critical Data Studies (CDS) is a new subfield of Science and Technology Studies 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; Dalton & Thatcher, 2014; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014), that 
focuses on the unique historical, infrastructural, methodological, epistemological, and 
ethical frameworks involved in understanding data, their structures, and data’s ensuing 
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impact on social life. This dissertation takes a CDS approach to the study of applied 
computational ontologies and the informational ontologies they produce by showing how 
a specific branch of philosophical ontology known as ontological realism directly informs 
a popular applied computational ontology called the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). I 
explain the logic and methods that contributed to the BFO’s success in becoming the 
most widely-used upper-level ontology in the world.  Through long form unstructured 
ethnographic interview data gathered from six interviews with key individuals involved 
in the creation of the BFO at the National Center for Ontological Research, I explain the 
BFO’s rise in the domain of natural science and then attend to the BFO’s ethical 
implications in the second half of the dissertation in the context of social ontology. 
Proponents of the BFO present the BFO as a purely realism-based and scientific 
ontology. I show that the BFO is applied to social contexts when it is used by entities 
such as the military and thus that the BFO is used for intelligence sharing and social 
organization and control.  
The dissertation has two parts and five chapters. The first part provides an 
overview of the relevant systems of thought and the historical and theoretical connections 
between the philosophical and scientific literature on realism-based approaches to 
ontology while the second part offers a modern empirical case study of the BFO and its 
application to the Military Ontology. I begin the dissertation by providing a theory of 
informational ontology and technologies of individuation and introduce a communication 
problem regarding semantic interoperability in computational ontology known as the 
Tower of Babel problem (Smith, 2004a; Blass, Gurevich, & Hudis, 2007) (chapter one). 
The first three chapters cover a broad spectrum of philosophical theories about ontology 
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and provides evidence of the value of one specific branch of ontology over another (the 
BFO’s realism-based ontology over concept-based ontology) (chapter two) before 
recommending a communicative approach to ontology studies by examining some of the 
main groups, institutions, individuals, and communities of practice involved in the BFO’s 
applied ontology work (chapter three). The second part offers a case study of science 
teams involved in the construction, use, and maintenance of the BFO (chapter four) and 
introduces the field of CDS to discuss the BFO’s potential ethical issues in applied social 
ontologies such as the Military Ontology (chapter five). The BFO-based Military 
Ontology project was a direct response to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction (CJCSI) entitled “Horizontal Integration (HI) of Warfighter Intelligence.” I 
show how the CJCSI’s mandate to construct the Military Ontology is an example of 
BFO’s application to social and governmental spheres, suggesting that the realism-based 
methods of the BFO should be reviewed when applied in the context of social ontology.  
Borrowing from the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon’s theory of 
individuation (2005), I describe applied computational ontologies such as the BFO as 
technologies of individuation that translate heterogeneous data to produce semantic 
interoperability, thus contributing to a reconceptualization of materiality as consisting of 
levels of informational abstraction. As technologies of individuation, applied 
computational ontologies not only re-ontologize (Floridi, 2013) reality but also produce 
new realities that have ethical consequences for social groups and individuals. 
Computational ontologies are tools that shape reality according to a new understanding of 
informational ontology and thus should be reviewed to measure their ethical impact. 
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A Definition of Ontology. Following from Husserl (1900/2001; 1901/2001), 
Ingarden (1947), Quine (1948), and Simondon (2005), I define ‘ontology’ as the 
philosophical and comprehensive study of the objects, entities, attributes, events, 
processes, relations, and structures that exist in reality and the principles through which 
they can be revealed. While there are different approaches to practicing ontology, the 
branch discussed here is tied to realism. 
A Definition of Informational Ontology. In Iliadis and Russo (forthcoming), we 
build on Smith (2004) and Floridi’s (2008a) notion of informational ontology, which we 
define as the multiple levels of informational granularity and abstraction though which 
reality is accessed and revealed. Informational ontology means that the ultimate nature of 
reality is best understood through informational structural realism (Floridi, 2011). 
General Questions. Four general questions that orient this dissertation are: Has 
ontology influenced scientific knowledge production? How have ontologies changed 
scientific practice? How has ontology changed scientific communication? Are ontologies 
a new way to communicate? 
Situated Questions. Floridi (2008a) suggests that “the ultimate nature of reality is 
informational” and can be understood through ISR. Smith and Ceusters (2010) suggest an 
ontological realism approach to applied computational ontologies as a way to process that 
informational reality. Russo and I (forthcoming) take up these issues to critically theorize 
informational ontology and computational ontologies using a CDS framework. 
Research Questions. The five research questions that inform this study are: RQ #1 
Is there a connection between philosophical ontology and computational ontology? RQ 
#2 Does Smith’s claim that ontological realism is the best way to practice ontology hold 
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up? RQ #3 Are there new types of ontologies that adopt the method of ontological 
realism? RQ #4 If there are, how are they applied and are there any ethical consequences? 
RQ #5 What might this tell us about ontology? RQ #1 is answered in chapters one and 
two, RQ #2 is answered in chapters three and four, RQ #3 is answered in chapter four, 
and RQ #4 is answered in chapter five. RQ #5 is a general research question based on the 
previous four and is answered throughout the dissertation. 
Theory-building and Methods. I use ontological theories developed by 
philosophers such as Aristotle, Husserl, Ingarden, Quine, Simondon, Smith, and Floridi 
to identify key moves in the history of ontology and to provide a critical analysis of 
ontology’s systems of thought, communities of practice, and practical application. I take 
applied computational ontologies as artifacts to help identify these changes, through the 
lens of CDS, with interviews and ethnography supplementing my analysis. Case study 
research is used to help uncover the complexity of these applied ontological issues. 
The main take home message of the dissertation is that there are ethical 
implications to applied computational ontologies for social organization and control. 
 
1.2 Philosophical and Computational Ontology 
 “Ontology” is a compound word that combines the Greek ontos (being, that which 
is) with logia (science, study, or theory). The first recorded known usage is from the 
Latin ontologia and appears in the German scholastic philosopher Rudolph Goclenius’ 
(1547-1628) Lexicon Philosophicum of 1613. Medieval scholastics like Thomas Aquinas 
(1225-1274) and Duns Scotus (1266-1308) developed works in religious philosophical 
ontology based on Aristotelian metaphysics to describe entities, attributes, and relations 
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that exist. The English philologist and lexicographer Nathan Bailey famously described 
ontology as “an Account of being in the Abstract” in An Universal Etymological English 
Dictionary (1721). Similarly, in A Fragment on Ontology (1843), Jeremy Bentham writes 
that the “field of ontology, or as it may otherwise be termed, the field of supremely 
abstract entities, is a yet untrodden labyrinth.”  
From a broad, philosophical perspective, ‘ontology’ (in philosophy ‘ontology’ is 
often treated as a singular noun whereas in computer and information science it is more 
often plural) is the study of what exists. ‘Ontology’ is sometimes conflated with 
‘metaphysics,’ a word often erroneously attributed to Aristotle (384-322 BC)—‘meta’ 
comes from the Greek word for ‘after’ and in Aristotle’s case this was meant to refer to 
his works that were anthologized after his works on physics. Aristotle referred to his 
work on the nature of ‘being qua being’ as a type of ‘first philosophy.’ Ontology remains 
an important area of philosophy and has splintered into many permutations and 
subgroups divided along various longstanding dichotomies (philosophical categories 
represented by such terms as universal and particular, substance and accident, abstract 
and concrete, essence and existence, and so forth).  
In his famous 1948 essay “On What There Is,” the American philosopher and 
logician Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) wrote: “Our acceptance of an ontology 
is, I think, similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory” (p. 35). On 
Quine’s theory, philosophical ontologies represent our closest representation for how 
‘things’ are ‘out there’ in the world by committing to the most accurate account of the 
objects, entities, events, processes, relations, and structures that exist in reality as 
identified by science. This version of philosophical ontology can be described as tied to 
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the scientific method insofar as it seeks not an explanation but rather a description of 
reality in terms of a classification of entities that is exhaustive, however Quine’s is by no 
means the only account. The relationship between philosophical ontology and 
computational ontology has received little attention by both fields and this is unfortunate 
for numerous reasons, not least of which is that philosophy contains the necessary 
conceptual tools for successful ontology engineering.  
Computational ontology is a burgeoning field that stands to revolutionize data 
organization at the intersection of a variety of disciplines, from bioinformatics 
(Bodenreider & Stevens, 2006) to management (Allen & March, 2012), military 
intelligence (Dragos, 2013) to farming (Sivamani, Bae, & Cho, 2013). In this chapter, I 
provide a theory of informational ontology (reality understood as consisting of levels of 
informational abstraction) and technologies of individuation (computational ontologies 
used to process that reality) based on the work of the French philosopher Gilbert 
Simondon (1924-1989). I show how computational ontology is historically linked to 
philosophical ontology and discuss a difficult problem in modern applied ontology 
known as the Tower of Babel problem (ToB) which concerns the difficulty of integrating 
heterogeneous datasets to produce semantic interoperability among data. I introduce a 
brand of realism-based applied ontology developed by leading ontology experts Dr. Barry 
Smith and Dr. Werner Ceusters (University at Buffalo) as a solution to ToB and defend it 
from longstanding concept-based approaches to applied ontology inherited from early 
scientific research in artificial intelligence (AI). Excerpts from long form unstructured 
interviews with ontologists is presented throughout as evidence of the ToB problem and 
potential of the realism-based applied ontology framework. 
8 
 
Ontologies are an attempt at solving ToB via the creation of formal taxonomies 
for use among disparate domains of application. There has been a widely-recognized 
need for “practical methodologies and technologies, which can assist a variety of user 
types with ontology development” (Suárez-Figueroa, Gómez-Pérez, Motta, & Gangemi, 
2012a; 2012b, p. 1). Multiple international organizations and centers have been created to 
assist in ontology engineering and the development of methods for processing disparate 
domains of data, including the European Centre for Ontological Research, the USA’s 
National Center for Ontological Research, and the Buffalo Center for Ontological 
Research. There are journals, societies, and conferences dedicated to ontology, including 
Applied Ontology: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Ontological Analysis and Conceptual 
Modeling, the International Association for Ontology and its Applications, and the 
International Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems, among others.  
Philosophical ontology asks general questions that become practically applied in 
computational ontology. Philosophical ontology questions how universals might be 
related to particulars and how events can exist which bring multiple distinct entities 
together (for example, do such events produce new ‘super’ entities?). It asks questions 
that attempt to reach further than this into the metaphysics of topics such as God and 
morality. Putting such questions aside, ontology asks questions related to how materiality 
is made up and the relations under which materiality may be constrained. It asks the most 
general and basic questions that can be asked about materiality in an attempt to, as Plato 
put it, ‘carve nature at its joins’ with the goal of offering a plain yet comprehensive thesis 
for how the world is organized. Generally speaking, there are two parts to any ontological 
project; the first concerns what entities exist and of what attributes those entities are 
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comprised while the second is concerned with the general relations that inhere to those 
entities. To complicate matters further, ontology must also give an account of things like 
holes, nothingness, or absences. Recalling the final line of Wallace Stevens’ poem “The 
Snowman” (1921): ontology must address “the nothing that is not there and the nothing 
that is.” For example, how should aortic dissection be categorized in an ontology? 
One of the main problems in starting an inquest into philosophical ontology 
concerns the meta-ontological problem of ontological commitment. To make a decision 
on what might be said to exist (or not exist) philosophers must first make some type of 
baseline ontological commitment which allows them to build their ontology from the 
ground up. An ontology must start somewhere and make a commitment to an entity or 
relation if it is to grow; to make an ontological commitment is to plant the first stake in 
the ground that will dictate what can be included in the ontology from there on out. 
Various types of ontological commitments exist among philosophers and some of them 
offer irreconcilable claims. Following Chalmers (2009), realist philosophers might 
subscribe to the commonsense notion that entities such as chairs and bridges exist (this 
can be called folk ontology) while antirealists might say that such entities strictly 
speaking do not exist and that only, say, our concepts of them do.  
In the same classic essay, Quine wrote that a theory “is committed to those and 
only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be capable of referring 
in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” (1948, p. 33). Quine’s 
highlighting of bound variables in ontological commitment is important to debates among 
philosophers and computer and information scientists in that it forces ontologists to make 
coherent decisions about what should be allowed in any given ontology using first-order 
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logic (first-order logic uses quantified variables in place of objects). The underlying 
assumption is that at bottom there must be some kind of baseline commitment to an entity 
that makes the proposed ontology’s internal logic uniformly veridical when variables 
refer to that entity. The bound ontological commitment endorsed by Quine has been 
adopted in some types of ontology engineering in the natural sciences (Oderberg, 2013) 
as it has enabled researchers to hypothesize and test theories related to naturally 
occurring entities and relations. Such researchers create concrete structures 
(computational ontologies) when attempting to model the world and in doing so they 
create what some have called a realist ontology (Weisberg, 2013) that contributes to 
scientific discovery. 
Realism-based (Smith & Ceusters, 2010) and informational (Floridi, 2011) 
ontology can be referred to as informational ontology (Iliadis, 2013). Informational 
ontology borrows from the work of philosophical ontologists such as Husserl 
(1900/2001; 1901/2001), Ingarden (1947/2013), Quine (1960), and Smith (2004a)—
philosophies that pay careful attention to various levels of informational abstraction 
according to the rules of first-order logic. Briefly, first-order logic is a type of reasoning 
involving symbols where every expression can be distilled to a subject and a predicate 
that modifies or defines the properties of the subject. Predicates in first-order logic must 
refer to a single subject and as such involve quantified variables over possibly non-
quantifiable, non-logical objects and typically do not include universals (the ontological 
realism endorsed by ontologists such as Smith does). Such informational ontologies from 
philosophy are used by scientists today to conduct research in the natural sciences. 
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1.3 Ontology as Communication 
After a philosophical ontology has been selected and before that ontological 
framework is expressed in an ontology language, researches argue and reason amongst 
themselves as they refine the ontology. This communicative middle ground is often 
overlooked in ontology research and by communication scholars or philosophers 
interested in the history of computer science; there is plenty of literature on the history of 
philosophical ontology and many volumes exist on practical computational ontologies. 
Apart from these, there is a noticeable lack of literature on what happens in-between 
these two realms in the area where actual researchers must settle on an ontological 
commitment and begin to reason and persuade each other through appeals to different 
ontological frameworks so that they may eventually agree on a standard approach that 
will be implemented. This is curious given the degree to which engineers and computer 
scientists often frame ontology problems in terms of communication problems. 
Communication problems and issues arise early in ontology-building, which should be 
treated as a communicative and open process that should be accessible to a variety of 
users.  
Ontologies provide shared vocabularies that support communication among 
agents (Jakus, Milutinović, Omerović, & Tomažič, 2013) and as knowledge 
representations ontologies provide a medium for the human expression and 
communication of datasets and infrastructures (Davis, Shrobe, & Szolovits, 1993). 
Ontologies have rarely been studied as mediums of human data communication – that is, 
not only as constructs for AI and machine learning but also as mediums for human 
communication – yet they are a means to enable one specialized knowledge group to 
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interact with another; human communication is central to the ontological enterprise in a 
way that reaches beyond technical specifications and abstract philosophical theorizing. 
Users must be able to understand the meanings produced by other humans in ontology-
building and in this ontology is partly engaged in the practice of human communication.  
As communicatively constituted organizations (McPhee & Zaug, 2000; Putnam, 
Nicotera, & McPhee, 2009; Putnam & Nicotera, 2009; 2010), ontologies are the product 
of communal deliberation, reasoning, and decision-making. Ontologies are co-constituted 
and co-constructed and must be communicatively maintained as their upkeep depends on 
groups of different editors and users. Bowker, Baker, Millerand, and Ribes (2010) 
highlight the role of such editors and users alongside technological and philosophical 
specifications since “who’s in charge of crafting the ontology remains at stake” (p. 102). 
The notion of community is central to understanding ontologies as constituted artifacts; 
ontology work involves “taking knowledge out of a closed community of practice and 
allowing for its reuse and reshaping by others in different fields” (p. 109). Ontology 
engineering is combined with background work in identifying a larger community of 
future users (p.110). On this point, there have been calls for greater collaboration between 
philosophical ontologists and computer and information scientists (Smith & Welty, 
2001). As a quintessential team science (Bozeman & Boardman, 2014), communication 
research in ontology construction should depend on talking to researchers who are 
actually involved in building ontologies. The life of ontology building involves 
ontologists who engage in daily decision-making and reasoning practices. To sufficiently 
understand ontologies as a form of communication entails looking beyond their 
technological specifications to the teams of researchers who are involved in their 
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construction and maintenance; following early works in science and technology studies 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979), attention should be placed on the interactions among 
ontologists and their communications in addition to technological and philosophical 
considerations. Ontology development is predominantly manual and laborious—though 
recent research in ontology expansion has attempted to automate this task (Pesquita & 
Couto, 2012). Full ontology automation will likely never be possible (partial ontology 
automation is a possibility) and ontologists continue to debate even minor rules and 
regulations in their ontologies, thus placing communication as central to the ontology-
building process. 
In short, ontology and communication are linked in at least three ways; ontologies 
are communicatively constituted, they facilitate and allow for data communication, and 
they change the way communication scholarship is practiced. Part of this dissertation is 
dedicated to exploring the relationship between ontology and communication, with the 
final aim of opening ontological practice up to fields outside of philosophy and science, 
including media, technology, and society. 
Craig (1999) outlines a variety of communication domaines, including the 
rhetorical, semiotic, phenomenological, cybernetic, sociopsychological, sociocultural, 
and critical. To this one might add the ontological, meaning the communicative way that 
scholars and researchers effect change in materiality by way of applied ontology practice 
and maintenance. Ontological commitment may affect issues in communication 
scholarship; take for example the notion that “commitment to a particular ontology will 
influence one’s epistemology and the attendant research methodology and protocol” 




1.4 Ontologies of Life and Death 
Imagine the following scenario.  
Bob has a family doctor named Alice. As a general practitioner, Alice examines 
Bob during his regular checkups and provides Bob with prescriptions when he is sick. 
Alice knows that Bob has been feeling nervous lately (for reasons that Bob cannot quite 
explain). After a heavy dinner and three glasses of wine, Bob begins to stammer and 
experiences a pronounced fluttering in his chest while finding it difficult to breathe. His 
wife rushes him to the emergency room. The doctors on call administer beta blockers, 
diagnose Bob with tachycardia, and send him to see an endocrinologist. Later that week, 
the endocrinologist sends Bob’s blood out for examination; the results suggest that Bob is 
suffering from acute hyperthyroidism and so the endocrinologist prescribes Bob 30mg 
each of Methimazole and Propranolol to help combat his symptoms. The first day after 
taking his new medications while he is turning in for the night, Bob again finds that he is 
unable to breath, experiences what can only be described as a falling sensation, and 
decides to call an ambulance. Once in the ambulance, the paramedics begin to take Bob’s 
information. What is Bob’s date of birth? Who is Bob’s doctor? Is Bob a smoker? What 
medications is Bob on? Does Bob have any serious medical conditions? Any allergies? 
Throughout the question and answer period Bob’s heart rate rises to 180bpm, close to the 
suggested maximum rate for his age (40). Once in the hospital (a different hospital from 
his first visit), the doctors begin to ask Bob the same questions that the paramedics asked 




Bob now has medical (and financial) records spread throughout both hospitals 
where he was admitted, the private ambulance company that drove him to the hospital, 
the commercial lab that processed Bob’s blood work, the medical center where Bob saw 
the endocrinologist, and another medical center where Bob’s family doctor, Alice, 
practices. The next time Bob visits Alice, she asks him to repeat the information that he 
learned from the other doctors and tests, since the digital files containing specialized 
information about Bob’s condition that did get sent to her office (not all of the files had in 
fact been sent) were not entirely clear to her (recall that Alice is a general practitioner).  
Bob may have been spared some time and considerable physical discomfort had the 
information generated between the various doctors and specialists existed in a single 
easy-to-use health database rather than existing in data silos each with their own unique 
terms, systems, and processes. The ambulance drivers had no previous record of Bob’s 
hyperthyroidism or the medication he was on—information that could save lives in more 
serious cases. Had Bob’s data existed (or been aggregated) in a single database, such data 
would then have to be searched according to a standardized vocabulary. For this to 
happen, the data (everything from Bob’s blood test results to Bob’s electrocardiogram) 
would need to be defined and categorized according to shared meanings and a common 
taxonomy (a scheme of classification) in a way such that everyone, from the 
endocrinologist to Alice, would be able to understand how to search for and interpret the 
data using this new representation.  
In the field of computer and information science, a hypothetical taxonomy and its 
attendant meanings, definitions, and relations is an example of a computational ontology, 
which is defined by the Italian computer scientist Nicola Guarino and colleagues 
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(Guarino  is one of the earliest practitioners of applied ontology work and a pioneer in the 
field) as a “means to formally model the structure of a system, i.e., the relevant entities 
and relations that emerge from its observation, and which are useful to our purposes” 
(Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 2009, p. 2). Ontology, then, concerns the shared meanings 
that are ascribed to particular entities, attributes, and relations. 
Ontology-building involves multiple partnerships and is a largely interdisciplinary 
endeavor (Okada & Smith, 2008). Work in applied ontology-building can involve 
philosophers who are able to logically define categories and their relationships (Smith, 
2003), as well as computer and information scientists who construct technical software 
for classification systems in fields as diverse as military intelligence (Dragos, 2013), 
bioinformatics (Bodenreider & Stevens, 2006), and management (Allen & March, 2012). 
When data are well-structured and annotated correctly, such data can be searched, 
compared, and interpreted using computational reasoning (Eisinger & Małuszynski, 
2005). In bioinformatics, ontologies such as the Gene Ontology are used to process data 
from experiments to compare multiple items such as diseases and species (Mayor & 
Robinson, 2014). In business, ontologies can be used to make data available across 
multiple departments (Michel, 2016). Ontologies include definitions and relationships 
that are logically formalized using semantics to produce greater data intelligibility 
(Heiler, 1995). Outside of specific domains, ontologies can enable better understanding 
among various and diverging research fields by allowing better data communication 
(Kallinikos, Aaltonen, & Marton, 2013). Ontology construction is now a topic of research 
in many different areas including bioinformatics (Stevens, 2013), geospatial analysis 
(Kitchin, 2014), management systems (Orozco, 2012), chemical engineering (Marquardt, 
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Morbach, Wiesner, & Yang, 2010), commerce (Fensel, 1998), judicial knowledge 
(Casellas, 2011), computer and information science (Poli, Healy, & Kameas, 2010), and 
even food (Boulos, Yassine, Shirmohammadi, Namahoot, & Brückner, 2015). 
Ontologies can reduce bureaucratic bloat (Riaño, 2009) and assist in discovery and 
innovation using Big Data (Wagner-Pacifici, Mohr, & Breiger, 2015; Kitchin & 
McArdle, 2016) while enabling better human-computer understanding across complex 
socio-technological domains (Geels, 2010); they allow for data integration and 
harmonization so data from divergent domains of application can be synthesized to 
produce new forms of knowledge (Bodenreider, 2008). Ontologies sit at the intersection 
of science and technology—it is neither science itself nor technology that explains the 
relational work of ontologies. By harnessing preexisting scientific data with 
computational sorting tools, ontologies produce new knowledge that – though not strictly 
tied to the scientific method – contributes to scientific progress in ways that did not exist 
previously (Brodaric & Gahegan, 2010). Ontologies fill in the gap that exists between 
science and technology by using technology to expand preexisting scientific data to 
produce new scientific discoveries (Bundy, 2008). To use a rather clunky metaphor, 
ontologies are like a good translator that not only translates languages instantly but also 
comes up with new compound words, neologisms that are more accurate constructs of 
words that previously existed in the original language (for example, connecting ‘after’ 
and ‘noon’ to create ‘afternoon’). Applied ontology uses methods from philosophical 
ontology to provide comprehensive and accurate representations of data that are used in 




1.5 A Theory of Informational Ontology and Technologies of Individuation 
Currently, there is little literature that considers applied ontologies as 
communicative technologies or intersecting sites of communicative and philosophical 
theorizing. I describe computational ontologies as technologies of individuation 
(Simondon, 2005) that partition reality to translate disparate data and produce 
informational cohesion and semantic interoperability (Heiler, 1995; Pileggi & Fernandez-
Llatas, 2012). In doing so, I argue that computational ontologies re-ontologize (Floridi, 
2013) reality, including elements of social reality via social ontology (Ziv & Schmid, 
2014; Gallotti & Michael, 2014) and thus that they carry ensuing ethical consequences. 
Data are metastable entities that can be interpreted, processed, and shaped according to 
various qualitative and quantitative techniques. By metastable I mean that data are never 
objective and transparent informational entities but rather are more like diamonds that 
refract light in multiple ways. Data can be processed differently depending on the 
techniques and frameworks from which the data are approached. As such, data are never 
‘raw’ (Gitelman, 2013) and should not be treated as such in ontology work. 
According to the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1924-1989), information 
exists in a state of metastability within a multi-dimensional and preindividual system 
(data are not completely transparent individual objects) where information can be seen as 
having the quality of being interoperable and indeterminate, carrying the potential to 
individuate into a variety of forms (as semantic information, environmental information, 
biological information, instructional information, and so on). Rather than stop at a 
definition of information in terms of its probabilistic transmissibility along a channel as 
given in Claude Shannon’s (1916-2001) mathematical theory of communication 
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(Simondon heavily engaged the work of early information theory and cybernetics), 
Simondon offers that information can be thought of in terms of instances where one type 
of information interacts with another in an event that produces a fundamental change in 
ontology. 
 In Individuation in Light of the Notions of Form and Information (2005), 
Simondon wrote that the notion of form must be replaced by that of information and his 
point was that arguments about dichotomies such as subject/object, realism/antirealism, 
and abstract/concrete are in some sense resolved once reality is thought of in terms of 
levels of informational abstraction. The main question that Simondon sought to solve was 
the following: How is it that entities, attributes, and relations in the world individuate? 
His answer was that it is in terms of information that agents are able to come to an 
understanding of how individual entities, attributes, and relations appear in reality. On 
this theory, doing philosophy in terms of objects and forms is outdated and Simondon 
saw this right at the beginning of the information revolution.  
According to Simondon, information does not exist in a single, homogenous 
reality—rather, it exists according to ordered levels of abstraction which can disclose 
new informational levels where entities emerge at greater or lesser degrees of granularity. 
Information either at the unit or transindividual level (transindividual in the sense of 
information’s capacity to represent multiple things at once) is understood here as not only 
deposited in a form that is given (specific, well-formed data) but instead is the potential 
communication between disparate realities that exist but which become actualized 
through information. Data are not only about entities but also represent potential 
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meanings that can arise when a discovery of individuation activates communication 
between virtually disparate dimensions that form a system of information.  
As technologies of individuation, computational ontologies translate information 
from a state of metastability to stability—by partitioning reality according to levels of 
informational abstraction, computational ontologies can constrain wildly divergent data 
according to logically coherent principles of organization, thus producing semantic 
interoperability between heterogeneous datasets. In this way, computational ontologies 
can be contrastively approached as a new form of data processing viewed as the 
integration of contrasting scientific data into semantically unified wholes. The theory of 
technologies of individuation acknowledges that even seemingly well-formed data are 
rarely static entities and that they have no unity or identity because data are never an end 
in themselves; rather, they require an individuating system. Information as data or 
message does not provide a complete picture and greater attention from communication 
researchers should be paid to technologies of individuation like computational ontologies 
where heterogeneous data are translated and new information is constituted. Simondon 
viewed information as multimodal and as something that could be exchanged not only 
between beings who are already individuated but also within systems to come that are 
productive of new individuations. On this theory, information is internally complex and 
should not be confused as consisting only of things like media signals. 
Informational ontology describes the virtual structures within which technologies 
of individuation interact to produce something that is ontologically new. Translation 
indicates the meeting of disparate informational realms and signals the beginning of the 
process of individuation—it points to the emergence of a new informational structure, 
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one that resolves a disparity between fields that come together to actively produce the 
potential that lives in matter. Translation signifies domains of potentiality that are 
represented in the interfacing of information that is inherent to their respective systems, 
unlocking and reconfiguring one another. For example, apps have altered ontology to 
produce new cartographic realities, as have global positioning systems and even the 
postal infrastructure (Bratton, 2016)—such technologies introduce layered informational 
realities that produce new ontologies. 
As technologies of individuation which carry the potential to re-ontologize 
(Floridi, 2013) reality, computational ontologies treat information not as an ideal or 
absolute entity but as inhering to materiality in such a way as between parts of a system. 
Information, rather than acting as bits within a channel, fundamentally alters the system 
itself, potentially producing new ontological realities by reconfiguring opposing realms in 
a way that resolves a contradiction. One current example of technologies of individuation 
can be found in the modern practice of annotating scientific research papers using a 
standardized ontology—a practical problem. Increasingly, publishers are investigating 
various methods to enable the tagging of scientific literature in ways designed to make 
their contents more easily searchable to computers and subsequently open to scientific 
experimentation. To maximize this potential, a single set of terms is used for tagging the 
literature in a given domain. The problem to be solved is how to select the set of terms 
(ontology) for each domain. Once such computational ontologies are introduced, they are 
the product of not only new ontological technology but also produce ontology and re-
ontologize (Floridi, 2013) scientific literature databases to produce new connections and 
potentialities that did not exist previously. When one scientific article’s data can be 
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meaningfully compared to another, such a process stands to alter understanding in the 
ontology of science. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Tagged Scientific Article (Smith, 2009) 
 
In Figure 1.1, tags include date, disease, habitat, institution, organism, person, place, 
protein, and taxon. By tagging vast quantities of domain-specific literature so, the 
ontology can produce new insights by cross-referencing the articles according to these 
new identifiers. Such ontology engineering facilitates the harmonization of data to 
produce intelligible content out of data that may not have been previously connected. 
Computational ontologies are also designed by engineers and computer scientists to aid in 
knowledge management, data integration, and decision support. For example, an 
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organization may wish to create an ontology of the classes and relations of its employees. 
Manager, packer, and security guard might represent abstract categories of employee 
class while interacts_with, cooperates_with, and backup_for might represent categories 
of relation. The main components of a computational ontology are the entities, attributes, 
and relations that cohere in a specific domain. Many organizations have data spread over 
multiple locations and databases that often lack consistency; the data remain unstructured 
and piled in data silos that are unable to interact to produce a wider scope of the domains 
in which the data are contained (Roussey, Pinet, Kang, & Corcho, 2011). The main 
function of an ontology is intelligence growth and the ability to produce a larger picture 
of organizations (in the broad sense of the word). Ontology user experience is also at the 
heart of ontology construction in that ontologies must be easy-to-use and friendly for the 
researcher who is searching through the data (Warren, Mulholland, Collins, & Motta, 
2014). Each ontologist must ask: ‘How am I to bring disparate data together to create 
intelligence across organizations for the user?’ The integrating and harmonizing of 
datasets are seen as valuable to science as basic research; combining vast quantities of 
data across disciplinary domains stands to increase knowledge growth exponentially. 
 
1.6 The Tower of Babel Problem 
Like many growing disciplines, ontology research has its own perennial problem. 
The hard problem of ontology is known as the Tower of Babel problem (Smith, 2004a; 
Blass, Gurevich, & Hudis, 2007). The Tower of Babel problem (ToB) states that each 
time a new database is constructed new terms are developed that represent an ever-
changing language thus complicating applied ontology-building, the goal of which is to 
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produce ontologies that can last over time. Sometimes a group of databases can be 
partnered in such a way that they share the same language; however, in the vast majority 
of cases databases that exist in the same domain remain effectively blocked from each 
other due to differences of taxonomy—their definitions and relations do not cohere. The 
ToB problem is what prevents scientists from realizing the full potential of ontologies; 
each new category and relation from a different domain threatens to undermine an 
ontology by virtue of the heterogeneity of the data structure. These stem from larger 
problems concerning distinctions between ontology, epistemology, and terminology. As 
John Doe (real names of interview subjects withheld to protect anonymity), a leading 
scientist involved in applied ontology-building explained to me: 
I quite often make the claim that if we want to advance science we should stop 
talking because I honestly believe that natural language currently did not evolve 
in a way that allows us to speak about reality in the way that we should speak 
because of all the discoveries that have been done. And that is not just a matter of 
adding new terms to the vocabulary. It has mainly to do with the way that when 
we hear sentences and how they are phrased grammatically that gives us already a 
bias toward interpretations, things that have clearly been demonstrated in the 
work by George Lakoff. Sometimes we fall also in that trap; sometimes I read my 
own work from five years ago and I must say that I am not sure anymore that I 
actually meant what I said (J. Doe, phone interview, September 9, 2015). 
 
Doe’s concern about the nature of language gets to the heart of the ToB problem, 
however there are also technological and philosophical issues to resolve, including the 
material constraints for language, such as when species identification changes as 
scientists learn more about genetic markers. If the goal of ontology-building is to 
eventually construct a normative hierarchy of entities, attributes, and relations through 
which human users can process and search large quantities of disparate data, how does 
the malleability of language and the transient nature of word adoption (particularly in the 
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natural sciences) enable or impede the development of applied ontology? For example, 
scientists once used the term luminiferous aether to refer to the alleged worldly medium 
that propagated light. Isaac Newton (1642-1726) suggested the existence of such an 
aether in the third book of his Opticks (1718), yet scientists no longer use the term today. 
This is not only a language problem but also a problem with the materiality that is 
theorized. Similarly, the phlogiston theory once propagated by the German alchemist and 
physician Johann Joachim Becher (1635-1682) is no longer accepted by science (we now 
know that what Becher had in mind was the process of oxidation). On an even more basic 
level, researchers simply tend to use different referencing tags and naming schemes for 
various kinds of research and data. Given these and other countless examples, how 
should scientific progress and linguistic impermanence be considered in the practice of 
applied ontology-building which (requires cohesion), and are there certain approaches to 
ontology-building that might offer more amenable solutions than others?   
One potential answer to ToB has been the linking of datasets (Heath & Bizer, 
2011) using hyperlinks; however simple links do not always work and are largely seen as 
a type of palliative measure. Linked open data is not enough since the data may be 
incompatible; a link may connect one dataset to another and allow for a connection of 
datasets but this does not grant the datasets any form of mutual intelligibility or logic 
(Hepp, 2008). The data must be organized in such a way that definitions and relations 
cohere among datasets. Links are often notoriously not well-defined and full of 
redundancies that threaten the potential productivity of data integration. While one 
database might contain links to another, unless those databases share a rigorously 
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maintained taxonomy of entities and relations such databases will be merely juxtaposed 
with one another while lacking any concrete opportunity for knowledge synthesis. 
Maintaining semantic interoperability (Heiler, 1995; Pileggi & Fernandez-Llatas, 
2012) among datasets in the face of data dispersion and the astronomical growth of new 
data via information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been recognized as a 
solution to ToB, yet it is incredibly difficult to sustain standards that constrain the 
definitions and relations of new databases. The outcome is that scientific knowledge 
growth is siphoned into different domains where data become inaccessible or 
incomparable (even with the use of a translator). While there has been an increase in 
scientific knowledge over the last century thanks to ICTs there has been a significant lack 
of progress in maintaining scientific datasets and data infrastructures in such a way that 
they remain semantically interoperable with high information quality (Floridi & Illari, 
2014). Semantic interoperability is the goal of ontology engineering; rather than allowing 
science to proliferate into largely diversified repositories of knowledge, ontology 
engineering seeks to make such repositories open to one another to produce new 
knowledge.  
The ToB problem also has to do with how a single entity, attribute, or relation is 
to be interpreted when data about said entity, attribute, or relation exists across several 
sites. Refer back to the case of Bob; information about Bob’s hyperthyroidism existed in 
multiple databases and ontologies. To Alice, Bob’s hyperthyroidism manifested as a 
symptom (his nervousness). To the endocrinologist, Bob’s hypothyroidism manifested as 
the blood test results that indicated incredibly high thyroid hormone levels. The entity in 
this case is Bob’s hyperactive thyroid and information about it has been shared across 
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various databases. Without the information from each database, it is impossible to receive 
a full picture of Bob’s hyperactive thyroid. Connecting different data points should allow 
for a fuller picture of Bob’s hyperactive thyroid, but this also says something about the 
reality of Bob’s hyperactive thyroid. There is an old philosophical joke that might clarify 
the point. A philosopher puts the following question to her friend: Two humans, a 
monkey, and a robot are looking at a piece of cheese; what is common to the 
representational processes in their visual systems? The friend replies: The cheese, of 
course! Similarly, computational ontologies as technologies of individuation try to 
recognize that mistakes or contradictions in data categorization are often attributed to a 
confusion of various levels of perspective and different vantages when attempting to 
build an ontology around entities, attributes, or relations in reality. 
A variety of approaches have attempted to solve ToB and achieve semantic 
interoperability with virtually all of them sharing in common the distinct feature of 
adopting methods from philosophy. Ontology has existed as a branch of philosophy for 
centuries and this has (perhaps not unexpectedly) produced competing views on the 
subject. If philosophical ontology is abstract, computational ontology is the practical 
application of specific varieties of abstract philosophical ontology. Much of the literature 
in computer and information science that deals with ontology engineering has long 
recognized this debt to philosophy (Zúñiga, 2001), however many do not engage the 
topic with any philosophical depth (Smith, 2004a). ToB is effectively a philosophical 
problem as well as a technological and linguistic one that forces ontologists to come up 
with a way for successfully implementing and practically applying philosophical 
ontology to computational ontology to make data structures cohere. I asked Dr. Steven 
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Thomas, one of the most influential ontologists working today (and a classically trained 
philosopher), if ontology building concerns making different data structures cohere. This 
was his response: 
I would say that the idea of making data structures cohere can be understood in 
two ways. One way is that you rebuild the data structures so that they cohere. The 
problem with that approach is that it’s expensive and it creates new errors. Every 
change can lead to a problem, because somebody makes a mistake or some 
machine isn’t programmed properly. The other way of making data structures 
cohere is to describe them in a hands-off way, using a common vocabulary. 
 
The common vocabulary raises the following problem, which is that people like 
to use their own vocabulary. If somebody comes along and they say they know 
how to build a common vocabulary, which will bring about this trick of making 
heterogeneous data structures cohere, it's a very difficult one to carry off. You 
need to know why a given common vocabulary is a better vocabulary than some 
other proposed common vocabulary. My influence has been in providing 
principles for building common vocabularies, which are tested in use very 
thoroughly, over many years now, but also which are well argued for. We have 
evidence. We have an understanding of why these principles should work. That's 
one of the reasons why I've been able to have an influence in the way that I have. 
It's not just that I know that we need a common vocabulary. It's that I also, to 
some degree anyway, know how to build a common vocabulary in a way that will 
gain acceptance. That's partly as a result of the philosophical background, but 
that's not the way to get people to accept something. If you tell them it’s 
philosophy, they will use that as a reason not to accept it (S. Thomas, phone 
interview, June 11, 2015). 
 
As another well-known scientist put it to me (J. Doe, phone interview, September 9, 
2015), we are living in a world where problems of making data compatible and 
discoverable are becoming ever more urgent. This means that the science that attempts to 
address issues relating to those problems, which many people in the computer world call 
ontology, is becoming ever more important. One of the roots of ontology in this new 
sense is certainly philosophy; the methods of doing ontology work for computer purposes 
are recognizably philosophical methods. But ontology, as it is now developing, is not a 
part of science. Rather, just as psychology grew out of philosophy in the nineteenth 
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century as an independent discipline, so too is ontology growing out of philosophy in the 
twenty-first century, becoming its own independent discipline tied to computer and 
information science.  
 
1.7 Computational Ontology and Science and Technology Studies 
The field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) has produced many volumes 
on the social, philosophical, and ethical approaches to emerging technologies 
(specifically ICTs) but has only recently engaged ontology as a theoretical and 
methodological topic of inquiry (Heur, Leydesdorff, & Wyatt, 2012; Woolgar & Lezaun, 
2013). According to Heur, Leydesdorff, and Wyatt (2012), despite this seeming 
‘ontological turn’ in STS there are actually “multiple discussions deploying the language 
of ontology” (p. 341), including three main themes which include the debate between 
constructivism and realism, discussion of ontology’s instruments and classification, and 
methodology in the social sciences and the humanities in general. In the debate between 
social constructivism (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 1987) and technological determinism 
(Dafoe, 2015), computational ontologies as technologies of individuation fall somewhere 
in-between. 
In The Cult of Information, a rarely cited STS polemic from 1986, the historian 
Theodore Roszak recalls Hans Christian Andersen’s children’s book The Emperor’s New 
Clothes. Early in the text, Roszak offers a response to what he perceives as the growing 
idolization of information: “Information has taken on the quality of the impalpable, 
invisible, but plaudit-winning silk from which the emperor's ethereal gown was 
supposedly spun.” The book is an historical overview that analyzes information as a 
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commodity. It argues that information – contrary to the claims of technology enthusiasts 
at the time – should not be perceived as a causal factor in the shaping of society. Rather, 
Roszak states that progress is “grounded in the mind's astonishing capacity to create 
beyond what it intends, beyond what it can foresee.” The Cult of Information’s early 
critique of ICTs and emphasis on their social dimension foreshadowed the trenchant 
critiques of technology that were to come in the next decade. It also showed, avant la 
lettre, that something called “the social construction of technology” (SCOT) as an 
academic theory was on the horizon (a Google Ngram search shows use of the term 
skyrocketing in the late 80s and 90s). 
That same year, Langdon Winner published his monumental The Whale and the 
Reactor (1986), which collected many of the celebrated philosopher’s essays on 
technology and politics. A year later saw the publication of what would become one of 
the key surveys of this emerging field – The Social Construction of Technological 
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (1987) – along with 
a deluge of social constructivist texts on technology in the intervening years. Roszak’s 
book about information fits squarely into this SCOT tradition. The main underlying 
assumption of SCOT is that technology is socially embedded and thus that it follows the 
path of human decisions. A classic example of SCOT can be found in Bijker’s research 
on the bicycle and the variety of socially related uses it has had throughout history (the 
penny-farthing was used by young, rich men to display physical prowess and provide a 
thrill). SCOT, in turn, grew as a reaction to technological determinism (TD), a 
reductionist view of technology that sees technology as shaping the path of human beliefs 
and culture. A good example of TD can be found in Lynne White’s famously 
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controversial claim, in Medieval Technology and Social Change (1966), that the 
invention of the stirrup effectively ‘caused’ feudalism. Similar TD claims can be found in 
Beniger’s (1989) detailed account of how information spurred a new technology 
revolution in the twentieth century and Friedel’s (2007) history of technology as cultural 
improvement. 
Both the SCOT and TD theories are available in strong and weak varieties and 
both have their critics. Williams and Edge (1996) argue that many researchers “are united 
by an insistence that the ‘black-box’ of technology must be opened, to allow the socio-
economic patterns embedded in both the content of technologies and the processes of 
innovation to be exposed and analyzed.” Conversely, critics of this tradition have 
included Winner, who has stated that technologies have their own “politics” and “forms 
of life.” He has also criticized the fact that SCOT offers “no judgment on what it all 
means, other than to notice that some technological projects succeed and others fail, that 
new forms of power arise and other forms decline.” Books have been published about 
information in both the TD and SCOT traditions. How computational ontologies as 
technologies of individuation are to be situated in the debate is not clear, specifically 
when compounded by ethical questions. Computational ontologies are both socially 
constructed and depend on previously existing scientific data and technological 
lifeworlds (Winner, 1986/1988; Ihde, 1990). How, then, do they fit into contemporary 
TD/SCOT debates? 
Whether or not computational ontology suits a TD or SCOT view of the world is 
likely a futile exercise. Since ICTs and emerging media like computational ontologies are 
interdisciplinary and social technologies, the TD/SCOT views are perhaps ill-equipped to 
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parse through the changes that such technologies bring. If anything, such technologies are 
surely not entirely deterministic entities; they require the social to be put to use. On the 
other hand, such technologies are developing at an exponential rate, and more and more 
fields today seem to be plugging in to the Ontology of Things. Technologies bend and are 
shaped by human choices and decisions that are made every day, yet the distinction 
between what Aristotle called epistêmê (knowledge) and technê (craft) might not be as 
clear as it seems and they are likely two sides of the same coin. Contrary to most 
historically important STS studies, the important question that should be asked is not a 
causal one about whether computational ontologies are technologically deterministic or 
socially shaped but rather a much more pragmatic one about whether or not the changes 
that are produced by computational ontologies as technologies of individuation are 
positive or negative ones. The scientific consensus seems to be that computational 
ontologies are inherently positive technologies that foster scientific collaboration (one 
ontologist I spoke to said that he could not think of a single ethical problem related to 
computational ontology), but it is not at all clear that this is the case.  
A Google Ngram search for the word “ontology” shows that use of the term 
increased steadily in the 1950s and skyrocketed after the 1980s (Figure 1.2). “Ontology” 
was used intermittently in early conversations about AI, information theory, and 
computer science (McCarthy, 1980) but it was in the early 90s with the publication of a 
series of papers by Thomas Gruber (1991, 1992, 1993, 1995) that ontology spread as a 
popular term for achieving semantic interoperability among databases predicated on first-
order logic. Previously, terms such as ‘knowledge engineering’ and ‘knowledge 
representation’ were used to describe the work of data integration. In his entry for 
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“Ontology” in the Encyclopedia of Database Systems (2009), Gruber writes that “in 
practice, the languages of ontologies are closer in expressive power to first-order logic 
than languages used to model databases” (p. 1963). The languages used to model 
databases and query them are indeed important to ontology yet what Gruber calls 
attention to is the purely philosophical first step of ontology construction and how this 
step must occur before applying the ontology to technological systems, or what amounts 




Figure 1.2 Google Ngram Search Results for “Ontology” 
 
An ontological commitment to some entity, attribute, or relation is typically a first-order 
logic combined with a specified domain of discourse on top of which quantified variables 
range (recall Quine’s bound variables). Once this has been achieved, ontology 
representation languages (ORL) are constructed, which can be seen as the practical 
application of first-order logics using technological vocabularies; these include 
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description logics (knowledge representation languages) such as F-logic, “a formalism 
that integrates logic with object-oriented programming in a clean and declarative fashion” 
(Kifer, 2005, p. 22), the Resource Description Framework (RDF), a representation system 
for sharing knowledge and data on the web, and more expressive ORLs such as the 
widely-used Web Ontology Language (OWL) and Dublin Core. 
Ontology engineering also requires the use of specific methodologies that are 
relatable to software engineering given that both involve the use of diverse data in 
distributed settings; one such methodology is Distributed Engineering of Ontologies 
(DILIGENT) which seeks to avoid the problem of peer-to-peer systems being 
inadequately supported by a centralized ontology by supporting “domain experts in a 
distributed setting to engineer and evolve ontologies” (Pinto, Staab, Tempich, & Sure, 
2006). There are tools such as Formal Concept Analysis and OntoClean which help 
ontologists grandfather old ontologies into new ones, as well as methods for designing, 
learning, and evaluating ontologies. There are the computational ontologies themselves, 
entities such as the popular Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive 
Engineering (DOLCE), Core Ontology for Multimedia Annotation (COMM), and 
Process Specification Language (PSL). Lastly, there are upper level ontologies which can 
be considered ontologies of ontologies; the most widely used upper level ontology is the 
BFO. BFO is one of the most successful ontologies in the world and its creator, Smith, is 
a professionally trained philosopher.  
 Ontologies need infrastructures to sustain themselves and the scalability of 
ontology engineering is important for international ontology growth in multiple domains. 
Managing multiple ontologies in indexes has become a key area of research to enable the 
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easy searching and reuse of ontologies. Ontology repositories such as the Open 
Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry provide tools for supporting such 
searching and reuse. The OBO Foundry is the world’s largest cohesive ontology 
repository and is organized using BFO principles. Ontology infrastructures like the BFO 
are rarely studied, yet as data infrastructures that enable scientific research they are 
central to the communication of some of the world’s most advanced scientific data. 
Ontology infrastructures are data assemblages that can be analyzed at various levels of 
abstraction (Floridi, 2011) and thus necessitate a mixed methods approach to capture the 
multiple perspectives from which scientific data infrastructures can be viewed, including 
technical, personal, and ethical dimensions.  
Technologies of individuation have the ability to re-ontologize the world. While 
not entirely in line with the SCOT approach to technological development, technologies 
of individuation are not fully deterministic and are often used according to the will of 
powerful institutions that control them (increasingly, intelligence agencies). On the other 
hand, as computational ontology research progresses, it will be important to pay attention 
to how computational ontologies engender more or less political attitudes among the 
groups who use them—and what the presence and absence of such articulated politics 
means. Data that are manipulated by technologies of individuation are not only unique 
theoretical objects that can furnish new scientific understanding; they can open profound 
philosophical and ethical questions that deserve to be asked. Computational ontologies 
change ontological understanding of the world by defining what that world is made up of. 
In doing so, scientific discovery should not trump political justice and data science should 
not put progress over people. What, for example, to make of the Military Ontology and 
36 
 
similar intelligence ontology projects that are being carried out to individuate the reality 
of war (and the individuals involved) into computationally processed entities? I reserve 
such ethical questions for the final section of this dissertation. Sidestepping decades-old 
debates between constructivism/realism and ontological methodologies in the humanities, 
my intention is to focus on the logic, instruments, groups, institutions, science, and 
classification of computational ontology. In doing so, I foreground the philosophical, 
historical, social, instrumental, and material dimensions involved in the making of 
computational ontologies as technologies of individuation to reach some of their more 
ethical consequences (Hacking, 1983; Haraway, 1991; Latour, 1988). 
 
1.8 Informational Ontology as a Realism of Relations 
Gruber (1995) is credited with defining an ontology as an “explicit specification of 
a conceptualization” (p. 908) and today this remains the most popular definition for what 
a computational ontology is. The first step towards achieving semantic interoperability 
between datasets is achieved through ontology builders coming to agreement on shared 
conceptualizations for entities, attributes, or relations and the second step involves 
specifying the data according to these shared conceptualizations (Gruber’s simple and 
widely-used definition gets at the heart of this process). Concepts have by and large been 






Figure 1.3 Ontology as a Specification of a Conceptualization (Guarino, 1998a) 
 
In his introduction to the proceedings of the first international conference on Formal 
Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS), the Italian engineer and ontology pioneer 
Nicola Guarino (1998a, 1998b) indicates that the word conceptualization should be 
borrowed from AI and used to indicate the philosophical notion of meaning so that two 
ontologies can be different in vocabulary while maintaining a commitment to the same 
entity (Figure 1.3). On Guarino’s interpretation, that conceptualization is meant to be 
language-independent is trivial (English and French words can share the same referent), 
yet the term raises problems with respect to the arbitrary nature of its claim on the reality 
or non-reality of entities. A shared conceptualization in the applied ontology sense 
implies something that originates by method of an arbitrary choice independent of reality, 
but such criteria would not be strong enough when attempting to build ontologies for use 
in the natural sciences which demand that ontologies represent scientific laws and 
structures accurately as they exist in reality and pointing to specific referents. A 
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commitment to concepts in ontology-building can lead to a number of infelicities arising 
from a lack of commitment to real entities. Concepts can change at any time given group 
consensus and suggest a shared arbitrary choice while a realism-based approach leans on 
the permanence and reality of scientific theories; realism-based approaches attempt to 
accurately describe entities to establish regulatory permanence and longevity across 
diverse datasets—such is the value of an applied ontology. 
Building on the work of ontological realists involved in the practice of applied 
ontology-making, I argue that realism-based ontologies offer a better solution to ToB in 
place of concept-based ontologies while emphasizing the important role of information in 
such realism-based approaches. For example, information can exist as reality, for reality, 
and about reality (Floridi, 2011)—distinctions that matter when attempting to label 
artifacts represented by data. A crude example might help to elucidate this point. Blog 
posts are often indexed via the use of tagging mechanisms to create a folksonomy. A blog 
may host many posts that are organized according to conceptual tags; a post containing a 
picture of a dog jumping into a lake can be tagged with such common nouns as picture, 
dog, lake, etc. But the picture can also be tagged as 45332249, Rex jumping, excited by a 
bee sting, or catching fish. Posts are given names and categorized according to the 
individual users who upload them (though other users may upload photographs using 
preexisting tags if they wish). Of course, there are many photos that align nicely into 
categories; millions of posts use the label cat or Thanksgiving to label their photographs. 
However, there are also countless posts and photos that are labeled conceptually and in 
many cases these make no sense to other users. One user may upload a photograph of 
their high school and label it nightmare. Now, that poor individual’s high school may 
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well have been a nightmare for them, however for the purposes of rigorous scientific 
categorization such a concept-based taxonomy does not suffice.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Example of Referent Tracking Confusion (Ceusters, 2015) 
 
Tagging photographs online may seem trivial when making a case for a realism-based 
approach to applied ontology-building, yet the importance of correctly identifying 
features of reality is extremely important in the natural sciences. The practice of referent 
tracking – the goal of which is to “create an ever-growing pool of data relating to the 
entities existing in concrete spatiotemporal reality” (Ceusters & Smith, 2007) – in the 
health sciences works the same way as standard tags that are used online; scientists must 
come up with ways to track certain entities over time and space with the eventual aim of 
including these entities in a shared ontology. Representing reality is not easy, as noted 
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with genetic markers as the ontological space for species identification versus 
morphological features that were once used—both are material. Ceusters (2015) shows a 
standard form used by doctors in medical settings with a check box that has the words 
“Mark diagnosis as chronic” next to it; he then asks if there are chronic diagnoses or if it 
is diseases that are chronic (Figure 1.4). Further complicating the matter are electronic 
records such as x-ray and scan images, receipts, prescriptions, patient information forms, 
etc. Such seemingly trivial errors in specification in these areas can lead to huge 
problems when it comes to sharing data between databases and among various users.  
Computational ontologists generally hold that concepts make up ontologies for 
knowledge representation, yet the term ‘concept’ is not often well-defined by ontology 
engineers in computer and information science. Though many agree that concepts are the 
product of human cognition, there is some disagreement about how this applies to the 
realm of ontology building. Following Smith (2004b), I defend the notion that ontologies 
developed for scientific research should be “understood as having as their subject matter, 
not concepts, but rather the universals and particulars which exist in reality and are 
captured in scientific laws” (p. 73). Simply put, such scientific laws represent reality as 
captured in universals. Such a realism-based approach to ontology construction yields 
rigorous formal axioms to describe the relations and entities that exist in many influential 
ontologies. Against such a view, Smith suggests that proponents of various types of 
idealism might argue that (a) there is ultimately no objective reality to which concepts 
might correspond, (b) we can never know objective reality so there is no point in trying to 
establish correspondence, and (c) reality is nothing more than concepts. 
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In much of the scientific literature, the conceptual/idealist position prevails. However, it 
can easily be shown that the reason for this is the fact that such endorsements do not take 
into consideration levels of abstraction, the distinctions that are available after 
considering time/space, and the differences between entities and relations in reality or 
names, concepts, or descriptions in terms of language. Take the following example from 
Smith, the staunchest defender of ontological realism. In linguistics, the assertion is_a is 
an assertion about meaning. A sentence such as lytic vacuole is_a vacuole (vacuoles are 
bubbles in cells) is not an assertion about lytic vacuoles; rather it is an assertion about 
language use. It tells us that the meaning associated with the name lytic vacuole is 
narrower or more specific than the meaning associated with the name vacuole by this or 
that group of subjects (2004b).  
Smith claims that there is a certain way in which linguistic and syntactic 
mechanisms at work in ontologies lead ontology engineers into thinking that they are 
talking about separate concepts when in reality they are talking about specific linguistic 
levels or types/sets of syntactic organization. The linguistic or syntactic element however 
does not constitute a separate concept tied to a real entity (this might explain the 
confusion that all entities must be referred to as concepts since there are different ways of 
referring to entities). This does not mean that entities do not exist. The fallacy lies in 
suggesting that there is no entity or only concepts given that, on the conceptualist’s 
theory, everything can be reduced to concepts; however most concepts can be attributed 
to linguistic, syntactic, informational errors of leveling. In engineering there is a similar 
confusion; when engineers speak of conceptual modeling they often think that they are 
offering only data or information about an entity and that is all. But upon closer 
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inspection the actual practice of modeling involves building models of reality once a 
specific ontological commitment has been made and a certain level of informational 
abstraction has been adopted. Once this happens, modeling does not only represent a 
concept or mere data or information—the model makes a claim on a part of reality and 
thus changes it (think of DNA sequencing).  
Ontologies as representative models of reality do work in the world. Yet many 
practicing ontologists still believe that concepts provide the content of ontologies. 
Ontologies are generative artifacts that facilitate knowledge synthesis via the practice of 
semantic interoperability but require real referents. One ontologist explained this to me 
using the following example. In linguistics, theories and definitions have been developed 
that treat the basis of terminology as consisting of concepts. On these terms, most of the 
things we talk about are concepts; concepts are everything and anything that is 
conceivable. Thinking of ontology in the same terms, he says, is a mistake: 
Ontologies should not contain what is conceivable. They should contain what 
existed or has not existed. Now, the fact that you can conceive of something or 
that people can conceive of something; that should go in an ontology. So ‘people 
who believe in the devil,’ you can say in one way or another, that’s an acceptable 
defined class in a realism-based ontology, but ‘devil’ itself should not be there (J. 
Doe, phone interview, September 9, 2015). 
 
This distinction regarding treating concepts as the either the content of ontologies or as 
the ideas that individuals have (which can be realistically represented in an ontology) is 
important in that it helps to identify mistakes in ontology categorization. It also points to 
the importance of stressing uniform realism in ontologies that must integrate divergent 
datasets. Popular description logics that have been used in ontology engineering since the 
1990s (a family of formal knowledge representation languages) and similar tools are 
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good in detecting logical inconsistencies in representations. They are able to do 
classifications and then show when the system comes up with a certain classification and 
whether it is an intended model or not. Yet, such logics still allow assertions about 
generic reality that are actually not true. There is no description logic that is able to tell 
that there are no unicorns or that unicorns are not horses with one horn on their 
foreheads. Such terms can be included in description logic, which has always been 
understood as being concept-based. The advantage of ontological realism, according to 
an ontologist I spoke to, “is that you do not look through the glasses of language or the 
glasses of concepts to see what is there. But you try to purely reason in first-order reality 
itself, or what should be there if such and such is the case.” They continued: 
Of course you can't do that without observation and without interpretation. For 
that reason it’s extremely important that you keep a distinction between what 
information and assertions are and how they are formed. How do you relate them 
to what they are information about? That has been the constant search that I have 
been doing (J. Doe, phone interview, September 9, 2015).  
 
Concepts, the ontologist held, are not accurate reflections of the information that data are 
supposed to be about. To come to a more accurate representation of entities in reality, 
ontologies require informational accuracy about real entities. Another ontologist echoes a 
similar sentiment:  
There are two schools of thought in ontology, simplifying a lot. One school says 
we can build ontologies using pattern recognition applied to free text or applied to 
word lists. The other school says that we have to build ontologies by using 
principles and by manual effort, largely. I belong very firmly to the second school 
of thought, and if I'm challenged I can demonstrate that the manually and 
theoretically, soundly built ontologies are still way better than those ontologies 





The traditional way of doing ontology work using description logics and machine 
learning is largely the product of the conceptualist way of thinking about language and 
ontology and has prevailed since the 1990s. The realism-based efforts of ontologists such 
as Ceusters and Smith revolutionizes the field of applied ontology by treating 
computational ontologies as technologies of individuation that restrain what can be 
referred to in an ontology to manually construct ontologies that are logically sound and 
based on universal structures.  
The practice of applied ontology-building necessitates the careful consideration of 
levels of informational abstraction. As a standard philosophical principle, levelism has 
enjoyed a long and fruitful career (Poli, 2001); the notion of thinking in terms of different 
levels has existed since antiquity, for example in Pyrrho and the beginning of skepticism 
or Plotinus and the Neoplatonic synthesis. Today, types of levelism are used in the study 
of AI and computer science, often with special attention paid to the modeling of these 
structures from a variety of perspectives. Floridi is one thinker in a small group that is 
leading this effort with his own unique brand of epistemological levelism. Levelism has 
become a useful conceptual tool to help clear up thinking about complex technological 
problems like ontology-building. Understood as a methodology, Floridi provides a 
comprehensive account of what he calls the method of levels of abstraction (LoA) that 
can be used in the analysis and design of ontologies. Distinguishing three general types of 
data, including information as reality, information for reality, and information about 
reality, Floridi offers that the method of LoA can clarify some of the inconsistencies that 
arise in ontology work. 
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Informational ontology is a realtional ontology that does not suffer from abstract 
conceptualizations and is predicated instead on the relations that obtain between real 
objects as they are informationally represented according to scientific laws. It follows the 
notion that ontologies are not merely concepts of entities, attributes, and relations but that 
an ontology is a representation of real objects or relations according to accurate 
knowledge produced by scientific laws and the scientific method. The worry in ontology-
building should be that information about entities, attributes, and relations be treated 
accurately as really existing relational entities themselves (what Floridi has called 
informational objects) and that these informational entities can be acted upon to produce 
more accurate applied ontologies. A version of this philosophical thesis has been called 
informational structural realism (Floridi, 2008a) and it is the philosophy that informs the 
realism-based ontology in this dissertation. By endorsing informational structural realism 
(ISR), ontology can bypass philosophical dead ends about realism or antirealism of 
entities, attributes, and relations to focus more closely on the differences that occur when 
adopting a specific level of informational abstraction to model reality. In this way, 
ontology engineering can be refined according to strict informational criteria concerning 
what might be admissible in an ontology. In the same way that better semantic constraints 
on an ontology make for greater semantic interoperability across ontologies, 
understanding ontologies as constrained levels of abstraction (LoA) allows for them to be 
seen as representing multiple levels of reality that do not exclude one another. These 
constraints actually act as constraining affordances; by semantically constraining 
ontologies at different LoAs, researchers can begin the task of solving the ToB problem 
by integrating cohesive datasets. 
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ISR offers a modern solution to longstanding realism versus antirealism debates 
by arguing in favor of a version of structural realism (Chakravartty, 2007) where 
structures are understood as informational since it is by adopting a level of informational 
abstraction that we interact with the world. At bottom, ISR states that a theory commits 
itself ontologically by adopting a specific LoA. Applying a LoA commits a theory to a 
particular model of a system; by adopting a LoA, the theory decides (much in the same 
way as Quine’s ontological commitment) what kinds of observables should be included 
in the model. Here, one can understand an applied ontology as a type of model that is 
generated by a LoA for the purposes of identifying a structure that is attributed to a 
system in reality. Floridi (2011) has offered the best formulation of this in his SLMS 
scheme (Figure 1.5). The LoA method informs realism-based computational ontology. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Floridi’s SLMS Scheme with Ontological Commitment (2008b, 2011) 
 
LoAs suggest a realism of relations (Santos, 2015) in that they treat a minimal 
commitment to a real entity and the ensuing theory about that entity as a real relational 
structure that can then be added to using multiple additional levels of abstraction. To use 
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another crude metaphor, one can think of LoAs in terms of a needle that weaves a thread 
through a piece of fabric. If the fabric represents reality, the first time the needle pierces 
the fabric and is pulled through until the thread’s knot catches can be seen as the first 
level of minimal ontological commitment that “grounds” the thread, with each 
subsequent piercing or weave representing another level of abstraction.  Cut the section 
near the initial thread from its knot and the structure is destroyed (think of when you find 
a loose thread in a piece of clothing and pull on it, thus ruining the garment). Such an 
understanding of ontological commitment requires viewing the ontology as consisting of 
real and relational entities. The language of concepts does not fit the types of ontological 
commitment that can be described using a LoA approach since LoAs are based on some 
minimally restraining entity that is committed to that must actually exist. From there, the 
ontology can be built up with greater levels of second and third order ontological 
commitments (and can indeed then include things such as concepts as when we say that a 
person has “an idea” of something) at more abstract levels of granularity, but these are 
always based on some commitment to a real entity that grounds the multiple layers of 
informational abstractions. To emphasize this point, Floridi provides a diagram (Figure 





Figure 1.6 Floridi’s SLMS Scheme with Ordered Ontological Commitment (2011) 
 
The benefit of this approach shows that there must be some commitment to a real entity 
before abstracting to greater LoAs that provide views of greater of lesser levels of 
granularity while also showing that entities do not have to exist at the exclusion of other 
entities. A LoA acts as a transparent partition of a single reality (Figure 1.7).  For 
example, a folk biology (remembering that folk merely implies some acknowledgement 
of regular things that actually exist) might dictate that there are such things as animals 
which include such things as fish or that there are animals which include such things as 
birds which include such things as canaries. There is also such a thing as DNA. 
Philosophers often enjoy arguing which one is more “real” than the other (the canary or 
the DNA) however if we view such categories as transparent partitions that exist in 
reality (LoAs) then we can observe, in a grid-like fashion, that by zooming in or out we 
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do not need to eliminate any of these entities in favor of another, as long as they are 
grounded in reality and adhere to universal laws and definitions of science.  
 
 
Figure 1.7 Transparent Partitions of One and the Same Reality (Smith, 2009) 
 
Ontologies are rarely prefaced by an adjective unless that adjective describes what is 
contained in the ontology (gene ontology, blood ontology, etc.). By referring to 
informational ontology I mean to signify the particular way of doing ontology work that 
follows a LoA approach, one that is based on ISR. Such realism-based ontology has a 
long history (dating back to Aristotle) and versions of ontological realism have been 
refined by various philosophers before being instantiated by scientists and engineers in 
applied computational ontology. Some of the most successful ontology projects in the 
world adhere to a strict realism program (Smith et al., 2007). 
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 The revolution currently underway in applied ontology work is associated with 
ontological realism and the work of ontologists such as Smith and Ceusters and the 
advancement of this position is important for expanding clarity in the field of applied 
computational ontology work, including how it is taken up by qualitative researchers, 
however it also necessitates an analysis of the ethical consequences of such a realism-
based method. Any new technology that claims to be based on realism with the power to 
alter what counts as real needs to be ethically analyzed, especially if those technologies 
interact with data concerning humans and their environments. Further, as technologies of 
individuation, computational ontologies are the product of diverse teams and researchers 
who build them and thus exert forms of influence, power, and control over other social 
groups. As such, a critical analysis of computational ontology should include analysis of 
the histories of the groups and individuals involved in building the ontology. Doing this 
entails interviewing the individuals responsible for ontological realism and its method 
while also laying bare its institutions, groups, and organizations that have historically 
contributed to the development of the realism-based method. 
 
1.9 Method and Framework 
 Ontological realism is important to work in the advancement of interdisciplinary 
scientific research. As such, applied computational ontologies that use the method of 
ontological realism should be open to qualitative, critical, and ethical, studies on the 
impact of ontology on people and their social lives. Following approaches taken in 
science studies, including studies in Science, Technology, and Society, Science 
Communication, Rhetoric of Science, Critical Data Studies, and allied fields, this 
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dissertation includes elements of philosophical theorizing, communication studies, and 
ethnographic fieldwork. Six ontologists involved in ontology research at the National 
Center for Ontological Research were interviewed over an internet telephone for one 
hour. The interviews were conducted using Skype and recorded using recorded using 
CallGraph Skype Recorder for Windows. The interviews were then anonymized and 
transcribed using CastingWords. Names of interview subjects have been changed to 
protect anonymity. The series of twenty-one interview questions is located in Appendix 
A. Each interviewee was asked whether or not they viewed ontology as a communication 
problem—virtually all replied in the affirmative. Some of the questions asked during 
these unstructured long form interviews were: How is applied ontology practiced? How 
do philosophers contribute to building applied ontology frameworks? Why are some 
computational ontologies preferred over others? Each of the interviews was conducted 
with the aim of understanding more about how philosophical ontology informs scientific 
ontology; they also provided a firsthand account of the history of scientific ontology 
engineering, including the names, places, and technologies that have contributed to these 
fields. As such, the dissertation follows a mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2013) 
utilizing a primary mixture of ethnography (Fetterman, 2009) and digital methods 
(Rogers, 2013). I conduct an ethnography of the BFO as a relational and ecological 
infrastructure (Star, 1999) via thick description (Geertz, 1973) and long form interviews 
(Weiss, 1995) with scientists and philosophers involved in the ontology-building process 
and utilize archival research methods (Ramsey, Sharer, L’Eplattenier, Mastrangelo, 2009; 




CHAPTER 2. PHILOSOPHICAL ONTOLOGY 
2.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents a variety of historical philosophies of ontology that feature 
significantly in modern applied ontology research, specifically in the BFO. It offers some 
background on early scientific researchers who had interests in philosophy, explains how 
Aristotle’s categories, Husserl’s formal ontology, and Ingarden’s ontology of time are 
relevant to some of the applied ontologists I interviewed, and shows why applied 
ontology should embrace the realism-based method. The main purpose is to show how 
ontological realism in applied computational ontology grew out of a specific branch of 
philosophy to help reframe the way that applies ontology work was being conducted in 
computer and information science. The philosophical theories presented here set the stage 
for the analysis of the BFO that is presented in the fourth chapter. 
 
2.2 Philosophy’s Influence on Applied Ontology 
Today there are numerous calls for more participation by philosophers in 
ontology engineering; Merrill (2011) encourages philosophers to work with scientists to 
combine the practices of philosophical and scientific ontology. He proposes a strong 
participation model where applied ontology is not passively appropriated from classic
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philosophical texts but rather actively discussed between philosophers and scientists so 
that contemporary philosophers can contribute to modern scientific methods while also 
progressing philosophy by adapting philosophical methods according to new scientific 
discoveries. Merrill envisions this interaction between philosophers and scientists as a 
mutually beneficial relation where trained philosophical ontologists ensure that scientific 
ontology engineering is both adequate and correct by checking it against formal 
philosophical logic while learning about advances in science. There are a number of 
practicing philosophers who might advocate the notion that modern philosophy should 
concern itself with applied ontology, including philosophers such as Smith, Luciano 
Floridi, Brian Cantwell Smith, Robert Arp, and Andrew Spear, some of whom are 
currently engaged in the practice of assisting with ontological engineering (Smith, 1996; 
Floridi, 2011; Arp, Smith, & Spear, 2015). 
After asking an ontologist about the distinction of ontology in philosophy and 
computing, I followed up by seeing if they could provide me with the names of other 
philosophers who he could think of as having been similarly involved in philosophical 
and computational ontology. They explained to me that ontology-building is an 
amazingly promising opportunity for philosophers to do new and interesting work (which 
was also well paid work) with a lot of social relevance. However, one of their biggest 
disappointments has been the degree to which few contemporary philosophers have taken 
a practical and real interest in applied ontology. There are philosophers who are disposed 
in a friendly manner towards applied ontology work but there are few who actually do it. 
Probably the most famous applied ontologist who has ties to philosophy is Patrick Hayes. 
Hayes, who has a PhD in philosophy, worked as a philosopher for a brief period but then 
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became a computer scientist specializing in AI. He is now one of the leaders in ontology-
based logic work in computer science after spending a long career considering 
philosophical problems from the standpoint of AI (Hayes & McCarthy, 1969). The 
ontologist went on to say that many of their students have positions now in industry or 
government and that they are still doing work which is related to the work they did when 
they were studying philosophy, but that they do not think of themselves as philosophers. I 
asked an ontologist about what makes for a good ontologist. This was their answer: 
I wish I knew the recipe for creating a good ontology creator. I tried various 
strategies. One strategy is to train philosophers, and I've been successful in that, 
but not in every case. The scenario which often happens is I train a philosopher to 
become an ontologist, but the philosopher still wants to be a philosopher, and they 
don't want to do this applied work, because it doesn't have the cache of doing 
“real” philosophy. Still, I have had success in training philosophers to become 
ontologists. The majority of the people who are doing good ontology work, or 
what I see as good ontology work within my orbit, are people who are at the 
fringes of science and computing. They are scientists who use computers a lot in 
their scientific work, and who see the need for ontology, and who have... They're 
able to use their computational skills, and their scientific knowledge, in order to 
build good ontologies. They are the two primary groups. There are some other 
kinds of people who are very successful at building ontologies, but they are the 
two primary groups (S. Thomas, phone interview, June 11, 2015). 
 
Philosophers and scientists who understand the importance of computation for 
developing new scientific techniques tend to be the best ontologists. Such philosophers 
must have a thorough grounding in philosophical ontology and its relation to natural 
science.  
 The ontologies of philosophers such as Aristotle, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), 
and Roman Ingarden (1893-1970) are in some sense comparable to the scientific 
taxonomies proposed by figures such as Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) in biology and John 
Dalton (1766-1844) in chemistry, though they are much more general and abstract in 
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nature. Some philosophers are realists about universals, transcending labels such as 
substantialist (the notion that there is some sort of substantial material reality underlying 
all things) and fluxist (the notion that reality is in essence comprised of flux) in favor of 
the realism of categories of such things like objects, events, and processes. The biologist 
Joseph Henry Woodger (1894-1981) contributed to the beginnings of a realism-based 
approach to applied ontology work in biology. Woodger was a biologist but he also had 
interests in philosophy; he translated the work of Alfred Tarski (1901-1983), specifically 
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (1956), a collection of Tarski’s work from the years 
1923 to 1938. It is through this translation work that Woodger is primarily known to 
philosophers but he actually wrote books on the ontology of medicine. Woodger’s key 
contribution to founding the field of biological ontology came in the form of his 1937 
book The Axiomatic Method in Biology; in it he applied logical axioms from 
Whitehead’s and Bertrand Russell's (1872-1970) Principia Mathematica to medicine and 
biology. One ontologist told me that Woodger was already in the 1930s doing what they 
were doing now; using philosophical logic to represent reality in ways which were 
supposed to be practically useful (Woodger was not necessarily an influence on all 
ontology work as some ontologists described to me that they had discovered him well 
after they had already started down the path of applied ontology).  
Through the discipline of history of philosophy it has become increasingly 
apparent that good work in philosophical ontology has been conducted in Austria, 
Hungary, and Poland. Philosophers in these countries have contributed to philosophical 
ontology yet some of their works in that tradition were not taken up by philosophers at 
large due to a general preferred focus in the twentieth century on interests related to 
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either the phenomenological or the existentialist tradition, or by a rather narrow 
language-focused analytic philosophy. One ontologist told me that the work being done 
in those regions was a way of doing philosophy of real problems, a real-world focused 
philosophy (as much continental philosophy is), but one that still had an analytic rigor. It 
was a combination of the two. For example, the inventor of speech act theory was a 
student of Husserl by the name of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917). Smith spent time working 
on Reinach and eventually became interested in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) because of the connections between Wittgenstein 
and Reinach's theory of states of affairs presented in Die apriorischen Grundlagen des 
bürgerlichen Rechtes (1913). In the period towards the end of the twentieth century, 
Smith saw that some of his work on ontology was being used by computer scientists, 
particularly in Italy, which was and still is a center on applied ontological research. Yet, 
computer and information scientists largely ignore the history of philosophical ontology, 
often preferring instead to include a brief reference concerning their indebtedness to 
Aristotle. The scientists I spoke to, some of them securing millions upon millions of 
dollars in research grants and funding, explained to me that the level of indebtedness to 
philosophical ontology goes much further, through Aristotle and up to figures of 
twentieth century philosophy—particularly Husserl, and Ingarden. Concepts such as 
universals and particulars, formal ontology, ontological commitment, and ontological 
realism – terms used in much of the applied ontology work that is being carried out today 
– each owe their existence to work that has been done in philosophy. What are some of 
the important principles and axioms that have to be accepted to commit to the existence 
of certain entities?—philosophers are the specialists when it comes to such questions. 
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2.3 Realism, Conceptualism, Nominalism 
When I asked one scientist about what they would like to see in a dissertation 
about ontology their recommendation was to include a comment on an important 
philosophical difference—in considering universals and particulars, there are 
philosophical differences between realism, conceptualism, and nominalism. Briefly, 
realism (sometimes realism is divided between exaggerated realism and moderate 
realism) holds that universals are real and that they are reflected in the scientific laws of 
nature. For example, realism would hold that a genus is as real as the species that fall 
under its domain. Conceptualism holds that there might be universals that individuals can 
conceive but that those individuals can have no confirmation of whether their universal 
concepts have any foundation outside of their cognitive processes. Nominalism denies the 
existence of universals and holds that cognitive processes cannot realize them. Now, 
some philosophers interested in applied ontology, such as Cocchiarella (2007) and 
Merrill (2010), hold that it is possible to maintain a blend of realism and conceptualism in 
something they refer to as conceptual realism. The argument goes something like this. 
Universals can be predicated of things. In nominalism, there is no such thing as a 
universal properly speaking; the predication in nominalism is merely a linguistic relation 
between subject and predicate. For example, in the sentence “the kids may have started 
the game,” the predicate in the verb phrase “may have started the game” is related to the 
subject in the noun phrase “the kids” only in terms of the phrase structure of the 
declarative sentence. There is no universal that is predicated of “the kids” or “may have 
started the game.” As such, nominalism is a poor choice for ontology-building, which 
requires some admission of universals that are predicated of things. The conceptual 
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realist might hold that there is an argument to be made in favor of viewing concepts (in 
place of universals) as the connective tissue that allows for sentences to be meaningful, 
rather than a mere string of words, as in the case of nominalism. In this vein, Cocchiarella 
(2007) argues that the “objectivity of referential and predicable concepts consists in their 
being intersubjectively realizable cognitive capacities that enable us to think and 
communicate with one another” and that “it is the complementarity between predicable 
and referential concepts that underlies the mental chemistry of language and thought” (p. 
143). Real concepts, then, are found in intersubjective cognitive capacities and 
complementarity between predicates and subjects. Along these philosophical lines, 
Merrill (2010) holds that a conceptualist approach to applied ontology-building can 
achieve as high a standard as realism-based approaches, and to support this he references 
the work concept-oriented applied ontologists such as Guha and Lenat (1990) and Lenat 
and Guha (1990). The trouble arises when one recognizes that such conceptualist 
approaches to ontology-building are rather outdated and used less frequently today due to 
technical errors. While Merrill would like to critique the realism-based approach in favor 
of a concept-based approach, the references to applied ontology work that he offers (the 
work of Guha and Lenat) refer to old engineering literature and ontologies that are no 
longer in use (for example, the Cyc ontology project from the 90s) and as such he fails to 
provide a thorough outline of what a new conceptualist approach would look like. The 
Cyc project in particular – a knowledge representation system design for AI – generated 
much controversy (Bertino, Piero & Zarri, 2001, p. 275), including problems related to 
the complexity of the system, unsatisfactory accounts of the concept of substance and of 
intrinsic versus extrinsic properties, and lacunas in the ontology of ordinary objects. 
59 
 
Building on previous work in the realism-based approach to ontology-building 
(Smith & Ceusters, 2010; Floridi, 2011), I offer that concepts are primarily either 
subjective, used to describe language use, or used to refer to formal entities such as 
numbers. They are assertions about reality and should be treated as such—concepts act as 
commentary on reality rather than as reality itself. For the purposes of applied ontology-
building in the natural sciences, such divergent definitions of concepts can lead to 
confusion. The realism-based approach, on the other hand, states that applied ontologies 
that are developed for scientific purposes should be built in such a way that their terms 
refer to universals in reality. The realism-based approach to ontology-building against 
which philosophers such as Cocchiarella and Merrill have positioned themselves has 
been formulated and extensively laid out by Smith and Cuesters (Smith, 2004b, 2006; 
Ceusters & Smith, 2007) and their resolution to the controversy is somewhat 
underwhelming. In their response to conceptualist attacks led by philosophers such as 
Merrill, Smith and Ceusters (2010) state that “Merrill’s critique is of little relevance to 
the success of our realist project, since it not only reveals no actual errors in our work but 
also criticizes views on universals that we do not in fact hold” (p. 139). There is a sense 
in which conceptualism might be legitimate with respect to the status of language as it is 
expressed within consciousness however conceptualism offers no substantial criticism of 
the realist applied ontology project.  
 The thrust of the realism-based approach to ontology-building – as summarized 
by Merrill (2010), its most vocal critic – can be formulated as follows. First, realist 
positions believe in the view that specific terms are aligned not with concepts but with 
entities in reality (Smith, 2006). This sort of thinking is grounded in linguistics and can 
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be aligned with the work of Katz (1966; 1981). Second, a realism-based approach to 
ontology-building should be able to plot nodes and edges on an ontology graph that 
corresponds not to concepts but to entities in reality (Ceusters & Smith, 2006a). Third, 
universals form the subject of scientific research; concepts form the subject of ideas, 
thoughts, and meanings. Universals are connected to instances in reality and are 
identified by discovering families of instances that share common properties (Ceusters, 
2006). Lastly, for the realist, a kind is a part of reality that corresponds to universals or 
patterns in reality (Smith, 2006). The idea is that it is universals that provide for 
descriptions of many different particulars and that make science possible. Universals are 
what make terminologies possible.  
While the nominalist position should be untenable in applied ontology work, the 
conceptualist position engenders some sympathy in the realist. Surely, concepts are real. 
Yet, they are not sufficient in describing the types of entities, attributes, and relations that 
should populate an applied ontology in the natural sciences, and should not the 
foundation upon which applied ontologies are built. 
 
2.4 Realism-Based Applied Ontology is a Method 
Some potential criticisms of the realism-based approach to ontology-building can 
be averted as long as the approach is understood as a method. The realism-based 
methodology “is based on the idea that the most effective way to ensure mutual 
consistency of ontologies over time and to ensure that ontologies are maintained in such a 
way as to keep pace with advances in empirical research is to view ontologies as 
representations of the reality that is described by science. This is the fundamental 
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principle of ontological realism” (Smith & Ceusters, 2010, p. 139). Ontological realism is 
a method and not a philosophical doctrine; it borrows terms like universals and 
particulars from philosophy but “it does not stand or fall according to whether universals 
or types do or do not exist in some metaphysical sense” (Smith & Ceusters, 2010, p. 141).  
 Philosophers enjoy asking absolute questions that often create an absolute mess 
(Floridi, 2011, p. 74). The methodology of realism is meant to provide a productive 
solution to applied ontology work while utilizing tenets from philosophy, but it does not 
attempt to make a grand metaphysical claim. Rather, it uses the language of philosophy to 
show how to do good empirical work in the sciences relating to categorization. Building 
applied ontologies that last and that are successful is extremely difficult work. Their 
success is not found in solving longstanding realism vs. antirealism debates in philosophy 
but in the longevity and success of their application. A kind of pragmatism is practiced in 
the method of ontological realism, which seeks to provide the clearest and most widely-
used standards for data integration and semantic interoperability. 
 
2.5 Aristotle’s Ontological Square 
Philosophers have only recently engaged in applied ontological work in the 
computer and information sciences however ontology as a philosophical category has 
existed since Aristotle—arguing against Plato’s theory of Forms—made a distinction 
between universals and particulars. The notions of universals and particulars are largely 
considered to be the foundation upon which much contemporary ontology-building is 
constructed. One famous scientist I spoke to illustrated that “the science of ontology is 
very old” and that it “started with Aristotle.” Aristotle can arguably be said to have 
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constructed a realist theory of categories in that he focused on the common properties of 
entities and how these might be grouped together; in Aristotle’s ontology one finds that 
intelligible universals can extend across various domains. While Aristotle’s ontology has 
been subject to debate among philosophers, many of the scientists involved in applied 
ontology with which I spoke recognize Aristotle’s contribution to ontology research. 
Aristotle is often referenced in the scientific literature as the first “ontologist” and 
arguments have been put forward by scientists in favor of the view that Aristotle’s 
philosophy can be seen as the first upper-level ontology (Schulze-Kremer, 2002) given 
that Aristotle’s work in his Categories dealt with general first-order questions relating to 
items like substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, 
and affection; on Aristotle’s theory, one can inquire into these basic categories to 
understand reality. Such categoricalism – the view that all of nature is categorical – suits 
ontology engineering given that such categories may adhere to multiple entities, 
attributes, and relations. Since the goal of ontology engineering is semantic 
interoperability between data, Aristotle’s categories provide a good foundation for 
finding similarities between the seemingly disparate items from which data are generated 
and there is a link to rhetoric here in its contemporary form and the productivity of 
scientific rhetoric (Gooch, 1975; Depew & Lyne, 2013). Categories provide conceptual 
clarity when engaged in the actual practice of applied ontology-building so that items and 
definitions in the ontology remain clean and uniform. 
The applied ontological interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics holds that 
universals are inherent to their particulars and that the understanding of what is real is a 
matter of understanding the relationship between particular substances and their universal 
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qualities. The universe is viewed as being comprised of types, universals, and categories 
that are hierarchically organized. According to Smith (2009), the most important 
universals in Aristotle’s ontology are substance universals which pertain to what a thing 
is at all times at which it exists; however there are also accidents which pertain to how a 
thing is at some time at which it exists. These universals and particulars coupled with 
substances and accidents produce an ontological square (Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Aristotle’s Ontological Square (Smith, 2009) 
 
Such an ontological square captures Aristotle’s early contribution to ontology and today 
many ontologists depend on Aristotle’s categories, universals, and particulars to engage 
in applied ontology. Looking at the ontological square, for the realist the universal cat 
does not exist separately from the particular cat (such would be a return to Plato’s theory 
of Forms). Rather, the universal cat is inherent to particular cats that exist. Similarly, the 
accident headache is a universal that adheres to particular headaches.  
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 Aristotle’s ontological square endorses a realist theory of categories by virtue of 
the fact that, on the present ontological interpretation, a universal cannot exist that does 
not already inhere in some particular substance or accident. Once it is partnered with such 
a realist approach to universals and particulars, categoricalism no longer appears to be as 
abstract as it may seem and difficult philosophical questions pertaining to the reality of 
concepts become less relevant. The conceptualist position might hold that a universal 
originates in the thought of the epistemic subject; however such would not be a realist 
theory of categories. Universals do not originate outside of their particulars and as such 
the Aristotelian metaphysics endorsed by ontology engineers should suggest that the 
content of ontologies should be realism-based rather than concept-based entities, 
attributes, and relations—yet many ontologists continue to embrace the term concepts in 
the technical literature. It should be acknowledged that Aristotle did not think of his 
categories in terms of information or realism yet this should not prevent ontologists from 
retroactively reading his work as realism-based and informational in nature.  
To emphasize the relationship between universals and particulars, one leading 
ontologist recommend to think of the link between universals and particulars in terms of a 
principle of instantiation. The principle of instantiation is used to make sure that users of 
the realism-based approach to applied ontology-building see types, categories, and 
universals not as abstract entities that exist in a magical realm outside of reality that 
exists beyond contact from empirical observation, but instead as firmly planted in the 
world and aligned with those entities with which scientific data is connected. A 
conceptualist might then inquire into the nature of hypothetical scientific objects that 
have not been proven by science and how they should be included in an ontology using 
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the realism-based method. For example, should such entities wait for science or rely on 
concepts? The answer provided by such realists such as Smith and Ceusters (2010) is 
rather straightforward, and rests “on the recognition that language can clearly still be used 
to communicate – in some sense – even where putative referring expressions fail in their 
reference. Some people assert their beliefs in the existence of unicorns. All such beliefs 
are false. But the beliefs exist just as do other beliefs; they can be communicated; and 
they can also be represented” (p. 179). Beliefs in a non-existent entity can be realistically 
represented in an ontology even when that entity itself cannot be represented in the 
ontology. The significance of this is that a space can be provided for the inclusion of non-
existent or hypothetical entities in ontological realism so long as they are referred to as 
beliefs, a practice which eliminates categorization errors in taxonomy. 
 
2.6 Husserl’s Formal Ontology – Formal Logic Distinction 
Formal ontology is used by philosophers and computer and information scientists 
to refer to ontology as a discipline. The term is included, for example, in FOIS and 
philosophers have used it ever since Husserl began referring to a formal ontology at the 
begging of the twentieth century. The applied ontologists I spoke to recognize the work 
of Husserl and describe him as the inventor of formal ontology as a discipline distinct 
from formal logic. What Husserl accomplished with this was a double distinction in the 
form of separating descriptions of material things that exist in the world from thinking 
about the abstract structure of those things and the separation of formal logic from those 
abstract ontological structures. Husserl famously advocated for a ‘return to things 
themselves,’ which is often interpreted to mean a return to thinking about individual 
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objects as they exist in the world and can be apprehended within phenomenological 
reality. As such, formal ontology began as a field connected to perception and common 
reality. One well-known ontologist said “Husserl was the first philosopher to use the 
phrase ‘Formal Ontology’ in his Logical Investigations, which is also important for my 
development. I was very much influenced by Husserl.” Husserl showed how philosophy 
and science had become detached from the life world of ordinary experience and wrote at 
length about topics related to Aristotle’s categories, including subjects such as universals, 
particulars, and meaning, yet he focused on them from an explicitly ontological 
perspective, seeking instead to provide a universal account of ontological structures. 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900/2001; 1901/2001) provided an early account of 
his ontology that would be developed throughout his later works, particularly his Formal 
and Transcendental Logic (1929/1969); in it Husserl offers a clear distinction of a formal 
discipline of ontology that should be viewed independently from formal logic. The 
formal status of Husserl’s ontology is meant to imply that the ontology can extend to all 
entities, attributes, and relations without being impeded by specific knowledge in various 
domains of application.  
Husserl saw logic as concerned with meaning and the deductively closed 
collection of meanings that constitute scientific theories. He takes this a step further by 
arguing that it is only until we have a complete theory of objects to which meanings refer 
that we can have a complete scientific theory; thus the unity of logic depends on a 
connection of meaning and a connection of objects to which meanings are directed 
(Smith & Smith, 1995a; 1995b). Formal logic is related in the first instance to meaning 
categories such as subject, predicate, proposition and any terms that are veridical in 
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nature; formal ontology concerns object categories such as entity, attribute, and relations, 
including such items as parts, wholes, and states. Logic can be said to provide the 
concepts that belong to a unified theory between meaning and object; logic’s truths are 
necessary truths related to such categories. Formal ontology provides models that are 
similar to formal logic in that they form complex structures in non-arbitrary, rule-
governed ways. Such a process is independent of domain specific knowledge and thus 
can be applied in any number of cases.  
The sociologist Robert Poli has worked extensively on ontology for knowledge 
organization (1996) in both the applied and philosophical sense, as well as on basic 
problems relating to theories of levels of reality (2002). He has also provided one of the 
most thorough readings of Husserlian ontology, emphasizing that Husserl’s ontology is a 
formal system that sits next to formal logic. It is a rule-governed system that is supposed 
to correspond to the material entities that are the referents of concepts. This interpretation 
of Husserl, which is by far the most common and accepted interpretation of his ontology, 
still posits that concepts are to be found behind formal ontology and ontological 
commitments (Figure 2.2). Formal ontology has different interpretations throughout 
history and in some cases the phrase is used by analytic philosophers when referring to 
formal logic, particularly with regard to scientific theories and structures. Husserl’s 
formal ontology is separate from formal logic and is practiced according to this 
distinction by computer and information scientists interested in ontology work (Poli, 





Figure 2.2 Poli’s Logical-Formal and Ontological-Formal Concepts (Poli, 1993) 
 
Such a conception of formal ontology made its way from Husserl to modern information 
science and the beginning of the applied ontology revolution. Guarino and Poli (1995) 
note that the “International Workshop on Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and 
Knowledge Representation” held in Padova, Italy on March 17-19 1993, was probably 
the first interdisciplinary initiative aiming to “explore the connections between 
philosophers belonging to the tradition of Husserl […] and people working on principles 
of knowledge representation and engineering” (p. 623). The proceedings show that the 
connection between Husserlian ontology and computational knowledge representation 
“proved to be very influential to the communities involved” (p. 623). Computer scientists 
saw the value in viewing the distinction between formal logic and formal ontology for 
showing that ontology should deal strictly with the interconnections of things, with 
objects, properties, parts, wholes, relations and collectives, while formal logic should deal 
with interconnections of truths, with consistency, validity, and statements like and, or, 
and not. Husserlian formal ontology views ontology as something that should exist in 
every domain of reality, and this is what makes it formal. It is not material in the way that 
physics and biology are in that it does not deal with material entities but rather with 
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ontological things in the abstract philosophical sense. Formal ontology deals with formal 
ontological structures while formal logic deals with formal logical structures. The word 
formal merely means that formal logic and formal ontology are meant to obtain in all 
spheres of reality. Here, material should be understood as regional structures within 
specific domains; formal ontology is domain-neutral and concerns parts of reality that are 
shared by all material domains. Material ontology deals with features which are specific 
to given domains, things like brains, buildings, etc. 
As Poli’s logical-formal and ontological-formal concepts show, concepts remain 
embedded at the top of the hierarchy, and in this there also remains a sense in which the 
origin of concepts stems from the mind of the epistemic subject who apprehends material, 
or formal-logical/formal-ontological structures. As is well-known by philosophers, 
Husserl is the godfather of phenomenology, and his phenomenology is centered on the 
epistemic subject’s intentional relation to objects; for Husserl, it is the nature of thought 
to be intended for an external object. On this view, different concepts can apprehend 
objects in different ways. This aspect points to the descriptive value of Husserlian 
phenomenology for the material world, but in the realm of applied ontology it is 
Husserl’s separation of formal-logic from formal-ontology that has left a lasting 
contribution to the way ontology is studied today. However, the positing of concepts at 
the top of the ontological pyramid remains problematic for the modern-day practice of 




2.7 Ingarden’s Ontological Essence of Time 
The Polish philosopher Ingarden was a student of Husserl who viewed ontology 
as a science of the possible ways of existence. When I asked one ontologist which books 
or philosophers they considered to be important to ontology, they stated that “Probably 
the philosopher whose work has influenced the ontologies which I build most centrally is 
Roman Ingarden…He would be the person whose views come closest to my own.” When 
this ontologist was studying at Oxford they had specialized in analytic philosophy and 
eventually became interested in looking to alternatives; this is how he discovered the 
work of Ingarden, which is to say more or less by accident one day in a library. The 
ontologist became interested in Ingarden because of his work on aesthetics but discovered 
that Ingarden wrote a rather large book on ontology, parts of which were translated into 
English in 1964. When the ontologist discovered that book and saw what Ingarden was 
doing, they told me, “I realized that I was an ontologist.” They said it happened within 
seconds, that they had the book in their hand, opened several pages, and realized that 
applied ontology was what they wanted to do. “And I've been doing it ever since,” they 
told me. “Which means now something like forty-five years.” 
 Ingarden is an interesting figure; a philosopher who many other philosophers have 
for a large part ignored for one reason or another, his philosophy is the subject of 
admiration for quite a few scientists in applied-ontology work. Ingarden’s monumental 
The Controversy over the Existence of the World (1947/1948), originally published in 
Polish, is a masterwork in ontology that sought to define the world (and the possible) in 
terms of ontological categories. The edition that our Ingarden-influenced ontologist found 
was an English translation of only a portion of The Controversy (which is in two 
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volumes) entitled Time and Modes of Being (1964). The “controversy” in the title of 
Ingarden’s book refers to the one that has been generated in the debate between realism 
and idealism. Importantly, Ingarden introduced the notion of an objective, realism-based 
time into formal ontology and this seems to have been his key contribution and the reason 
for his profound influence. Unlike Husserl, Ingarden moved beyond concepts and 
phenomenology to create a realism-based formal ontology that included time as an 
objective universal category. Building on Husserl’s formal ontology and in disagreement 
with Kant, Ingarden writes that 
The question at issue here does not belong to a general theory of time or to a 
general theory of existence, but is rather a problem which in this context – where 
we examine the ontological problem of the existence of the real world – is of vital 
interest to us. For – true or not! – the real world as we grasp it in pre-
philosophical, everyday experience appears to be organized in such a peculiar 
fashion that anything and everything that occurs within its unity is somehow 
temporal, or is at least bound up with time. But even if that should turn out to be a 
transcendental illusion-say, in Kant's sense-still, the problem of time cannot be 
left out (2013, p. 227).  
 
Ingarden claims that according to his realism-based ontology, entities can be divided into 
the temporal and atemporal, and he spends the majority of Time and Modes of Being 
brilliantly combing through the differences between objects existing in time (things in 
particular), events, and processes. It is interesting to note that the ontologist I spoke with 
was surprised in retrospect by how similar Ingarden’s continental philosophy was to that 
which was being studied by analytic philosophers in England at the time, however 
Ingarden’s emphasis remained focused on logically partitioning reality rather than on the 
abstract language games that were often practiced by English philosophers at the time. 
Ingarden, in a footnote in The Controversy, remarks that he was unaware of the work of 
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analytic philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) while writing the 
book.  
 Ingarden states that the temporal nature of the mode of being of an event consists 
of the occurrence or coming-into-being of some state of affairs or of some object-
involving situation (1947/2013, p. 229). He provides as examples of events the collision 
of two bodies, the arrival of a train at a station, a lamp's lighting-up, a person’s death, and 
the like. The word event is also used in common language when referring to things such 
as a battle or other historic events. However, Ingarden argues that those types of cases are 
actually processes of relatively brief duration which display an inner unity (a coherence 
of phases) and are contrasted with longer-lasting processes.  
On the temporal nature of the mode of being of processes, Ingarden writes that 
examples would include things like a specific, concrete movement of a material mass in 
space such as a runner’s dash at a track meeting, the evolution of an organism, the life of 
a human being, and any and all activities and transactions of a purely physical (as well as 
psychophysical) nature. In every process (e.g. a well-defined movement) one should here 
distinguish between the continually growing totality of phases and the object constituted 
in them in the course of time as the processes’ peculiar subject of properties (1947/2013, 
p. 235). However, both categories make up the single entity in which they are 
distinguishable only as two different aspects. The general constitutive property of this 
process-object is that the growing totality of phases unfolds in time. This means (1) from 
phase to phase – from inception to conclusion – the process runs its course in ever new 
time intervals, and (2) the totality of the process-phases grows constantly until its closure, 
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and – in contrast to the event – it cannot in virtue of its essence be contained in a single 
instant, in a single present. 
 Finally, the temporal nature of the mode of being of objects involves some 
arbitrary thing; a stone, a house, or a mountain can each be taken as example of this sort 
of object. Living beings such as cells or trees, animals, humans, as well as specific 
humans such as President Barack Obama can all be considered objects. Living beings 
(especially the cellular) pose certain difficulties if they are to be sharply contrasted with 
other temporally determined objects. But on closer inspection, Ingarden reveals that it is 
precisely they that enable us to discern the radical distinctiveness of persistent objects 
from events and processes; persistent objects differ from events by outlasting the 
individual instants in which events are confined (1947/2013, p. 251-252). This also 
applies to processes. Meanwhile, it is precisely in how a persistent object out-lasts 
individual instants that its deep disparity from processes is exhibited; a process does it in 
such a way that its currently active phase passes over into a wholly new one—though 
essentially inseparable from it; the former prolongs itself continuously into the latter. In 
contrast, a persistent object remains as identically the same in the incessantly new 
instants of time for as long as it exists. If one were to find something new in it in the 
newly incipient instants of time, it is either processes that are existentially interconnected 
with it, which sometimes play out internally, or certain events that take place in the 
object. This is to say that both can elicit new properties in it, or entire ensembles of them. 
But the persistent object itself, which serves as existential basis for the various sorts of 
entities that frequently coexist with it, remains, so to speak, as the same old thing that 
already existed earlier, in the previous, elapsed instants. 
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Ingarden’s analytically rigorous yet realism-based approach to objective time 
implies that objects, events, and processes exist at various levels of granularity, and his 
ontological project is to formally define such categories to assist science. Ingarden writes 
that “it appears to be likely that the real world, or at least what exists in it, is temporally 
determined. At any rate, time-determination belongs among the primal attributes of 
entities existing in the real world, much as it may be no more than a “transcendental 
illusion” in Kant's sense” (1947/2013, p. 280). Taking a stance against Kant, Ingarden’s 
ontology permits of an objective universal conception of time that, once combined with 
Husserl’s formal ontological method, expanded the class of entities that could be 
permitted in an ontology. It is this characteristic of Ingarden’s work that seems to have 
influenced the ontologists I spoke to. In the turn from idealism to realism, Ingarden 
rejected the notion that the essence of things like time could exist only as an allusion in 
the mind in favor of viewing time as a real, constitutive parts of the universe.  
 
2.8 Ontological Realism in Modern Applied Ontology 
The work of philosophers such as Aristotle, Husserl, and Ingarden can be said to 
rest upon the realist assumption that a single consistent ontological theory can 
comprehend reality at a multiplicity of different levels of granularity. There are many 
other philosophers that are relevant to a discussion of the realist ontological project 
(Simondon, 2005; Floridi, 2011) but covering them would be beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, the work of Quine seems to be a real turning-point in ontology 
work for some of the computer scientists I spoke to. Quine, some philosophers explained 
to me, famously did not believe in the existence of properties. His ontology really 
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supported only a realism about nouns and his theory of ontological commitment sought to 
study not what there is but what sciences believe there is when logically formalized. 
Quine thought that the way to understand the ontological commitments of a scientific 
theory is to translate the scientific theory into predicate logic form; this could then allow 
one to read off the ontological commitments by looking at all the predicates needed to 
capture the existential assertions of the science. In Quine’s terms, to be in the ontological 
commitment sense is to be the value of a variable in a scientific theory formulated using 
predicate logic. 
 Quine and many of his contemporaries in the analytic tradition of philosophy 
established a common understanding according to which the use of first-order logic as a 
technique of philosophy should accompany the acceptance of a nominalist view as 
concerns the variety of things to which constituent terms in first-order logic are allowed 
to refer. The view that came to be adopted in much philosophy concerning ontology 
found that all terms in first-order logic should refer to individual objects (atoms, cells, 
persons, etc.) with the outcome of a restriction on the available expressive resources of 
first-order logic. According to Smith and Ceusters (2010), universals fall outside of the 
domain of what can be referred to within the framework of first-order logic.  
Because terms in received FOL [first-order logic] range exclusively over 
individual objects such as molecules or cells or people, such terms cannot be used 
to refer to universals, or to anything general or repeatable. And the predicates in 
FOL cannot be used to refer to such entities either – because they cannot be used 
to refer to anything at all (p. 158). 
 
The realism-based approach to ontology construction depends not only on first-order 
logic but also on what Smith has called first-order logic with universal terms. First-order 
logic with universal terms is different from first-order logic in that it expands the types of 
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entities to which first-order logic can refer while also majorly restricting the group of 
allowed predicates, abolishing all predicates of the typical sort (is_a man, is_a thyroid, 
etc.) and admits rather only a small amount of formal predicates, including two-place 
predicates (relational). First-order logic with universal terms allows terms to refer to 
independent and dependent continuant particulars and occupant particulars and also 
universals in each of these categories (Smith, 2005).  
 A summary of the realism-based methodology is found in Smith and Ceusters 
(2010). Therein, relational predicates on the level of instances are described, as well as 
relational predicates on the level of universals or types, and bridging universals and 





Figure 2.3 First-Order Logic with Universal Terms (Smith & Ceusters, 2010) 
 
Temporally indexed versions of each are included in the ontology. The outcome of 
expanding the scope of permitted referents in first-order logic to include universals is that 
it allows for the simulating some of the expressive possibilities of second-order logic 
within the framework of first-order logic, including relations.  
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 The realism based approach to applied-ontology building is a radically new 
approach. Previously, concept-based ontologies did not include universals and as such 
many of them fell into disarray. The rules included in first order logic with universal 
terms combined with the LoA approach allow for greater semantic interoperability to 
produce a realism-based perspective of applied ontologies that can then be used to 
combine different types of scientific data for the purposes of progressing science. 
 Understanding the technical theories that inform applied computational ontologies 
opens the black box of ontology up to see its inner logic and rational, making clear the 
mechanics behind ontological decision-making and development. However, the rhetorical 
and practical work of ontologists themselves contributes to work in the community 
development of ontology knowledge-sharing. Gieryn (1983) has emphasized that 
scientific communities are bound by rhetoric and practice that influence scientific 
methods and research. Chapters three and four address this in the context of communities 
of practice who are engaged in applying the method of ontological realism to science and 
basic research. Chapter three offers a brief history of contemporary communities 
involved in applied computational ontology research while chapter four offers a specific 
look into communities involved in the development of BFO.
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CHAPTER 3. SCIENTIFIC ONTOLOGY AS COMMUNICATION 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a theory of community practice, describes individuals, 
groups, and institutions involved in ontology work at the local and global levels, and 
argues that ontology should be studied as a form of community practice. Communities of 
practice have been described in Science and Technology Studies literature as the formal 
and informal connections that emerge when interdisciplinary groups of knowledge 
seekers form around an emerging technology (Wenger, 1998; Schiavone, 2014). The 
chapter describes various groups and organizations involved in applied ontology research 
and provides some of the history behind their origins and development. It describes some 
of the communities that have been active since the 1990s who formed around and 
participated in applied ontology research, particularly those who have embraced the 
realism-based method, including the conferences and international organizations that 
have come to embrace the realist method.  
 
3.2 Ontology as a Community Practice 
Communities of practice in the fields of computer and information science have 
been described in the Science and Technology Studies literature as consisting of four 
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types (Cox, 2005), including the socialization of new group members into a knowledge 
field by a form of apprenticeship (Lave & Wenger, 1991), creating knowledge in 
interdisciplinary groups that form in resistance to old hierarchies of power in institutions 
(Brown & Duguid, 1991), informal connections among individuals that emerge through 
mutual engagement on knowledge ventures (Wenger, 1998), and informal horizontal 
management groups across institutional boundaries (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 
2002). In the relatively short history of applied computational ontology work, 
communities of practice seemed to have emerged informally among researchers through 
their interests in ontology, thus the story of ontology fits into Wenger’s (1998) informal 
account.  
 In many ways, the practice of applied ontology building is a black art. How does 
one go about organizing scientific knowledge if there are no theoretical foundations or 
practical principles? To come up with such foundations and principles, ontologists work 
with computer scientists, philosophers, communication specialists, engineers, logicians, 
and many others. To work in their trade requires that ontologists get along with a 
somewhat mysterious blend of specialists. Merrill (2010, p.105) accuses Smith and 
Ceusters’ realism-based approach of being “neither science no philosophy.” In their 
response (2010), Smith and Ceusters write that in suggesting such Merrill “hits the nail 
exactly on the head.” In propagating the realist methodology they claim that they are 
“indeed engaging in a novel interdisciplinary activity that involves elements of both of 
these, and also of computer science, politics, community organizing, sociology, logic, 
and other black arts.” Smith and Ceusters describe coordinated ontology work across a 
large scale as being so difficult that they are “happy to draw on any means that will help 
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us to achieve our ends.” Building on such literature in the realism-based approach to 
ontology construction, I argue that ontologies are commonsensical and real but also that 
they require significant communicative effort to be maintained. The fact that ontologies 
require communal maintenance is something that has been overlooked by researchers in 
communication and media studies. “I increasingly see myself as being a practitioner, or a 
scientist, working in the discipline of ontology,” one scientist told me. Such individuals 
and communities centered on ontology work should be studied by communication 
researchers. 
I asked one scientist if it is correct to say that ontology is trying to solve a 
communication problem amongst scientists. “Yes. That’s true,” they said (J. Doe, phone 
interview, September 9, 2015). Many realism-oriented ontologists explained to me that 
the ToB problem in ontology is going to be a problem for multiple fields and disciplines 
in the future—from statistics to biology, and from physics to farming. The more 
computers are introduced to the world and the more computer-driven daily activities and 
research activities become, the more ToB problems are going to have to be addressed. 
Somehow, all of this data will need to be interfaced in such a way that they become 
semantically interoperable. Problems will have to be addressed first not in those areas 
which have Big Data, but in those areas which have heterogeneous big data. There is less 
ontology development in physics, for instance, than there is in biology. Physics has huge 
amounts of data in the field of astronomy (there is work in the ontology of astronomy) 
but it is not as important as work in the ontology of biology. The data of biology and the 
data of medicine is so fantastically heterogeneous that researchers are forced to try and 
find ways of making it comparable across species, diseases, experiments, and across 
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chemistry. Chemistry is an area where we now have good ontological resources but 
applied ontology work is still in its infancy in many domains.  
There is some agreement on the notion that ontologies can be treated as 
collectively agreed upon scientific theories, rather than strictly as engineering artefacts 
(Eschenbach & Grüninger, 2008b, p. v). Up to fairly recently, the term controlled 
vocabulary was used in much of the scientific literature to describe the practice of 
organizing words and phrasing to better enable the indexing and retrieval of content 
through computerized searching. Similar to ontology, controlled vocabularies usually 
included different terms and domain scopes. Unlike ontologies, an emphasis on 
community was not typically associated with a controlled vocabulary. Today, the term 
ontology has recently taken over from controlled vocabularies (Bodenreider, 2008) in the 
domain of biomedical informatics (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Ontology vs. Controlled Vocabulary in PubMed/MEDLINE (Bodenreider, 
2008) 
 
Even when terms such as knowledge engineering were still being regularly used in the 
1980s and 1990s, Uschold and Gruninger (1996) noted that the construction and use of 
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ontologies involved different backgrounds, languages, tools, and techniques that often 
acted as a barrier to effective communication among people, organizations, and systems. 
They noted a need for the development and implementation of techniques to enable 
shared understanding and communication between wildly divergent teams of researchers. 
To produce more and better ontology work, the ontology-building process must 
be seen as a communal endeavor. Yim (2015) argues in favor of the communicative 
approach to applied ontology, suggesting that ontologists should diversify the 
membership of their community of practice, expand penetration into education, keep 
intellectual property rights open, and continue bootstrapping. The value of the 
communicative approach to ontology work is found in the interdisciplinary nature of 
applied ontology-making. Ontologies require not only philosophers to work on the logic 
of the ontologies but also communication specialists (ontologies need to be advertised, 
disseminated, measured, reviewed, etc.), computer and information engineers (ontologies 
need to be instantiated using computer science and programming), managers (ontology is 
a team science involving different research groups), and many others.  
 
3.3 Realism-Based Ontology Groups and their Institutions 
Institutions also play a large role in that realism-based applied ontology work is a 
costly and time-consuming process that requires significant resources and infrastructure. 
Today, the realism-based approach to applied ontology-building is practiced within a 
variety of institutions in the northeastern United States, with the majority of them located 
in Buffalo. As one researcher there put it to me, Buffalo is quickly becoming “the Silicon 
Valley of ontology research,” with much of the ontology work attached in some way to 
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the University at Buffalo. “I think now most people would say it is Buffalo which is the 
most important player,” another scientist told me. One ontologist also stated that “Buffalo 
is probably the largest single community of people who are building, or maintaining, or 
using ontologies.” Part of the reason for this is that ontology work requires large groups 
of teams and institutions working in close contact. Buffalo has been or is currently home 
to many ontology research groups, centers, and individuals, including the Ontology 
Research Group (ORG) (directed by Ceusters, Smith, and Louis Goldberg), the National 
Center for Ontological Research (NCOR), and the Buffalo Center for Ontological 
Research (BCOR). 
The ORG is a part of the New York State Center of Excellence in Bioinformatics 
& Life Sciences (CBLS), which is housed in the University at Buffalo. Researchers at the 
ORG have experience in ontology research in many different disciplines, including the 
review and editing of applied ontologies in biomedical informatics as well as skills in 
referent tracking and language processing. Work within the ORG is divided into three 
specialized units: The Ontology, Logic and Technology Unit (OLT) conducts primary 
ontology research and development in biomedicine; the Referent Tracking Unit (RTU) 
specializes in software research focusing on electronic health records; and the Qualitative 
Spatiotemporal Reasoning Unit (QSR) applies ontological methods that come from 
qualitative reasoning in fields such as Geographic Information Systems to improve upon 
representation systems and other forms of image data. The goal of the ORG is to help 
scientific researchers working primarily in biomedicine by providing single databases in 
specific domains that can be computationally processed. The ORG’s mission is to create 
high-quality domain ontologies that can facilitate translational research. 
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The NCOR was created in 2005 with the aim of conducting ontological research 
by building tools and measures for ontology evaluation and quality assurance. The 
National Institutes of Health thought that it was important to support the Gene Ontology 
(a specific domain ontology) and similar efforts because of the importance of the Human 
Genome Project for medical research. The principle investigator of the NCOR was Mark 
Musen (Musen is currently at Stanford) and Smith served as co-principle investigator. 
The pair thought that it would be important to have something similar for non-biomedical 
ontology and so they NCOR for areas which were at that stage restricted to a small 
amount of military work and a larger amount of theoretical work in domain and discipline 
neutral ontology work. Within a short time, the NCOR moved to be fully located in 
Buffalo and Smith became the director. Currently, the NCOR does a lot of work for 
military projects and has done most of its work within the military ontology research 
area. However it is not restricted to military projects and is still active in areas such as 
financial services, economics more generally, and legal ontology. 
Ontologists working at the University at Buffalo participate in the center and its 
activities and collaborate with scientific, private, and public institutions in the USA and 
around the world by organizing ontology-themed research activities, conferences, 
publications, and funding opportunities. NCOR operates as an infrastructural hub that 
enables the coordination and review of organizations that use ontologies in many 
different fields, including national defense and intelligence, management, and healthcare. 
The center provides resources for those engaged in applied ontology by helping them find 
funding and establish interdisciplinary teams.  It also provides consultants for ontology-
related projects, particularly in security and healthcare. They engage in training and 
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outreach that are designed to spread ontology research around the world and to include 
more institutions and individuals in the applied ontology-building process.  
 The BCOR, also housed within the University at Buffalo, contains many different 
faculty projects that span across a variety of different departments. BCOR specializes in 
collaborative work and has secured major funding from the National Science Foundation, 
the National Institute of health, North American defense agencies, and the European 
Union. Goals of the BCOR include providing a forum for philosophers and applied 
ontologists to work together on multidisciplinary research projects. The BCOR focuses 
primarily on biomedical ontology—molecular biology and biochemistry, functional 
genomics, and proteomics, specifically. 
 In Europe, the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science 
(IFOMIS) at the Philosophy Institute of Saarland University is perhaps the largest 
organization specializing in ontology. Its primary research activities are the investigation 
of the basic philosophical tenets of formal ontology, the development of specific domain 
ontologies, and the development of data integration techniques for ensuring semantic 
interoperability. IFOMIS is home to multidisciplinary groups of researchers including 
members from philosophy, computer and information science, and medicine. 
IFOMIS was founded in 2002 after Smith won the 2001 Wolfgang Paul Award of 
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (with additional funding supplied by the 
Volkswagen Foundation and the European Commission). The Wolfgang Paul Award was 
granted then for the first and last time to fourteen promising researchers. The award was 
worth four and a half million German marks (the equivalent of just over two million 
Euros) and was the most valuable research award for a scholar at that time. It provided 
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winners with the freedom to pursue their research projects away from administrative 
constraints at a German academic research institution and to create their own 
interdisciplinary working groups of researchers. The award was financed by the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research and were made available from a federal government 
program that existed at the time named the Future Investment Programme. In total, 
fourteen scholars received the award (a total reaching almost twenty-six million Euros), 
and Smith was one of only two recipients from the humanities, having been trained as a 
philosopher. The other recipient from the humanities was a linguistics professor. The 
majority of the awards went to individuals in the fields of physics, mathematics, 
engineering and geoscience. 
At the beginning, IFOMIS was established at the Faculty of medicine in the 
University of Leipzig but it eventually relocated in 2004 to Saarland University in 
Saarbrücken to capitalize on interdisciplinary collaboration at the frontier of computer 
and information science research. IFOMIS set the task for itself of advancing research in 
ontology in the field of bioinformatics and to prove how the knowledge of philosophers 
can be greatly beneficial for such fields. Doctoral researchers in various fields including 
philosophy but also medicine, linguistics, and computer science have interacted with 
IFOMIS and its training and research modules.  
IFOMIS is largely responsible for bringing about a worldwide transformation in 
the logical development of ontology research and have developed highly refined 
techniques for evidence-based applied ontology development which have spread in 
popularity and are now used worldwide by various well-known and highly regarded 
ontology groups. The methods developed at IFOMIS led to the development of the BFO, 
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a top level ontology that organizes multiple domain ontologies and which is now serving 
as an integrating framework for a large variety of ontology projects. In 2005, Smith 
joined the Gene Ontology Consortium to found the Open Biomedical Ontologies library, 
which later in that same year become institutionalized as the OBO Foundry. Smith is still 
heavily involved in OBO Foundry activities and in the development of BFO principles. 
The OBO Foundry and the BFO will be discussed in the second half of this dissertation. 
  
3.4 The Data Smiths 
I asked one ontologist what they viewed as being some of the biggest challenges 
facing ontology development today. They said that there were three main issues. One 
issue is that the ontology software is becoming more usable, which means that a lot of 
people are using ontology software to build ontologies who do not know how to build an 
ontology. There is an influx of bad ontology content, which is giving the people who 
have been building good ontologies a bad name. Another problem is that there is a 
shortage of trained ontologists with the right kinds of skills. The ontologist told me that 
any student of theirs who was trained in ontology immediately gets a job because there is 
such a need and that this will continue to grow over time. The other issue is that 
ontologies are becoming rather standard now. Lots of people see the need for an 
ontology, including institutions such as the NIH and other funding agencies. The problem 
is that institutions like the NIH do not fun ontology research as they once did because 
they view ontology building as a kind of standard, as being infrastructure. Primarily, they 
are concerned with and want to fund original research. They do not want to fund 
infrastructure. This, there is a problem in getting the right kind of funding to enable 
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ontology development work to take place. This is a problem that applies not just to 
ontologies, but to maintaining large database. If Big Data is going to continue to grow 
and be a prominent issue in research, the ontologist explained, then it is going to become 
harder and harder to keep Big Data in ways which allow it to be used properly because as 
it grows and costs more to keep it. Unfortunately, many funding agencies do not want to 
pay money to databases. 
There are a handful of individuals who have been instrumental to spreading the 
realism-based method to applied ontology engineering—they are the data smiths who 
focus on the practice of increasing semantic interoperability among diverse data sets. 
Smith and Ceusters are two of the most important individuals working in applied 
ontology today; they are the creators and main proponents of the realism-based method to 
applied ontology research. Both work at the University at Buffalo and have at some point 
or another been associated with ORG, NCOR, BCOR, or IFOMIS.  
Currently, Smith is SUNY Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Julian Park 
Chair in the Department of Philosophy at University at Buffalo (Smith is also Research 
Director of IFOMIS). He studied at Oxford and received his doctorate from the 
University of Manchester and is currently also Director of the NCOR, as well as Adjunct 
Professor of Biomedical Informatics, Computer Science, and Neurology at Buffalo. 
Smith edits one of the oldest philosophy publications in the word—he is Editor of The 
Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry. He is a 
well-known contributor to both philosophical and computational ontology and has 
authored over four hundred and fifty articles on ontology and ontology-related topics. His 
research has been funded by the United States’ National Science Foundation (including 
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those of Switzerland and Austria), the National Institutes of Health, and the European 
Union, among many others (including the Wolfgang Paul Award of the Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation). Smith works primarily in the application of ontology in 
biomedicine and bioinformatics. He is also Coordinating Editor of the OBO Foundry. 
The world’s first institute of applied ontology was founded in Padua but then 
moved to Trento and is now called the Laboratory for Applied Ontology (LAO). Smith 
spent a semester working at LAO in 1993 and has been collaborating with the LAO team 
ever since (there is also a branch of the LAO in Rome). There is another laboratory for 
ontology, Labont, in Turin, with whom Smith has also collaborated. Smith’s work with 
the Italians led him to discover the work of Hayes (Hayes & McCarthy, 1969). More 
generally, he discovered that there was a community of people in the AI world who were 
trying to solve a problem, which can be summarized as being a problem in robotics. How 
do you build a robot which would have the same common-sense understanding of the 
physical world that a human being has, and also a common-sense understanding of things 
like economics and ethics, and so forth? The robot is going to have to be able to do things 
like buy salad in a restaurant, and to do that requires a commonsense knowledge of 
economics, ethics, of politeness, salad physics, tomatoes, and so on. There was a big 
effort known as “formal theories of the commonsense world,” in which Hayes was one of 
the most important figures, which was attempting to use formal logic to represent reality 
(Hayes & McCarthy, 1969). Since then, Smith himself has also produced work in this 
field (Smith 1995a, 1995b). This early work is one way of describing what ontology is 
trying to do. Smith started to write papers on naïve or formal theories of common sense. 
This work was partly theoretical and partly based on his historical work on people like 
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Husserl, who did in fact work very seriously on formal theories of common sense without 
having formal logic as a tool. That work led Smith to become interested in the ontology 
of geography, formal theories of space, common sense space, political space, and so 
forth. As the result of the work he did on the ontology of geography, Smith received the 
prize from the German government to found an institute on ontology research in 
Germany, and that is when the idea of working in biology and medicine became 
interesting to him; he had resources in Germany and wanted to do something ambitious. 
Since Smith has been in Buffalo, now for more than 20 years, he has been 
working on ontology and has brought a number of collaborators and colleagues, 
including senior and junior faculty positions over the years. They have students and 
researchers that make up a large community of people doing biomedical ontology in 
Buffalo. There is also now a slowly growing community of people working for military 
ontology projects in Buffalo. Initially, the main institution around which Smith and his 
team built this collection of people was the CBLS. Now, there are several institutions, 
including the newly created Department of Biomedical Informatics, the head of which is 
himself somebody who is engaged in doing ontology work, amongst other things. There 
is also the Institute for Healthcare Informatics, which is engaged in a lot of ontology 
based in health and patient data research not only in Buffalo but in New York State and 
beyond. As a result of this growth in the numbers of institutions, Smith’s role is not tied 
to any one of these. He has an adjunct professorship in the Urology Department and in 
the Biomedical Informatics Department, and also a joint appointment with Computer 
Science. Smith works with researchers in other departments as well. 
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 The goal of ontology is to make large heterogeneous bodies of data discoverable, 
comparable, and capable of being handled either by a computer or by a human being. The 
first discipline which really faced that issue and which had Big Data that they needed to 
grapple with was biomedicine. The Human Genome Project and the project to decipher 
animal genomes (the mouse genome, fly genome, and so forth) presented biologists and 
researchers doing clinical science with a difficult problem. The data they needed to use to 
do biology was gigantic sequences of chemical symbols with no obvious biological 
meaning. They needed to find ways of making genomic data meaningful, discoverable, 
and comparable. For example, this would allows them to compare the results of doing 
experiments on mouse diseases with the possible consequences of performing the same 
actions on human beings when it is illegal to do experiments on human beings with the 
same kind of freedom that is allowed when working with animal models. The animal 
model community, which was by the time Smith created IFOMIS already an informatics 
based community, conceived the first successful ontology in the modern sense, which 
was called the Gene Ontology. Smith organized a meeting on the Gene Ontology; he 
could see its importance. It was a successful artifact for researchers who wanted to do 
information driven biomedical research. Smith also could see that the Gene Ontology 
was, from a logical point of view, incredibly bad. The definitions were bad; they were 
circular or they were worse than circular. The researchers involved in the Gene Ontology 
did not understand the basics of first year logic when they created the ontology. They 
created something which was very successful, but which needed a logical structure. The 
leadership of the Gene Ontology visited Smith’s institute in Germany. The outcome of 
that meeting was that the ideas which he’d been working on for logically based 
92 
 
ontologies became used by the Gene Ontology community as a way of increasing the 
logical structure of the Gene Ontology itself. Due to the influence of the Gene Ontology, 
Smith thereby became influential in the area of information driven bioinformatics and 
biomedical informatics more generally. Quite a significant amount of the work which has 
taken place in biomedical informatics since then in the field of ontology has been 
influenced, one way or another, by Smith. 
When Smith won this prize from the German government in 2002, he got an 
email on the very next morning after the prize was announced from Ceusters. Smith did 
not know about him at the time and knew very little about the biomedical world. That 
was one of the reasons why he chose biomedical ontology as the focus for the institute 
that he was founding—it was a new area and gave him the opportunity to apply the work 
he had been doing in naive physics and geography to an area that was much more 
challenging and stimulating (for him). Ceusters was a leading figure in bioinformatics 
and medical informatics in Europe and had his own company focusing on the use of 
ontologies to support medical natural language processing, natural language translation, 
and natural language analysis. He was one of the very first proponents of the idea of an 
electronic health record in Europe. In fact, Ceusters was based in Belgium, where some 
of the earliest successful experiments in electronic health record technology were carried 
out, partly by Ceusters himself. One ontologist told me that Ceusters wrote to 
congratulate Smith and said “I've been studying your work for some time. I'm really 
happy that you are now going to start working on medicine. I want to come and work for 
you.” In the end, Ceusters did go and work with Smith at the institute Smith founded in 
Germany, and then later in Buffalo. Ceusters’ company was bought by Nuance, an 
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influential speech comprehension company that focuses a lot on medical speech 
understanding and is part of the IBM Watson Medicine project. Because Nuance bought 
the ontology that Ceusters built for medical natural language understanding, there is some 
influence from his work on the IBM Watson project. 
 Ceusters is Director of the ORG at the CBLS, Director of Research at the Institute 
for Healthcare Informatics, and Professor in the Department of Biomedical Informatics, 
all at the University at Buffalo. He is a medical doctor who specializes in 
neuro-psychiatry. When he was doing what is the equivalent of what is residency in 
Europe, he earned a master’s degree in informatics and later another in knowledge 
engineering from the Babbage Institute for Knowledge and Information Technologies. He 
then worked for a brief period of time in the Department of Psychiatry at the University 
Hospital of Ghent. His specialty was in helping the department with informatics. Owing 
to his success at Ghent, Ceusters received a few awards and was then invited to join the 
Department of Biomedical Informatics, which was headed then by Georges De Moor, one 
of the pioneers of standardization in healthcare informatics. De Moor asked Ceusters to 
work on a research project that he initiated, acting as principle investigator. Ceusters 
related to me that he finished that project successfully, although it was quite difficult for 
him. After the success of the project with De Moor, Ceusters explained to me that he 
thought that he could write a grant himself, and so he did. He wrote a grant about Natural 
Language Processing through the Department of Medical Informatics in Ghent and it was 
accepted. Six months later he wrote a second grant which also got accepted. On the bases 
of this success, he started his own research company and began to receive massive 
amounts of support from the European Commission, particularly in the areas of natural 
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language processing (which Ceusters applied to medicine). One of his dreams, he told 
me, was to “see every health care provider using an electronic health care record system.” 
 One ontologist explained to me that at the time, the United Kingdom, France, and 
Belgium were strong countries in the adoption of electronic health care. Belgium was 
strong for primary physicians but not for specialists in informatics and support. The main 
reason and problem being that doctors usually do not have the time to fill out the 
structured information that is actually required to make machines be able to reason with 
the data. The solution that Ceusters had in mind was to use natural language 
understanding—doctors could just speak and the machine would transform the language 
in such a way that it would be able to convert it to structured information. While Ceusters 
was working on that, he was approached by somebody who said he should bring the 
technique on the market instead of simply doing research. Ceusters then created the 
company Language and Computing in 1998, which focused on semantic indexing for 
medical documents. They developed what at the time became the largest Biomedical 
Ontology. The company had about forty-five employees; twelve were medical doctors, 
primarily refugees from South America and Eastern Europe—people who had a medical 
degree in their home countries but who were not allowed to practice medicine in 
Belgium. Ceusters gave them a job as content experts, but he also employed 
computational linguists and software engineers.  
 It was while doing this type of work that Ceusters eventually met Smith. In 2001, 
after Smith won the prestigious Wolfgang Paul Award, Ceusters was surprised to learn 
that Smith had received the prize. Ceusters explained to me (W. Ceusters, phone 
interview, September 8, 2015) that at that point he had already read a couple of Smith’s 
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ontology papers but he really had no idea who Smith was. “The only thing that I knew 
was that he was a philosopher,” he told me. “I was really pissed off…” (W. Ceusters, 
phone interview, September 8, 2015). After Ceusters had tried with great difficulty to 
secure European money to build a medical ontology – he in fact did receive a lot of 
European money but never for that specific task – Ceusters was upset that Smith – who 
had virtually no experience in medicine – was awarded such a large prize for that very 
task. Ceusters wrote to Smith on a Sunday morning via email, and surprisingly Smith 
immediately responded. They conversed a little bit, picked up the phone. Two weeks later 
Smith arrived at Ceusters’ office in Belgium to see what kind of research he was doing.  
He looked at my system and he said, ‘Oh yeah, I mean that's absolutely fantastic 
but that’s wrong and that’s wrong and that’s wrong.’ I said, ‘Why is that wrong?’ 
He gave me some reasons that I didn’t understand because in those days I was 
working on what we would call concept-based ontology and I wasn’t aware of the 
ontological theory of realism. Barry introduced me to that, and I am always eager 
to learn. We made an agreement that I would use his knowledge to understand 
what he was talking about to make our system better. And I would introduce him 
to all my connections in healthcare. We formed an extremely good team (W. 
Ceusters, phone interview, September 8, 2015). 
 
Ceusters related to me that it was through Smith that he became acquainted with ontology 
and that after that he started to follow the literature, eventually looking back to previous 
philosophers. “At some point, I came across Kripke, which I didn't think much of 
honestly because of his possible world semantics, which I think is a nice trick, but is not 
ontologically well founded” (W. Ceusters, phone interview, September 8, 2015). At some 
point Ceusters, like the ontologist I spoke to, came across Ingarden, who Ceusters admits 
did the type of “interesting work” in ontology that he had been following. Around this 
time, likely in 2004 or 2005, the board of Ceusters’ company, which was by that time a 
seven million dollar company, did not want to invest any more in research because they 
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were already five years ahead of the competition. “They didn't accept my plan for a new 
research grant,” Cesuters told me. “At that point, I simply left the company and worked 
with Barry in Germany where I created the Center for Ontological Research at the 
University of Saarbrücken. When the money from the Wolfgang Paul Award ran out, 
Smith invited Ceusters to join the newly created CBLS. 
 Though not connected to Smith and Ceusters’ realist project, Guarino is another 
figure who is important to the history of ontology research. Guarino is Research Director 
at the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies of the Italian National Research 
Council (ISTC-CNR), where he leads the LOA in Trento. Since 1991, he has played a 
central role in ontology, emphasizing an interdisciplinary role in ontology-building that 
combines philosophy with science. Guarino and Poli coedited a 1995 issue of the 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies on the role of formal ontology in 
information technology. Guarino helped lead teams to develop the OntoClean 
methodology and the DOLCE foundational ontology. His Current research interests 
include service science, socio-technical systems, and e-government. He is founder and 
editor-in-chief (with Mark Musen) of the journal Applied Ontology, founder and past 
president of the International Association for Ontology and its Applications, and editorial 
board member of the International Journal of Semantic Web and Information Systems 
and Journal of Data Semantics.  
 
3.5 Communities in Ontology History: Conferences, Email Lists, Organizations 
Ontology work has largely been coordinated over email lists and through the 
internet by interdisciplinary teams of researchers. Studying ontologies should involve 
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knowing the history of such groups and how they contributed to the rise of a multiplicity 
of ontology projects that vied for dominance in the field before the realism-based project 
took over. The communities in ontology history, their conferences, email lists, and 
organizations show that computational ontology is a communal endeavor that requires the 
participation of a multitude of different researchers who have specializations in different 
fields.  
 As technologies of individuation that are able to partition reality into computable 
portions, ontologies necessitate the integration of specialized domains of knowledge that 
are often far removed from one another. The internet, message boards, emails, and 
conferences of emerging ontology communities needed to be formed and established with 
the aim of facilitating research across such disciplinary domains and maintaining 
longevity. Further, the specialized tools of ontology-based work were developed in 
communities and had to be shared to enable mentorship and apprenticeship relations 
where newcomers could learn the difficult new languages and technologies of ontology. 
The loose knit cultures that formed around ontology work, particularly on the internet and 
through conferences, allowed for the dissemination of these language and cultures, 
furthering the ontological enterprise.  
An extremely valuable summary of the history of modern computational 
ontology, including excerpts from transcripts of multiple oral histories of ontology 
research, is included in Yim (2015). Yim himself is a pioneer in applied ontology and 
sought to document some of the key communities that formed during the rise of 
computational ontology as a discipline. Yim describes some of the key events that led to 
the emergence of international communities structured around ontology discourse and 
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development. In the first presentation of the International Association for Ontology and 
Its Applications (IAOA), Guarino noted that a 1993 workshop served as the first major 
event that marked the development of ontology communities (Guarino, Oberle, & Staab, 
2009). Yim states that this was one of the first times where many different researchers 
from multiple countries convened to discuss issues related to applied ontology. The event 
was the International Workshop on Formal Ontology in Conceptual Analysis and 
Knowledge Representation and it took place in Padova, Italy.  
 The Protégé user community is one of the largest ontology communities in the 
world with over 200,000 registered users. Protégé was developed by the Stanford Center 
for Biomedical Informatics Research at the Stanford University School of Medicine and 
is an open source ontology editor that includes a graphic user interface to help define 
ontologies. Yim notes that Protégé has its roots in work doctoral work of Mark Musen 
from the 1980s and that Protégé’s “community was created around the tool/technology, 
and served to foster collaborative research, development, education, and user support” (p. 
3). It was around 1995 at a conference that Musen recalls gathering with some colleagues 
at a bar to hold one of their first meetings, eventually settling on establishing an email 
list. In the 1990s many communities formed around specific domain ontologies dedicated 
to specific content, such as the Gene Ontology, for example. Yim recalls speaking with 
the Gene Ontology’s creator, Chris Mungall, who noted that various GO mailing lists 
were established for GO Consortium members and people applying GO terms to genes as 
part of their bio-curation work. “While the size of the GO discussion list is 100-200 
subscribers, the size of the wider community of users is much larger, as there are 
hundreds of software applications doing GO-based analyses, and each of these has its 
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own community of users (although those communities are no longer tightly knit 
together)” (Yim, 2015, p. 3). 
 The Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) initiative started in 2001with the aim of 
coordinating “with other ontology developers for the life sciences so that they would 
apply the key principles underlying the success of the GO – namely, that ontologies be 
open, orthogonal, instantiated in a well specified syntax, and designed to share a common 
space of identifiers” (Yim, 2015, p. 3; Smith et al., 2007). As the most comprehensive 
ontology repository in the world, the OBO Foundry has one of the largest ontology 
communities in existence. The OBO Foundry will be discussed in chapter five. Currently, 
there are hundreds of ontologies in the OBO Foundry and the email list of the Foundry 
has over three hundred subscribers (Yim, 2015, p. 4). The First Formal Ontology in 
Information Systems (FOIS) conference was held in 1998 in Trento, Italy. Yim notes that 
like “other scientific conferences, the FOIS conferences provide the ontology research 
and development community with a familiar platform for collaboration. FOIS addresses 
diverse domains, such as conceptual modeling, database design, software engineering, 
organizational modeling, AI, computational linguistics, the life sciences, bioinformatics, 
geographic information science, knowledge engineering, information retrieval, and the 
Semantic Web” (p. 4). The efforts at FOIS are collaborative and involve large groups of 
interdisciplinary researchers who specialize in applied ontology-making.  
 An ontology workshop in 1998 (the same year as the Trento conference) held in 
Heidelberg, Germany brought together diverse groups with an “attempt towards 
achieving some sort of convergence on basic ontological categories and relations among 
representatives of a broad interdisciplinary community […] the mail thread among 
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participants of this workshop initiated an informal virtual collaboration of formal 
ontology researchers” (Yim, 2015, p. 4). Yim notes that the Standard Upper Ontology 
Working Group (SUO WG) evolved in part in 2000 thanks to the events at Heidelberg 
and built a community that   
worked and thrived on a set of mailing lists hosted by IEEE […]  The 
SUOWorking Group grew to 88 voting members and logged 25,000 postings. 
They went as far as shortlisting six candidate upper ontologies, but never came to 
building a consensus on the one “standard upper ontology” they had set out to 
create. The SUO mailing list, however, set the stage for virtual collaboration 
among geographically distributed members of the community, and paved the way 
for some of the same players to collaborate in the Ontolog Forum, after the 
Ontolog community emerged in 2002 (p. 4). 
 
In 2002 the ONTOLOG community of practice comes into being led by Jon Bosak 
(Bosak was widely regarded as the father of XML). Yim suggested to Bosak that he 
convert his Universal Business Language into an ontology. Subsequently, the UBL-
Ontolog mailing list was formed. Even at that time, Yim notes that ontology “clearly 
wasn’t mature enough to deliver what was needed then. Everyone reached consensus that 
the effort would best be spun off and made into an independent mailing list, which would 
garner even more support from a broader community. Bosak (who was actually a 
philosophy major at college) was very supportive” (Yim, 2015, p. 5). The Ontolog 
community was created by Kurt Conrad, Leo Obrst and Peter Yim 2002 and an additional 
email list was created to open up ontology to a wider community. Yim describes Ontolog 
as an “open dialog in ontology” that was “designed to be a Community of Practice (CoP) 
in the sense that John Seely Brown (of Xerox PARC) would have it: “a small group of 
people who have worked together over a period of time. Not a team, not a task force, not 
necessarily an authorized or identified group. They are peers in the execution of “real 
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work.” What holds them together is a common sense of purpose and a real need to know 
what each other knows” (Yim, 2015, p. 5; Brown & Gray, 1995). Yim describes a surge 
of energy taking place in the ontology community at that time, with many engaging 
online discussions, activities, and projects. Yim writes that the Ontolog community “grew 
into, arguably, the strongest community of its kind – an open, international, virtual, 
community of practice devoted to ontology, ontological engineering, and semantic 
technologies. Ontolog developed processes that were regarded as community best 
practices that others were following” (2015, p. 5). Yim retired in 2014 and left the 
operations of Ontolog to a board of trustees. 
 In 2006, the Ontology Summits began, organized by Patrick Cassidy, Leo Obrst, 
Steve Ray, and Yim. The focus was on upper ontology and in the same year the Upper 
Ontology Summit was held in partnership with the US National Institute for Standards 
and Technology. The event was an opportunity to bring many different upper ontologies 
together to converge on key issues. Yim writes that the Ontology Summits were 
structured around a specific theme each year, allowing individuals interested in ontology 
to work together and share their research. He also write that the Ontology Summit 
“process matured as time progressed, and this annual program now comprises almost four 
months of virtual discourse (over archived mailing lists) and virtual panel presentations 
and discussion sessions (over augmented conference calls), and culminates in a two-day 
face-to-face workshop, during which the community, among other things, shares its 
findings and present its distilled thoughts in a collaboratively developed communiqué” 
(2015, p. 6). Multiple groups have helped in the organizing of the summits, including the 
Ontolog Forum (Ontolog), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
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NCOR, the National Center for Biomedical Ontology (NCBO), the IAOA, and the US 
National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and 
Development (NCO-NITRD). Various themes have included taxonomies and 
folksonomies, open ontology repositories, ontology standards, ontologist training, Big 
Data and semantics, ontology evaluation, and the Internet of Things. 
The International Association for Ontology and Its Applications (IAOA) started in 
2009 and Guarino was chosen to lead the project. The IAOA is an international non-
profit organization dedicated to promoting interdisciplinary research and collaboration at 
the intersection of philosophy and computer science. The main activities of the 
association as stated on their website include educating stakeholders in the practice of 
ontology making and in how ontologies can be utilized for a variety of purposes. 
Promoting interdisciplinary collaboration among private and public organizations, 
networking with national and international groups, supporting the research and 
development of ontology in science and industry, supporting personnel exchanges, 
nurturing ontology learning in developing countries, facilitating the publication of books, 
journals, and conference, distributing awards and scholarships, and the creation of ad hoc 
groups to solve new problems. IAOA’s main conference is the FOIS and it has been held 
biannually since 1998. The IAOA “designated the journal Applied Ontology (which was 
started in 2005) an affiliated publication” and “hosts various workshops, operates a range 
of technical committees and special interest groups, provides scholarships and other 
incentives to upcoming scholars in the field, and supports other related professional 
events” (Yim, 2015, p. 7-8). Lastly, there have been many smaller organizations that have 
been involved in applied ontology standards over the years, working in partnership with 
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organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization, International 
Electrotechnical Commission, the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and 
Electronic Business, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards, the Object 
Management Group or the WorldWideWeb Consortium (Yim, 2015, p. 8). Such 
standards are discussed in the next half of the dissertation. 
Understanding applied ontology through its history and communities sheds light 
on the emergent nature and progress of ontology from its multiple origins. Qualitative, 
critical, and historical analysis also provides a look into the network of individuals who 
might be accountable for the ethical problems that might arise in future applied ontology 
work. The individuals, groups, and institutions in applied computational ontology 
illuminate the invisible infrastructures through which ontologies are created and thus 
enable a closer look into ontological practice and methods. Critical Data Studies must 
focus on the methods but also the concrete structures through which those methods are 
developed—it is through a foregrounding of such structures that the black box of 
ontology can be opened. 
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CHAPTER 4. BASIC FORMAL ONTOLOGY AND THE FOUNDRY 
4.1 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter uses the theory of technologies of individuation to describe the 
science teams, editors, rules, methods, and standards (Star & Lampland, 2009) that make 
up the BFO. The BFO was developed by Smith and researchers at the University at 
Buffalo and is an upper-level ontology used to organize ontologies that are domain 
specific. It is the most successful upper-level ontology to date that enables semantic 
interoperability between domain specific ontologies. The chapter then goes on to describe 
the Open Biological and Biomedical Foundry (OBO), an online resource that houses 
domain specific biological and biomedical ontologies that adhere to strict BFO principles. 
The OBO Foundry is one of the largest collections of domain specific ontologies that are 
semantically interoperable, thanks to the BFO. Primary data was gathered from 
interviews with individuals involved in the building and organization of BFO and OBO 
and secondary data was collected from archival research at the OBO Foundry, including 
data on the Foundry and its operational policies, including access, management and 
dissemination, capacity building resources, and protected information. The thrust of this 
chapter is to show that the BFO and OBO should be viewed as 
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technologies of individuation that enable to organization and sharing of data as 
representations of invisible partitions in reality.  
 
4.2 The Basic Formal Ontology Discuss Group 
In Simondon’s philosophy, individuation is meant to be understood as a process 
of informational individuation whereby entities emerge through levels of informational 
abstraction and granularity. Technologies of individuation are computational emerging 
technologies that translate data to sharpen our understanding of the world and the levels 
of informational abstraction through which it is accessed. Such technologies sift through 
data disorder to locate complex patterns and meaning across disparate datasets and in 
doing so they alter our conceptions of materiality. The subject of technologies of 
individuation is informational ontology, meaning the way in which materiality is 
rethought along information-theoretic lines. Technologies of individuation re-ontologize 
reality and produce new realities through informational ontology by using data to 
understand reality as relational and consisting of abstract levels of granularity. 
Informational individuation is a process whereby technologies of individuation such as 
computational ontologies use heterogeneous data to individuate new entities that emerge 
through the process of semantic interoperability.  By achieving semantic interoperability 
through applied informational ontology computational ontologies individuate entities and 
locate new forms of reality.  
As technologies of individuation involved in the partitioning of reality into 
representative data artifacts that are semantically interoperable using computation, 
ontologies first require a team of professionals to create, maintain, and monitor their 
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infrastructures. Similar to the ad hoc communities formed around ontology engineering 
groups, institutions, and conferences mentioned in the previous chapter, the method of 
ontological realism similarly requires an exposition of the social lives of the groups and 
individuals that participate in its everyday activities. Such activities typically begin with 
establishing a means of communication between the large groups of researchers who 
must discus BFO principles and interact with each other on a daily basis. Individuals 
involved in massive group operations in ontology-building must communicate with each 
other while sometimes being located in different geographic locations. Further, a close 
look at such groups and their communities of practice illuminate the methods through 
which decisions are made and discussions are conducted. In the case of the BFO, the 
public material that has been generated by the community of practice that has formed 
around applied ontological realism shows that there is a degree to which scientific 
rhetoric plays a productive role in the communication, formation, and maintenance of 
BFO methods (Gooch, 1975; Depew & Lyne, 2013). Communities of practice use a 
variety of tools and techniques to maintain contact, including technologies such as 
Google Groups and other forms of online social networking. The BFO Discuss group is 
one such community (Figure 4.1) where members involved in the day-to-day activities of 
the BFO participate and discusses issues concerning methods, implementation, editing, 
and infrastructure. There are currently 536 topics in the BFO discussion group which 
effectively act as message threads that contain many more individual messages. The 
group was started by Holger Stenzhorn in 2006 to provide a space to enable groups of 
researchers interested in applied computational ontology a home to work through some of 
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the BFO’s theoretical and methodological problems. The group has been the main 




Figure 4.1 BFO Discuss – the Basic Formal Ontology Google Group 
 
Within such groups, members discuss the terminologies that must be adopted by the 
BFO, including borderline cases in the natural sciences, but also how various types of 
documents are to be represented in the BFO (Smith, 2014; Almeida, Slaughter, & 
Brochhausen, 2012). For example, how is a digital document like a prescription to be 
referenced in the BFO? The BFO Discuss group allows for debates to be aired openly and 
in the public so that input can be received from any number of individuals. For example, 
on top of debating scientific entities in fields such as biomedicine, members of the group 
have debated document types (virtual digital artifacts and virtual transactions) and how 
such artifacts should be represented in the BFO, including forms, templates, memos, but 
also things such as entire archives, protocols, amendments, dates, maps, photographs, and 
diagrams. They also discuss what can be done to documents, including things such as 
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stamping, approving, cancelling, filing, etc. Using the realism-based method of BFO, 
BFO Discuss members debate how to include things such as funding data and legal 
actions in the ontology, and also things like errors, forgeries, and invalidity. Institutional 
systems and entities such as government agencies and nongovernmental organizations 
must be represented in the ontology. Many of these organizations represented entities that 
must exist in a social ontology where the method of ontological realism becomes more 
complicated—social structures do not depend on such things as universals in science, 
thus arguments in favor of the inclusion of entities in a social ontology are difficult to 
make. We will return to such difficulties in the next and final chapter, but for now we 
will turn to the debates that occur in the BFO Discuss group and their significance for the 
BFO method. 
 The publicly available BFO Discuss group contains records dating back to 
October 15th 2006. The first message, written by Stenzhorn (currently Stenzhorn is 
working at the Universität des Saarlandes) reads,  
Welcome to "BFO Discuss", 
I have created this group for discussions pertaining to the theoretical and practical 
aspects of the "Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)". If you are interested in this 




The introductory message from Stenzhorn shows that BFO Discuss was created to be 
publicly available and open to everyone including specialists and generalists. This 
follows Yim and Smith’s tenant that ontolgoy work should be open and accessible to the 
widest variety of users. It is through collaborative effort that ontologies like the BFO are 
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maintained and updated into further iterations. Such collaboration also shows that the 
scientific realism endorsed by the BFO is still up for debate in such groups where terms 
can be debated on and everntually implemented or erased. Such a dialogic approach to 
applied computational ontology rules and methods runs the risk of falling further from 
claims of scientific objectivity and closer to ad hoc conceptualist approaches. Yet, BFO 
Discuss contains examples of many practical issues that are unrelated to definitions that 
still come up in applied computational ontology work, including transfer issues, as the 
second message in the group indicates. Effectively the first problem posted in the BFO 
Discuss group, the next message in the group reads: 
Hello BFO gurus. 
I hope this is the right site to discuss some issues that came 




The following OBI top level classes may not belong into 
OBI and are perhaps better suited to exist in BFO (or 
PATO)? 
 
 1. OBI:time_interval (duplicate with List 2) 
 2. OBI:time_point (duplicate with List 2) 
 3. OBI:state (duplicate with List 2) 
 4. OBI:characteristic (duplicate with List 2) 
 5. OBI:value 
 6. OBI:cardinal_part_of_value 
 7. OBI:physical_entity (duplicate with List 2) 
 8. OBI:immaterial_entity 
 9. OBI:material_entity 
 10. OBI:boundary (duplicate with List 2) 
 11. OBI:material_entity 
 12. OBI:collection_of_physical_entities (dup with List 2) 
 
Do OBI:physical_entity and material_entity belong under 
snap:object and immaterial_entity under snap:site ? 
 
Are the following classifications correct? 
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obi:state is_a bfo:quality 
obi:characteristic is_a bfo:quality 
obi:time_point maps bfo:temporal_instant 
obi:time_intervall maps bfo:temporal_interval 
obi:boundary maps bfo:object_boundary (and 
bfo:process_boundary) 
obi:spatial_region maps bfo:site 
obi:collection_of_physical_entities maps 
bfo:object_aggregate 
obi:population is_a bfo:object_aggregate 
obi:sample_population is_a bfo:object_aggregate 
 
is obi:data_set a bfo:object_aggregate subclass? Is 
obi:time_interval a bfo:continuant , when in the bfo 
definition is stated that a continuant can not have temporal 
parts ? obi:data_set is_a bfo:object_aggregate subclass ? 
 
Any thoughts and comments appreciated. 
Cheers, Daniel Schober 
 
From this beginning stage, the BFO Discuss group was used to ask and answer questions 
about the methods of BFO and ontological realism in the context of a community of users 
and specialists who kept up to date with the practice of applied ontology engineering. In 
the example given above, Daniel Schober asks “Do OBI:physical_entity and 
material_entity belong under snap:object and immaterial_entity under snap:site ?” The 
question concerns how BFO functions once it is populated by the content of another 
ontology, which in this case is the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI). This is 
significant since the OBI is a domain ontology that contains biomedical data that are 
sensitive and should be carefully approached when being searched and re-categorized 
according to a new ontological method such as that contained in the BFO. The OBI is a 
good example of how domain ontologies interact with the BFO to produce new technical 
problems that can also be potentially ethical problems. For example, in running OBI data 
through the BFO, the data contained in the OBI have their own anonymization and codes 
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and there is a potential for these to be complicated when being processed through the 
BFO. Further, complications can arise in the translation of terms from the OBI to the 
BFO. Schober asks whether or not “obi:population is_a bfo:object_aggregate” to see if 
the translation from the OBI to the BFO principles is correct. The BFO follows much 
more abstract rules and principles and this is part of the reason it is so successful (notice 
the transfer of the class population in the OBI to the class object_aggregate in the BFO). 
Such a translation of existing data into much more abstract terms of categorization 
threatens to undermine the existing data structure, especially if the individual who 
originally defined the data is not present to interact and dsiscuss translation rules before 
integration. Similarly, in a threaded discussion that runs from February 4th 2013 to April 
25th 2013, members of the BFO Discuss group argue over the definitions of processes and 
entities. Combing through the vast archive of publicly available material on the BFO 
Discuss list, I came across numerous examples where members of the group engaged in 
heated dialogue with one another on some of the basic principles of ontological realism. 
For example, in a post from February 24th 2007, Smith himself had to intervene in a 
debate that was happening in the discussion board to clarify mistakes concerning 





Figure 4.2 Debate in the BFO Discuss Google Group 
 
 
Members of the BFO Discuss group participate and attempt to answer questions about 
ontological realism as they come up from a variety of users around the world. Such a 
group represents a subset of the ontology research community, one that has formed 
around a specific subject (BFO) using a specific technology (Google Groups) to facilitate 
community action. As an example of scientific culture forming online, the BFO Discuss 
group facilitates the “arguments and beliefs to which there is a constant appeal in daily 
life” of scientists (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p.55). The BFO Discuss group acts as a 
venue to extend dialogue around issues that align with different arguments and belief 
systems that can potentially affect the applied ontological technology since the BFO 
method involves definitions and relations which are constantly revised and susceptible to 
biases and beliefs. For example, in Figure 4.2, Smith attempts to reason with the group to 
explain why boundaries should be considered independent continuants and how they 
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should be included in the BFO. Alan Ruttenberg, in a previous message, asks “How can a 
boundary of an object be an independent continuant? Surely it intimately depends upon 
the thing it is the boundary of? The boundary can exist even if the thing it is a boundary 
of doesn’t. For instance, think of a ball. We can define a sphere which is its boundary. 
But even without the ball we can think of the same sphere.” Smith in turn replies: “The 
boundary is at any given time coincident with a certain sphere. But it is not identical with 
the sphere, any more than you are identical with the Alan-shaped region of space you 
happen to occupy at any given time.” In the end Smith convinces Ruttenberg that a 
boundary is an independent continuant. Such exchanges show that the BFO is subject to 
debates and exchanges that can potentially affect its method and this suggests that there is 
some degree of rhetorical force involved in the construction and communication of the 
BFO itself in terms of its scientific principles (Gooch, 1975).  
BFO Discuss is not official but is rather an informal ad hoc community formed 
around a recognized need to provide support to the ontological realist project. Like the 
many other historical ontology discussion groups noted by Yim (2015), BFO Discuss is 
the latest iteration in a line of communities that has formed around the practice of applied 
ontological engineering. Such virtual communities (Rheingold, 1993) contribute to 
transparency and add to the overall value of the realist ontological project by enabling 
individual’s direct access to knowledge bases and specialists whom they might not have 
access to otherwise. Historically, such groups are familiar in the early development of 
emerging technologies—the internet and email being just two examples. Similarly, as 
Yim (2015) has shown, ontology work since the 1990s has embraced a somewhat 
inclusive and community-oriented nature owing to the large amounts of interdisciplinary 
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resources that are required of applied ontology work. There is a certain sense in which 
applied ontology work does not fall under any specific domain and that it is the result of 
numerous forces of activity and specialized knowledge that form in ad hoc communities. 
Computational ontologies are in this sense like the alleged black arts that consist of 
techniques or practices that are mysterious or sinister—the practice of applied ontology 
work is somewhat opaque and hard to pin down, yet applied computational ontologies as 
technologies of individuation as extremely powerful. A black art that engages 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary fields, computational ontology elicits work from 
philosophers, logicians, engineers, computer and information scientists, managers, 
community-builder, and many more.  
 The openness and community-centered work of the BFO ensures access and 
increased accountability in the ecology of information sharing in the digital sharing of 
ontology resources, commentary, and critique (Christen, 2009). BFO Discuss represents 
the type of shared community actions that coalesce around problems in the application of 
ontological realism. What is interesting to note is the sheer number of individuals who 
are involved in the discussions and decision-making process. Smith (who is for better or 
worse the lead inventor of BFO) himself has engaged in discussion regularly, as have 
numbers of rank and file engineers, computer scientists, even other philosophers. The 
discussions are often illuminating and provide a snapshot of the rhetoric that ontologists 
engage in when arguing about ontological realism and its principles, suggesting that there 
is a degree to which scientific rhetoric (Depew & Lyne, 2013) plays a role even in the 




4.3 I’d Rather Share My Toothbrush (Referent Tracking) 
In Life out of Sequence: A Data-Driven History of Bioinformatics, Stevens (2013) 
describes that when he “raised the subject of ontologies among biologists” they often 
responded to him with a quote that is sometimes attributed to the influential biologist 
Michael Ashburner. Ashbrunner is reported to have said that “biologists would rather 
share their toothbrush than share a gene name” (Stevens, 2013, p. 125). This type of 
guarded cloistering is a regular enemy in applied ontology work—researchers would 
often rather share their toothbrush than share names in an ontology. The reason for this is 
that researchers develop and use their own naming procedures that have usually been in 
place for a substantial length of time. Such procedures are often clumsy and not well-
defined yet the length of time that research teams have spent with the data make it 
difficult for them to envision seeing such data be integrated with others if such an 
integration were to require a substantial change in their referent tracking (the names for 
data artifacts). It is a bit like already having bought a vacation to less desirable local 
when a newer, better, yet more expensive option is presented. People will likely stick to 
the original destination (it was good enough to begin with) rather than go through the 
process of cancelling their flights, hotels, and other travel plans to rebook everything for 
the new destination. In fact, much of the time the problem of referent tracking occurs 
even before the issue of semantic interoperability via applied ontology is relevant. Data 
are simply not categorized in an accurate fashion, or individuals have strong preferences 
for how they would like to label their data, resulting in heterogeneous data structures that 
do not cohere.  
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Part of good computational ontology work includes good referent tracking before 
data are even run through the ontology (recall Ceuster’s example from the first chapter). 
Computational ontologies and ontologists produce what Coleman (2010) has described as 
“vernacular cultures” in digital media, meaning the special types of languages, codes, 
naming systems, and ways of labelling that develop when specialized fields begin to 
amass massive amounts of data (the BFO similarly adopts a vernacular even though it is 
given upper-level ontology status—it is not immune). Such vernaculars extend to 
domain-specific ontologies, data sets, and researchers as well and are represented in the 
various types of referent tracking that data scientists engage in when acquiring data that 
act as representational artifacts. Data must be tagged, labelled, and stored for the data to 
be about and represent an entity and such processes often lead to problems in terms of the 
standards and clarity of data organization. The integration and semantic interoperability 
of heterogeneous information resources arising from different branches of science is one 
of the most pressing problems of applied ontology.  
Information comes in so many formats – including everything from data about 
instruments, standards, products, protocols, instructions, codes, and even whole domain-
specific ontologies themselves – which are incompatible and formalized only locally. 
Descriptions are often made using very general terms, are based on natural language, or 
are adopted according to a formalized classification system. Yet very few naming 
procedures contain explicit and accurate references to actually existing entities that 
correspond in a realist tradition. Such a lack of explicit reference is not typically a big 
issue for normal everyday life in the laboratory; a researchers discuss data during 
meetings and in everyday parlance are able to share with each other the definitions that 
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are applied to data, and if they are not informed a simple email will correct the lack of 
knowledge. Humans can easily explain to each other what data are about and interpret 
their meaning—they are able to disambiguate the reference in general statements and 
terms by embracing contexts, times, places, and people. Such understanding for machines 
is much harder and makes achieving the semantic interoperability of data much harder. 
Typically, even well-formalized data – data that use controlled vocabularies – are still 
poorly organized due to the adoption of codes or terms that are formal but that do not 
provide an accurate alternative to general terms in natural language. The errors that can 
evolve are similar to those that come from description logics (recall unicorns); the 
outcome might be highly formal but realistically inaccurate an ambiguity issue that has 
long existed in the field of natural language processing. 
Ceusters explains the problem in referent tracking in the following way: Is it 
possible for different ontologists to produce a collection of data independently from each 
other that refers to the same portion of reality in a semantically interoperable way? 
Ceusters has built a successful and influential career in referent tracking working with the 
ORG at the CBLS in the University at Buffalo and has developed a comprehensive theory 
around it, specifically in the domain of health and the medical sciences—an earlier 
influential text in this regard is Rector, Nolan, and Kay (1991). The idea of referent 
tracking was first introduced in Ceusters and Smith (2005) which explained that the 
practice would be a new paradigm for data entry and retrieval in electronic health 
records. The text introduces some of the problems that occur when comparing general 
terms in a health database to specific terms on the side of the patient and explains how 
ambiguities can be avoided by referring to such specific terms by way of identifiers 
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instead of codes. Ceusters and Smith’s approach to referent tacking follows a realism-
based method in that it places emphasis on avoiding concepts as descriptors wherever 
possible and instead using a realistic approach to name entities using a distinction 
between three levels of reality: reality, our understanding of reality, and our 
representations of reality—a thesis that bears a striking resemblance to Floridi’s 
conception of information as, for, and about reality (2011). The difference between 
realism-based reference tracking and ontology work is that ontology is concerned with 
general terms in reality while reference tracking refers to the specific entities that 
populate the ontology. Thinking back to Husserl’s separation between material and 
formal ontology, referent tracking would fall on the side of the material in that it deals 
with specific items that can be identified. 
 One of the big challenges in referent tracking (as in ontology work) is the ability 
to represent entities that are missing, such as fissures, cracks, crevasses, holes, and tears. 
A conceptual approach to referent tracking would simply posit that such a claim as “does 
not have diabetes” is a concept and leave it at that, however this does not present a great 
deal of accuracy. To account for this problem, Ceusters and Smith introduce the notion of 
lacks into their referent ontology as a relational category that holds between particulars 
and universals (Ceusters, Elkin, & Smith, 2006)—a rather late addition considering the 
field of applied computational ontology was already at this point almost two decades old. 
Another challenge has to do with keeping track of entities over time and their changes in 
reality, understanding, reassessment, and mistakes. Ceusters and Smith (2006a) introduce 
the notion of versioning in an ontology to address these concerns and emphasize the 
notions of class, time, and history.  
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 The relevant applications of referent tracking outside of medical contexts are 
numerous, including decision support in the semantic web (Ceusters & Smith, 2006b) and 
digital rights management (Ceusters & Smith, 2007). Interestingly, an article by Ceusters 
and Manzoor (2010) entitled “How to Track Absolutely Everything” describes using 
systems of referent tracking implemented in networks for intelligence agencies to help 
achieve the aims set out in Office of the Director of National Intelligence John Michael 
McConnell’s Vision 2015: A Globally Networked and Integrated Intelligence Enterprise 
(2008). Ceusters and Manzoor write that referent tracking “uses a system of singular and 
globally unique identifiers to track not only entities and events in first-order reality, but 
also the data and information elements that are created to describe such entities and 
events in information systems. By doing so, it meets the requirements of the Nation’s 
Information Sharing Strategy” (p. 13). In Manzoor, Ceusters, and Smith (2009), a method 
is presented that enables storage of the contents of Joint Battle Management Language 
messages in a referent tracking system (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Military Referent Tracking (Manzoor, Ceusters, & Smith, 2009) 
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These and other examples of referent tracking and ontology work in the intelligence 
world will be covered in the next and final chapter on CDS and ethics. It is in these areas 
that the realism-based method might encounter some ethical problems, since they concern 
entities that exist outside of the domain of science, such as human subjects and social 
groupings.  
 We have seen how debates occur online in communities such as BFO Discuss and 
how these discussions can potentially influence the methods and theory of the BFO, 
suggesting that rhetoric plays some role in the communication of scientific methods and 
principles endorsed by the BFO (Gooch, 1975). Smith and creators of the BFO must 
appeal to BFO Discuss members to have them agree and accept their terms and 
definitions. The introduction of social ontology to BFO represents yet another significant 
step away from the alleged purely scientific nature of the BFO and points to potential 
ethical problems in applied computational ontology work. As technologies of 
individuation that facilitate the processing of informational ontology, applying social 
ontological entities to the BFO expands the types of entities to which BFO principles are 
allowed to refer, moving beyond mere objective scientific categorization and into the 
realm of government control and social engineering (Raskin, Taylor, & Hempelmann, 
2010; Mouton, Leenen, Malan, & Venter, 2014). Social ontology can be understood as a 
type of social engineering in that it is related to information security and can influence 
the psychological states of individuals who fall within the domain of the ontology 
(economic actors in an economic ontology, civilians and combatants in a military 
ontology, customers in a bank ontology, etc.). A concrete example of this is presented in 
the form of the Military Ontology in the next chapter.  
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 In the effort to track absolutely everything for use in computational ontology, 
such efforts must be open to critical and ethical reflection. Just as the internet developed 
as a government sponsored technology fueled by military interests, applied ontology 
work now – though originating in the world of AI and maturing in natural sciences such 
as medical informatics – is being applied to spheres that exist outside of science such as 
the military, but also finance and management. As technologies of individuation that 
divide reality into invisible partitions according to levels of informational abstraction, 
computational ontologies that embrace ontological realism must be open to investigation 
when they are applied to the social world. 
 
4.4 The Method of Individuation: SNAP and SPAN 
Opening the black box of ontological realism and technologies of individuation is 
required to see how computational ontologies might affect individuals, groups, and 
society. Referent tracking has shown to be an important part of the ontology-building 
process but how exactly are entities defined at the beginning of that approach and in 
ontologies? What are the specific methods and conceptual frameworks that are used to 
define entities for use in referent tracking and ontology-making? Chapters one to three 
introduced computational ontological realism and tracked its growth out of philosophy 
into a full-blown network of scientists and researchers who embrace the realist method to 
advance scientific research. Formal ontology was defined as separate from formal logic 
and materiality, and first-order logic with universals was shown to be the method of 
ontological realism. The significance of levels of informational abstraction was discussed 
along with ontological commitment. Opening the black box of computational ontological 
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realism requires going further and analyzing how the labeling of entities actually occurs 
during the practice of applying the realist method. What are the exact procedures that are 
employed when making decisions about how to classify entities for computational 
ontological realism? 
As technologies of individuation, computational ontologies concern the 
granularity of ontology and the ontological zooming in and out of levels of informational 
abstraction which are complicated buy the notions of space and time. Spatiotemporal 
reasoning has long been one of the most difficult aspects of both philosophical and 
applied ontological work—even fairly recently the topic was not seriously considered in 
basic applied ontology tutorials (Noy & McGuinness, 2001). The main theory of the BFO 
has been developed in a series of papers by Smith and Pierre Grenon. One of the most 
significant theoretical contributions to computational ontology made by Smith and 
Grenon was the ability to capture time and space in ontological reasoning through a 
distinction between what they (2004) have called SNAP and SPAN entities. SNAP 
entities represent a spatial view of ontology supporting snapshot views of reality at 
successive instants, while SPAN entities represent a spatiotemporal ontology of change 
and process (p. 137), and it is here where the influence of Ingarden’s work on applied 
ontological realism is most apparent. SNAP and SPAN represent the groundwork from 
which the BFO was constructed—the realism-based computational ontology that is the 
BFO grew out of the ideas presented in the SNAP and SPAN theories. Grenon and Smith 
(2004) develop a theory of modular ontology of the dynamic features of reality and argue 
that a dynamic spatial ontology “must combine these two distinct types of inventory of 
the entities and relationships in reality” (p. 137). 
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Drawing on the work of Ingarden and Zemach (1970), Grenon and Smith (2004) 
state that the BFO acknowledges that there are continuants (entities that preserve their 
identity over time through changes) and occurrents (processes, events, activities, change). 
Entities persist, while occurrents are bound in time. Zemach’s (1970) concise and power 
paper entitled “Four Ontologies” seems to have been a rather large influence here. In that 
paper, Zemach offers the following logical axioms for good ontological work according 
to a spatiotemporal matrix: 
A.  
 
1. At one time a thing cannot be as a whole in different places. 
2. At different times, a thing can be as a whole in one place. 
3. At any time, a thing must have all its parts in different places. 




1. In one place, a process cannot be as a whole in different times. 
2. In different places, a process can be as a whole in one time. 
3. In any place, a process must have all its parts at different times. 
4. In all places, a process need not have all its parts at one time. 
 
Appling such axioms in their description of the SNAP and SPAN method in BFO, 
Grenon and Smith seem to offer that reality is essentially dynamic but that it is expressed 
through time. Here, time should be understood in the sense that Ingarden describes and 
that Smith and Grenon have inherited, meaning that time should be thought of in terms of 
the duration or cessation of entities, events, and processes at multiple levels of 
granularity—time emerges out of these structures. Traditionally, philosophical theories 
tend to privilege either the belief that time and space exist separately and that they have 
rigorously defined axioms (the snapshot view of the universe) or rather that there is a 
single overarching spatiotemporal theory (the process view). Grenon and Smith write that 
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what they offer is “a theory that is designed to do justice to what is of value in both of 
these approaches” and that their “position is that a good ontology must be capable of 
accounting for spatial reality both synchronically (as it exists at a time) and 
diachronically (as it unfolds through time), but that these are two different tasks” (p. 137-
138). Figure 4.4 is a visual representation of the hierarchy of entities as they exist in the 




Figure 4.4 SPAN and SPAN Entities (Grenon and Smith, 2004) 
 
Grenon and Smith describe the SNAP and SPAN method as realist, perspectivalist, 
fallibilist, and adequatist. The theory is realist in that they claim it exists separate of 
linguist or cultural representations, perspectivalist in that they maintain there can be 
alternative yet equally legitimate perspectives on reality, faillibilist in that it accepts that 
both theories and classifications can be subject to revision, and adequatist in that it is 
opposed to reductionism and the view that there is only one basic view of reality (p. 138). 
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Added to this theory are fiat objects, which Smith (2001) describes as boundary objects 
owing to acts of human decision. In that same way that there are entities that exits – 
which Smith refers to as bona fide objects – fiat objects exist equally according to 
logically veridical measures. On Smith’s theory, all true empirical judgments can be 
viewed as effecting a division of reality in fiat fashion 
in such a way as to mark out a certain truthmaking region consisting of those 
entities that are relevant to the truth of the judgment in question. Truth itself can 
then be defined as the relation of correspondence between a judgment and its 
corresponding truthmaking region, in such a way that a true judgment would be 
something like a map of the corresponding portion of reality (2001, p. 17). 
 
Smith’s claim that fiat objects represent boundary objects that can be veridical with 
regard to the way in which those fiat objects are empirically observed in reality echoes 
Quine’s claim about ontological commitments and the bound variables that must exist for 
the theory to be true. Take the cuts of meat or the map of the United States represented in 
Figure 4.5. Both of these representations refer to specific entities in reality but are 
partitioned according to fiat. That the entities (the cow and the landmass of the USA) are 
partitioned by fiat should not hide the way in which such fiats are tied to empirical 
observations of the reality of those entities. The chuck as fiat object corresponds to an 
empirical boundary in the cow in the same way that Indiana as fiat object is tied to an 
empirical boundary in the USA. Remembering Quine, all that is necessary is that a theory 
“is committed to those and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory 
must be capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true” 
(1948, p. 33). Indeed Smith references Quine in the SNAP and SPAN project and writes 
that Quine is responsible for coming up with these sorts of fiat objects. The fiat objects 
chuck and Indiana, as they exist in an applied ontological framework, need only to refer 
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back to the relation of correspondence that is established in the empirical observation of a 




Figure 4.5 Cuts of Meat and a Map of the United States 
 
SNAP and SPAN are the method by which ontological realism functions in applied 
computational ontologies. They represent the BFO method that informs computational 
ontology as a technology of individuation in that they are responsible for partitioning 
reality into levels of granularity and informational abstraction. In this way, reality is 
presented as a structured informational ontology that can be parsed using the methods of 
ontology and individuated further and further into multiple entities, attributes, relations, 






Figure 4.6 Taxonomy of Fiat and Bona Fide Entities (Smith, 2001) 
 
Entities are divided into spatial and temporal boundaries. From there, spatial entities are 
divided into objects that are spatially extended entities and spatial boundaries such as 
inner/outer. Temporal entities are divided into processes that are temporally extended 
entities and temporal boundaries such as inner/outer. After these initial partitions, entities 
can begin to be populated within the ontology. A bona fide object is something like John. 
A fiat object is something like Utah. A bona fide spatial boundary is something like the 
Earth’s surface. A fiat spatial boundary is something like the equator. A bona fide 
process is something like your life. A fiat process is something like the 20th century. A 
bona fide temporal boundary is something like the Big Bang. A fiat temporal boundary is 
something like the summer solstice. The methods of ontological realism as expressed in 
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computational ontology partition reality according to such levels of informational 
abstraction.  
Computational ontologies are technologies of individuation that lay bare portions 
of reality and are responsible for individuating entities so that vast sciences, 
methodologies, and technologies can cohere using standardized representative data 
artifacts. The SNAP and SPAN method of BFO is the normative tool that produces 
semantic interoperability between disparate datasets and it produces new informational 
ontologies. SNAP and SPAN create an upper-level ontology that semantically constrains 
the definitions that can be given to data in terms of the reality of time and space. By 
integrating heterogeneous data using the BFO method, new entities become individuated 
that emerge from disparate data, producing a new type of informational ontology. The 
BFO is a technology of individuation that is responsible for making new orders of reality 
apparent by applying constraining-affordances such as SNAP and SPAN to datasets. 
 
4.5 Basic Formal Ontology, Upper Ontologies, and Domain Ontologies 
As I already mentioned, Arp and Spear are coauthors along with Smith of the 
book Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology and they are philosophers. I asked 
Smith how this team came to be created and he told me that when IFOMIS was founded 
he advertised amongst philosophers. Smith was disappointed by the degree to which his 
philosophy colleagues had taken the opportunities created by applied ontology seriously. 
He still, at that stage, had some optimism and so advertised positions for philosophers in 
the institute which he had founded. One of the successful applicants was Andrew Spear. 
Spear was there when they were working on BFO and he created a manual for BFO 
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which was an early version of the book. He was also very much responsible in creating 
the book itself which is a heavily revised version of his manual plus chapters dealing with 
things like users and also the formal developments which had taken place since the 
manual was written at some point around 2005. When the NCBO was founded, Smith 
advertised again for a postdoc who would work with him on the NCBO dissemination 
activity. Their job was to disseminate the work of the NCBO including disseminate good 
ontology practices to people who did not know about ontology. During this period, 
Robert Arp and Smith worked on various publications which can be seen now as being 
also extensions of Spear’s manual. Some of that work then was incorporated into the 
book and Arp played an important part along with Spear in putting the final versions 
together. 
 Before the development of the BFO and when Smith was working in Italy, the 
people he was collaborating with had created a somewhat similar upper ontology called 
DOLCE, which stands for Domain Ontology for Language and Cognitive Engineering. 
DOLCE was the first upper ontology to be developed and was innovative. The head of 
DOLCE, Guarino, is somebody who played a historical role in creating the new science 
of ontology (Guarino and his team are discussed in the first half of this dissertation). 
Smith immediately saw that DOLCE was important and worked with the DOLCE team. 
However, there were certain problems with DOLCE. Simplifying, DOLCE was created 
by people whose native language was Italian and while the ontology was very good, the 
documentation was less than good. Smith worked with them to try and improve their 
documentation. For some reason, this collaboration did not work. It was not possible for 
Smith, as an outsider, to help what he saw as being the primary shortcoming of DOLCE 
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to be rectified by helping them have better documentation. Smith thought that was a sad 
thing but that forced him to think about how he could create a better upper ontology. 
When Smith moved to Germany he worked with colleagues there to create what became 
BFO. Smith’s most important collaborator in that connection was Grenon, a former 
employee of a company called Cycorp. Cycorp was created by an AI guru by the name of 
Doug Lenat who grew out of the movement to create a formal representation of common 
sense knowledge. Cyc is an ontology-like artifact which is designed to capture, in first 
ontologic terms, the entirety of human common sense. Cyc has been funded over the 
years in part by military and CIA type funding because people think that a resource like 
that could be useful, for instance, to support natural language processing. 
In the preface to Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology (2015), Arp, 
Smith, and Spear write that even though they were professionally trained as philosophers, 
“What follows is not, however, intended as a contribution to philosophy. It is intended, 
rather, to form part of what we conceive as the rich, new technical discipline of ontology” 
(p. x). The BFO is a small, upper-level ontology that is used for organizing domain 
ontologies and provides the abstract rules and grammar that organize the particulars that 
populate specific domains. It is the most widely used upper-level ontology in existence 
today and is used to coordinate the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry 
(OBO Foundry), one of the largest collection of coordinated ontologies in existence. As 
such, the BFO does not admit any specific references to material that would belong in 
domain ontology—thinking back to Husserl’s separation of formal ontology from 
materially, BFO exists on the side of formal ontology and contains only those entities that 
are abstract enough to satisfy the organization of entities and their relations. BFO 
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emerged from a philosophical project which is focused on the task of providing a genuine 
upper ontology for domain ontologies that are used in scientific research (such as those in 
the OBO Foundry). The BFO does not contain references to specific entities in any of the 
fields that utilize it—there are no references to genes, particles, files, or chemicals, but 
rather only the definitions of their potential hierarchical relationship. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Blood Ontology Website 
 
A domain ontology is a representation of the types of entities, attributes, and relations 
that exist in a specific sphere of reality such as geography, economics, or law. In this 
sense upper-ontologies are closer to philosophical ontologies since they can be applied to 
all domains (recall Husserl’s distinction between material and formal ontology). Domain 
ontologies use controlled vocabularies to label data to make it searchable and useable. 
The Blood Ontology (Figure 4.7) is an example of a domain ontology, since it provides a 
taxonomy for describing blood-related artifacts and makes communication. Domain 
ontologies benefit from basic research in formal ontology since it is the task of formal 
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ontology to help in facilitating communication between and among domain ontologies by 
providing a common language and framework for ontological reasoning.  
The BFO (Figure 4.8) was started in 2002 though the original theory was 
developed by Smith and Grenon in a series of papers, including the aforementioned 
SNAP and SPAN papers. Since that time various other individuals have contributed in a 
big way to the BFO project, including Ceusters, Chris Mungall, Fabian Neuhaus, Melanie 
Courtot, Holger Stenzhorn, Alan Ruttenberg, Mathias Brochausen, Bjoern Peters, Randall 
Dipert, Janna Hastings, Darren Natale, James Overton, Ron Rudnicki, Stefan Schulz, 
Selja Seppälä, Jie Zheng, Kerry Trentelman, and over one hundred other individuals 
involved in the BFO Discuss group. Much of the work has been conducted in Buffalo. 
There is a team of people lead by Alex Diehl (Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Neurology at the University at buffalo) which is doing work on neuro ontology, 
neurological disease ontology. As previously stated, BFO’s development has been 
supported by the Forms of Life project which is sponsored by the Volkswagen 
Foundation and the Wolfgang Paul Program of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. 
BFO is used by over 130 ontology-driven projects throughout the world. Some of these 
include the Alzheimer Disease Ontology, Adverse Event Ontology, Actionable 
Intelligence Retrieval System, Bacterial Clinical Infectious Diseases Ontology, Bank 
Ontology, Beta Cell Genomics Application Ontology, BioAssay Ontology, 
Bioinformatics Web Service Ontology, Biological Collections Ontology, Biomedical 
Ethics Ontology, Biomedical Grid Terminology, BioTop, BIRNLex, Blood Ontology, 
Body Fluids Ontology, Bone Dysplasia Ontology, Cancer Cell Ontology, Cancer 




Figure 4.8 Basic Formal Ontology Website 
 
A descendant of Husserl’s formal ontological distinction, the BFO is made up of a series 
of perspectives on reality represented by SNAP (a series of snapshot ontologies indexed 
by time labeled Oti) and SPAN (a single ontology labeled Ov). Otis represent an 
inventory of all entities that exist at a given time. Ov is an inventory of multiple 
processes that unfold over time. Such processes are invisible in the Oti view while 
substances are invisible in the Ov view. Depending on the level of granularity and level 
of informational abstraction, both a SNAP and SPAN method serves as the basis for a 
series of sub-ontologies. The main outcome of this approach – producing multiple 
subontologies using the overall method of SNAP and SPAN in the BFO – is that a single 
portion of reality can be partitioned according to various levels of granularity; entities at 
one level may be aggregates at a different level. BFO is a technology of individuation 
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that captures the essence of informational ontology and is able to lay bare the invisible 
structure of the world. As a technology of individuation, what might be seen as a single 
process at one level might be a part of a longer process at another level a la Ingarden; 
every ontology is a representation of a portion of reality into Aristotelian categories or 
universals. In the BFO, ontologies are like windows of a portion of reality; they are 
partial representations of reality from a specific viewpoint (the ontology). The abstract 
categories in SNAP and SPAN are meant to be populated by concrete entities in the 
ontology, entities such as in the stomach, the north of France, or below the table are tied 
to specific empirical boundaries (they are ontologically committed). Such commitments 
are bound portions of space. 
One important domain ontology related to BFO is the Information Artifact 
Ontology (IAO). IAO was developed by Smith and Ceusters and is a domain ontology for 
accurately representing information artifacts. I asked one ontologist about the IAO and 
they said that they invented it because they “started to think very seriously about what 
data and information actually is and how it relates to reality. We needed to give a good 
ontological description of what elements contribute to data and information and so 
on…That's the part of the information artifact ontology.” Ruttenberg is somebody in 
Buffalo with whom Smith has worked a great deal on BFO, OWL, and IAO. IAO is an 
attempt to address the following general problem. The domain of the BFO is everything, 
or at least everything which is a part of the world of empirical measurement. As such, 
there are no numbers in the BFO ontology. Maybe there should be and maybe there will 
be—BFO is, like every ontology, always a work in progress. Now, OB is the ontology for 
biomedical investigations. There is no ontology for investigations generally, since 
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funding has been primarily for biomedical issues and so Ceusters was involved in 
creating the ontology for biomedical investigations. “Now, we have a problem,” the 
ontologist said. Biomedical investigations yield information artifacts like databases, 
publications, footnotes, protocols, and so forth, but these information artifacts are not 
restricted to the world of biomedical investigations. Exactly the same information 
artifacts exist in a physics experiment or a report about some kind of human intelligence 
observation of people moving around in the backstreets of Baghdad. The ontologist 
decided to create the IAO with the idea that people were using the word “information” in 
a way in which was primarily influenced by Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver and 
seeing information as a “kind of jelly.” The ontologist stated that they wanted to focus on 
the information artifacts which were always created by human beings and that they did 
not want to get bogged down on issues such as “Is the genome an information object?” 
They wanted to think about boring things like publications, databases, receipts, bills, 
orders, licenses, and so forth, because they needed those terms to describe the process of 
carrying out an experiment.  
“You need a license to use a satellite,” one ontologist told me. “Or whatever it 
might be. We found out that there was no way of fitting in that kind of entity into BFO as 
it then existed.” BFO has been updated in new versions since its inception. At the time of 
inventing the IAO, BFO was in its first iteration. The ontologist said that they were 
“forced to add a new branch to BFO in order to deal with information artifacts, and so we 
created BFO 1.1. We are now up to BFO 2.0. We've had, so far, three versions. BF0 2.0 
is really just a tidied up version of BFO 1.1. The ambitious goals that we had for BFO 2.0 
have now been postponed for BFO 2.1. The IAO is not a component of the BFO 2.0. It is 
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its own separate ontology.” The problem is that for every entity in any ontology there is a 
BFO top level node and there was no top level node which would suit license protocol 
database data entry and so the ontologist’s team had to create one that was domain 
neutral. It just so happens that gene sequences are also subtypes of this BFO category, so 
it is neutralized between different disciplines—they go into BFO but then the information 
entity goes into the IAO. Gene sequences go into the sequenced ontology, which is a 
third, separate ontology from the BFO and the IAO. 
 Figure 4.9 shows the IAO terms and their definitions. IAO has become a 
successful domain ontology that is beginning to be integrated into upper-level ontology 
infrastructure and likely will be included in the next version of BFO. Its importance lies 
in the way that IAO clearly defines informational objects and digital entities so that they 
can be included in ontologies without confusion, ambiguity, or error. Before the IAO, 
there was no stand way to refer to digital objects in an ontology. The IAO provides the 





Figure 4.9 Information Artifact Ontology Definitions (Ceusters, 2012) 
 
For example, the IAO has its own information dictionary—a comprehensive hierarchical 
taxonomy of information types and definitions that describe the aboutness of information. 
In a paper entitled “An Information Artifact Ontology Perspective on Data Collections 
and Associated Representational Artifacts,” Ceusters provides a mini dictionary of data 
definitions and refers to Aristotle as an influence. In the dictionary, various information 
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types are referred to, with some of the highest classes including Information Content 
Entities (an entity that is generically dependent on some artifact and stands in relation of 
aboutness to some portion of reality), Representational Artifacts (an Information Content 
Entity which is believed to represent a portion of reality external to the representation), 
Representational Units (a Representational Artifact which according to the structural 
conventions it is designed, is not built out of any other RAs), Composite Representations 
(a Representational Artifact built out of constituent sub-representations as its parts), Data 
Items (a Representational Artifact that is intended to be a truthful statement about 
something (modulo, e.g., measurement precision or other systematic errors) and is 
constructed/acquired by a method which reliably tends to produce (approximately) 
truthful statements), and Directive Information Entities (an Information Content Entity 
whose concretizations indicate to their bearer how to realize them in a process). Lower 
subcategories descend from these top level categories.  
As previously stated, the BFO is an upper-level ontology. Other upper-level 
ontologies have included Cyc (Cyc is one of the outdated ontologies referred to in chapter 
two). Smith told me that he did not want to give me his opinion on Cyc but he did say 
that ontologically speaking it does not satisfy what he sees as being minimal 
requirements. Still, Grenon (Smith’s coauthor on the SNAP and SPAN papers) came out 
of the Cyc world and he and Smith worked closely to create BFO and are co-authors on 
the initial papers in the BFO method. Since then, BFO has been co-managed and 
co-directed by Smith and a number of people. BFO has become very much a group 
exercise yet it is very hard to keep even a very small, upper level ontology in a good 
form—this is a hitherto unanticipated problem. BFO is small and changes slowly but to 
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get good definitions of the terms and good axioms to make it work with the software 
involves all kinds of considerations which are difficult to resolve. It involves people with 
a number of different kinds of expertise in logic, in software, in programming, in social 
engagement with standards organizations, in applications of the ontology to building 
other ontologies which are domain specific rather than domain neutral, and so forth. The 
book (Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology), Smith thinks, is a fairly 
successful representation of principles which they have developed over the years, tested 
over the years, and which are sound and which will survive. The difficulties – some of 
which have been covered in this dissertation – are not covered in the book. The version of 
BFO that exists now, BFO 2.0, is sound and stable, but it cannot be used in all the ways 
that people would want it to be used because the software is not amenable.  
 The success of ontology work is very much a difficult phenomenon that requires a 
large number of users. One ontologist explained to me that they think of the term 
“success” in ontology work in the following way. Suppose that you are building a 
telephone network for a country and you have really fantastic hardware and really 
fantastic cables, WiFi, or whatever it might be, and a really fantastic way of keeping track 
of telephone numbers, but there are not more than three subscribers. This would not be a 
successful telephone network. Success for ontology is, to a very large degree, a function 
of the numbers of users. BFO has been used by something like 130 different ontology 
groups. 100 or so of them are biomedical and there are a few groups in different areas 
who are applying BFO to topics such as financial services, developmental 
nanotechnology, or military projects. In that respect, BFO is by far the most successful 
ontology in that it has the greatest number of users. DOLCE did have, and still does have 
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a number of groups who use it, but it is a relatively small number of groups compared to 
BFO. 
The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OB) is a domain ontology that uses 
the BFO. If the BFO from a philosophical point of view is a bit like basic metaphysics 
then OB is the philosophy of science, particularly experimental science. OB is a BFO-
based ontology which is designed to give the possibility of describing not the data created 
by an experiment but the processes which led to that data. The funding processes, the 
sampling processes, the staining processes, the measuring processes, the publishing 
processes, and so on. The point of this is that when dealing with complicated 
experimental results in medicine, or biology, you need to know how those results were 
acquired and processed. For that purpose, you need some kind of control vocabulary for 
describing the processes which led to those results. 
 Smith and Ceusters (2011) state that there are four main upper-level ontologies 
currently available today. These are the BFO, DOLCE, SUMO, and OpenCyc. They are, 
more or less, all strict upper level ontologies that do not contain representations of 
material entities—things like chemicals, rocks, and particles or other entities that would 
typically fall into specialized fields and discourses that are represented by domain 
ontology. BFO was purposefully built to be as tiny and abstract as possible so that it 
could succeed in the specific task of acting like the glue that holds domain ontologies 
together (Figure 4.9.1). In this way, the BFO can integrate many heterogeneous 
ontologies to create semantic interoperability, in the same way that those ontologies 
themselves create semantic interoperability among data. BFO operates at a higher 
dimension, as it were. DOLCE (Gangemi, Guarino, Masolo, Oltramari, & Schneider, 
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2002) has been very historically successful and has a high amount of users. DOLCE and 
BFO share many similar philosophical distinctions in their methodology, however 
DOLCE remains fundamentally different in that it focuses on “linguistic and cognitive 
engineering.” As such, DOLCE’s domain scope includes specific conceptual objects that 
would not be included in the BFO, such as fictional entities or things that can only be 
represented by concepts. There is an argument to be made that this makes DOLCE 
weaker from the perspective of scientific applied ontology-work which seeks to create the 
widest and tightest amount of semantic interoperability between ontologies.  
 
 




SUMO has also proved historically valuable (Niles & Pease, 2001). However, as Smith 
and Ceusters note, the fact that SUMO “contains its own tiny biology (‘protein’, 
‘crustacean’, ‘body-covering’, ‘fruit-Or-vegetable’) means that it cannot support the 
strategy of downward population that has proved so useful to scientists in the case of 
BFO, since biologists are unlikely to find SUMO’s definitions (and selection) of 
biological terms acceptable” (p. 181). Remembering back to referent tracking and the 
notion that some biologists would rather share their toothbrush than a gene name, what 
this means is that it is unlikely that scientists would choose an upper-level ontology that 
attempts to create domain-specific names since those scientists likely would already be 
using their own domain-specific names and likely require the upper-level ontology for 
organization. Both DOLCE and SUMO are preferable to Cyc, however, since Cyc has 
ties to many common terms that are not used by scientists. Smith and Ceusters state that 
the primary problem with Cyc is that it does not “strive for consistency among the 
various ‘microtheories’ which form its parts” (p. 181). “Hence the very goal of creating a 
single consistent suite of interoperable ontologies which would capture the terminological 
content of biomedical science – which is from our point of view the only coherent 
strategy for achieving ontology-mediated data integration in the domain of the life 
sciences – is undermined by Cyc’s own paraconsistent logical structure” (p. 181). 
Smith and Ceusters embrace what they call the Ontological traffic law principle: 
 
Ontological traffic law principle: Ontological standards, including a common 
upper-level ontology and standards governing syntactical uniformity, are 
indispensable to every successful large-scale ontology development initiative, and 
this is so even if they are selected arbitrarily provided they enjoy widespread 




An example of this would be the “law according to which all terms within an ontology 
should be nouns and noun-phrases that are singular in number” (p. 182). However, there 
are many scientists and engineers who do not agree with ontological realism or the BFO 
method. Many scientists and engineers still take sides in the realism versus conceptualism 
debate and there are a variety of blogs that discuss this issue. The blog OntoGeek 
(https://ontogeek.wordpress.com/) contains a series of posts on applied ontological 
realism with titles such as “Realism, Really?” and “Yes, really.” (OntoGeek doubled 
down on realism). Other blogs contain views against realism, such as those expressed in 
An Exercise in Irrelevance’s (http://www.russet.org.uk/blog/) post “Why Realism is 
Wrong.” There is also some tension between BFO and OWL. One ontologist related the 
following to me: 
I refuse to collaborate in any way on attempts to express ontologies by means of 
OWL. I won't do it and I don’t take any responsibility for what is there. An 
example is for instance the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS). I am 
one of the co-authors of the paper where the descriptions, the definitions, and the 
axioms were given for what became the OGMS. But I disagree with how OGMS 
is represented in OWL, simply because OWL is not expressive enough to really 
be able to express everything that is important if you want to have a good 
description of first order reality (J. Doe, phone interview, September 9, 2015). 
 
OWL is used rather extensively in natural language processing where language is viewed 
as constructed, indicating that there are contexts in which OWL may be preferred to 
BFO. I asked the ontologist what is good enough and whether OWL was outdated. It is 
not outdated, he told me, because it is still extremely heavily used. However, OWL is 
built on the assumption, adopted by many computer scientists, that “bullshit in, bullshit 
out.” I assume that what the ontologist meant by this was that many technicians involved 
in ontology work do not see the semantic problem as being their problem and that they 
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would rather produce ontologies that work and that can “consistently reason with 
bullshit.” Such individuals call themselves ontologists, they said, but do not pay attention 
to semantics. According to the ontologist, the logic goes something like “Yeah well, but 
there is nothing better for the time being, and at least you can say some things in OWL, 
so then it is better to be able to say something than nothing at all.” The ontologist says 
they are more principled in the sense that they refuses to work on a solution which cannot 
be perfect, though they perhaps underestimate the degree to which natural language 
processing communities deal with semantics in human language. 
I then asked what areas they thought needed the most attention in ontology work. 
What areas need more development and research? The first thing, they said, is that there 
are different levels—the basic principle of referent tracking is that anything you want to 
say something about should be uniquely identified, but this principle is not widely 
adopted. It is adopted for a few things like patients who get unique identifiers, doctors, 
organizations, and x-ray machines, but not much else. The ontologist’s claim is that 
everything that you want to say something about should first be given a unique identifier, 
but not before checking to see if someone else has already created one. If you are sure 
that nothing has been said about what you want to describe then you assign a new unique 
identifier. That is a principle that needs to be there. Secondly, the ontologist thinks that 
all descriptions should take serious consideration of the dimension of time more 
seriously.  
It is nonsense to come up with statements like “all humans have a heart,” because 
that’s not true during heart replacement surgery. Or that all humans have two legs. 
Look at the street. So those things should just not just be said like that. You 
should at least specify a certain type. You should say that whenever there is a 
human leg, it has been part of some human being at some time, but it might have 
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been cut off. So those kind of statements, I think that's important. Assertions, 
which, both in ontologies as in individual statements, take the time elements 
seriously (J. Doe, phone interview, September 9, 2015). 
 
Other ontologists are less critical of OWL. He explained to me that first order logic is not 
from a computational point of view ideal. If you have an ontology which is using first 
order logic, it will very often not execute queries. The computer just will not be able to 
result queries in a reliable way. The computer will not be able to reliably execute queries, 
not because the computer will create false results but because the computer will never 
end its process of trying to work out what the results might be—it will take an infinite 
time, which is not good. In consequence to this the military and other agencies have been 
working on trying to find fragments of first order logic which will execute reliably. The 
current preferred fragment of first order logic is OWL, one of whose founders is Tim 
Berners-Lee. Lee founded OWL as part of what is called the Semantic Web, which was 
an idea to create a version of the Web which would enable the kind of search, 
combination, comparison, and reasoning that has been covered in this dissertation. OWL 
is today the default language of choice for ontology work. OWL's expressivity is weak 
but its computable properties are good. One ontologist told me that there are features of 
BFO which they would like to be able to express using OWL which they cannot. There 
are some things that can be expressed easily using first order logic which cannot be 
expressed easily using OWL. The tradeoff is that researchers involved in the BFO do not 
want to create a BFO which no one will use because it is too complex and so they are 
trying to find a way of resolving this issue. Keeping BFO simple, keeping its capacity to 
deal with time, which is where the problems primarily arise, but without sacrificing the 
computational qualities that OWL provides. 
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Smith is now attempting to make people take the view that BFO exists in different 
forms. There is an OWL version, there is a first order logic version, and there is also an 
English version. All of these versions have their good qualities and their bad qualities, 
and all of them should be kept alive, and will be kept alive, one ontologist said. They 
should be kept alive in such a way that the three versions are compatible as far as they 
can be. But because OWL has weak expressivity, there will be parts of BFO that cannot 
be expressed in OWL. OWL is like the alphabet (A, B, C, D…), while BFO is like and or 
not, thing, process, adjective. BFO is the next level of structure after the alphabet. There 
is some structure in OWL but it is not a competitor to BFO. “Some people think that if 
you have an artifact which has been built using OWL then you have an ontology,” the 
ontologist said. “I think that in order to have an ontology which is useful for anything you 
need a lot more than just a piece of correct OWL code.” The ontologist is partly right—in 
the empirical natural sciences BFO is the more desirable of the two ontologies since it 
follows the rules of ontological realism. However, there are natural language processing 
communities that continue to find OWL useful in basic research in that domain. 
 
4.6 The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry 
The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry (OBO Foundry) 
(http://obofoundry.org/) is a coordinated attempt to evolve ontologies to support 
biomedical data integration. Currently, the OBO Foundry is one of the largest 
coordinated grouping of ontologies in the world (Figure 4.9.2). As noted in chapters one 
through three, the value of data is increased when organized in a form that allows for 
them to be semantically interoperable. Applied ontologies are an attempt at producing 
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such semantic interoperability, yet the profusion of a great many ontologies replicates the 
same problem that exists when attempting to combine different datasets. Many ontologies 
in one area of research means that those ontologies carry their own meanings, definitions, 
and relations and consequently cannot be combined with other ontologies. The Foundry 
is a strategy to remedy this problem by employing standards and editors (the OBO 
Foundry Operations Committee) to make sure that semantic interoperability can be 
maintained across domain ontologies. The Foundry follows BFO principles and Smith 
acts as one of its coordinating editors. The Foundry also includes a list of principles that 
are intended as normative constraints according to which submitted ontologies for review 
will be evaluated. These principles are considered best practices that ontologists should 
follow even if they are not planning on submitting their ontology to the Foundry. The 
principles listed on the OBO Foundry website are divided between MUST and SHOULD 
requirements. To be added to the Foundry, ontologies must be openly available, created 
using a common formal language, include metadata for describing changes in the 
ontology, use coherent natural language definitions of top-level terms, include textual 
definitions, use unambiguously defined relations (this is a controversial rule in the OBO 
Foundry), provide documentation, document that the ontology has multiple users, be 
carried out in a collaborative fashion, have a contact person, follow naming conventions 





Figure 4.9.2 The OBO Foundry 
 
One ontologist explained to me that if someone wants to get a label from the OBO 
Foundry they need to pass through a panel of experts, including the OBO Foundry 
Operations Committee, who will look at the documentation on the ontology and the 
principles that are used and make a decision on whether or not the ontology deserves the 
OBO Foundry’s stamp of approval to be included in the group. Unlike the Foundry, a 
similar attempt at collecting ontologies – the NCBO’s BioPortal 
(http://bioportal.bioontology.org/) – does not enforce such standards and allows for the 
inclusion of many different ontologies that are not semantically interoperable. Of the 
BioPortal, the ontologist told me: 
That's the biggest collection of ontology junk, because there is no principled 
approach at all in what is submitted there. The majority of those ontologies even 
violate the semantics of the description language used. The BioPortal is the place 
where you can get all the biomedical ontologies without any quality criteria. The 
only thing that they do is to say there are so many classes and there are so many 
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individuals and there are so many relations and that's it (J. Doe, phone interview, 
September 9, 2015).  
 
There is, however, disagreement among the ranks of the OBO Foundry as well and this 
has been well documented on the OBO Discuss mailing list (http://obo-
discuss.2851485.n2.nabble.com/). There are currently debates about clarifying the 
wording of certain principles and expanding the criteria used to review the ontologies for 
consideration in the Foundry, indicating that the Foundry itself is not immune to the type 
of controversy that affects entities such as the BioPortal. Not all members of the Foundry 
community are happy with the standards as they currently exist, indicating that there are 
problems even though such principles are in place. Similar debates have existed for years 
on the mailing list. Below is an example of Smith responding to a comment left by Peter 
Karp on the OBO Discuss mailing list on July 16th 2010 (Karp’s text has arrows while 
Smith’s answers do not and are located in between Karp’s text): 
At 12:52 PM 7/16/2010, Peter Karp wrote: 
>My take on this discussion is 
> 
>(a) The paper by Dumontier and Hoehndorf makes a number of excellent 
>points. It will of course be interesting to see what Barry et al 
>have to say in response. 
> 
>(b) The OBO Foundry Principles are so unclearly expressed that they 
>are not deserving of all the key pokes they have generated. The 
>instantiability principle is one example of such a vaguely formulated 
>principle (in fact, it is rather ironic that a group concerned with 
>ontologies has formulated such unclearly stated principles for 
ontologies). 
> 
>Most of the principles on that page require further discussion, 
>explanation, and justification, and I recommend that the OBO Foundry 
>group create an accompanying web page that provides a more in-depth 
>discussion of each principle. 
 
I believe that we have been trying to do this, in very many papers,  
lectures. videos, etc. But we can of course try harder. 
 
>  Examples would be particularly helpful -- 
>"near misses" are always a helpful way of clarifying definitions. 
>For example, it would be helpful to know what Barry or others think 
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>are possible ontology terms that people might want to define that 









entity that is simultaneously an instance of Heart failure, Tooth  
decay, and Pregnancy 
single-celled mammalian organism 
 
>  What does it even mean to correspond to an instance in 
>reality? 
 
An instance is something that exists in space and time. Often  
instances can be observed or measured. For a referring expression to  
correspond to an instance means nothing more sophisticated than for  
it to refer to or name that instance. E.g. 'Peter Karp' corresponds  
to Peter Karp. Part of the problem is that we are dealing with issues  
so basic that there is very little further that we can say that would  
illuminatingly explain them. 
 




> Is an 




>  Is the process of transcription 
>an instance in reality? 
 
Any given transcription process occurring in some given place and  
time is an instance in reality; an instance of the type transcription 
process? 
 
>  Or are these entities simply cognitive 
>constructs? 
 
If they exist independently of scientists' descriptions of them then  
they are not cognitive constructs. 
 
>(No doubt these issues are discussed in Barry's 
>papers, but the OBO Foundry principles should be comprehensible 
>on their own.) 
 







In the above exchange, Karp writes that the “OBO Foundry Principles are so unclearly 
expressed that they are not deserving” of their success and that the principles are 
“vaguely formulated.” Karp notes that it is “ironic that a group concerned with ontologies 
has formulated such unclearly stated principles for ontologies,” further stating that “it 
would be helpful to know what Barry or others think are possible ontology terms that 
people might want to define that should not be defined because they do not correspond to 
instances in reality.” Smith (Barry) replies that they are attempting to clarify the 
principles and offers Karp a list of “near misses” that would not qualify as entities in the 
ontology: unicorn, mermaid, leprechaun, absent nipple, absent leg, cancelled 
performance, entity that is simultaneously an instance of heart failure, tooth decay, and 
pregnancy, and single-celled mammalian organism. Perhaps most interestingly, when 
Karp asks “What does it even mean to correspond to an instance in reality?” Smith 
simply answers back “An instance is something that exists in space and time.” This 
exchange represents a small portion of a larger discussion around fundamental issues 
within the BFO and OBO Foundry communities. It is interesting to see such debates 
continuing to exist around some of the common BFO principles when applied to entities 
such as the Foundry. Such debates are indicative that even the method of ontological 
realism is not devoid of debate and controversy, that rhetorical appeals must occasionally 
be made to convince other members of the BFO and Foundry communities, and that there 
are applications of the ontological realism methodology that can potentially lead to 
perceived problems. The BFO Discuss group and the OBO Discuss mailing list contain 
numerous examples of such controversies. 
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CHAPTER 5. CRITICAL DATA STUDIES, ONTOLOGY, AND ETHICS 
5.1 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter discusses ethical concerns that may arise out of the application of 
computational ontology to the social sphere, introduces the field of CDS, and explains 
how CDS is concerned with ethical and epistemological issues related to data (boyd & 
Crawford, 2012; Dalton & Thatcher, 2014; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014). It describes some 
of the concepts that inform CDS as a framework, including the concepts of data 
assemblages (Kitchin, 2014) and infrastructural inversion (Bowker & Star, 2000). 
Following work on ethical reasoning in Big Data (Steinmann, Matei, & Collmann, 2016), 
I present a heuristic approach to ethical reasoning in computational ontology and the data 
that constitute it that is built on the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
and justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 1979/2013). It proceeds by offering a critique of 
BFO principles and methods when applied to contexts outside of natural scientific 
research, including applied social ontology in the form of the Military Ontology. The 
Military Ontology is supported by the BFO and the project was a direct response to a 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) entitled “Horizontal Integration 
(HI) of Warfighter Intelligence.” The chapter argues that the subject of CDS should 
include not only things like social media and the internet but also emerging media like 
the BFO and other technologies of individuation that affect social 
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ontology. CDS focuses on the techniques, technologies, institutions, and methods 
involved in the production of data. The chapter explores ethical reasoning in applied 
ontology work and ends by discussing virtual science.  
 
5.2 Critical Data Studies 
CDS is a subfield of STS and a new approach to studying data and their 
infrastructures, one that may be considered a subfield of Science and Technology Studies. 
Technologies of individuation that process informational ontology are the general 
subjects of CDS, which is a theoretical approach (boyd & Crawford, 2012; Dalton & 
Thatcher, 2014; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014) that questions data structures according to a 
mixture of ethical, critical, organizational, practical, and policy-oriented criteria (Iliadis 
& Russo, forthcoming). CDS is a growing field of research that focuses on the unique 
ethical and epistemological challenges posed by data infrastructures. Articles in CDS 
have shown that data are never ‘raw’ and that they must constantly be negotiated, 
maintained, and interpreted (Gitelman, 2013). Rather than treat data infrastructures as 
only scientifically empirical and therefore largely neutral phenomena, CDS advocates the 
view that data should be seen as always-already constituted within wider data 
assemblages (Kitchin, 2014). Assemblages is a concept that helps capture the multitude 
of ways that already-composed data structures inflect and interact with society, its 
organization and functioning, and the resulting impact on individuals’ daily lives. CDS 
questions the many assumptions about data infrastructures that permeate contemporary 
literature on ICTs and society by locating instances where data may be naively taken to 
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denote objective and transparent informational entities to expose their communicative 
power.  
Computational ontology is not immune to ethical questions and problems from a 
multitude of perspective. For example, one ontologist said that there are powerful 
incentives in the software industries to invent something new for each body of data and 
each new customer. Some of these incentives relate to genuine issues of data privacy and 
security. Often, however, the resultant siloing of data is indefensible on ethical grounds. 
The idea here is that it is wasteful and counterproductive to produce more and more 
heterogeneous data when one of the important objectives in ontology work currently is to 
produce semantic interoperability. Another data scientist put it to me that there are simply 
too many databases and that there should be a tax for each new one that is created (a 
database tax). I am more interested here, however, in some of the ethical implications of 
ontologies when applied to specific domains, particularly when they are applied to areas 
that exist outside of the natural sciences. How should issues relating to causality, quality, 
security, and uncertainty in computational ontologies be taken up when these 
technologies of individuation are applied to domains in the social, for instance? Such 
questions are difficult to formulate and require a set of conceptual tools to help set up a 
framework that can enabler ethical investigative inquiries into applied computational 
ontology and its ethical consequences. Ontologies are a form of emerging media (Smith, 
2016) in two sense in that they are, first, a new form of technology that has been 
developed to mediate data and transform it among computers, networks, and between 
individuals and institutions, not to mention methods and standards, but also, second, 
emerging in the sense that the data that they produce are themselves emergent—the 
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partitions that are created by computational ontologies individuate entities and are thus 
productive in re-ontologizing the world. Technologies of individuation are theoretically 
important for understanding how computational ontologies and similar forms of emerging 
media manipulate reality according to an informational ontology that partititons reality 
according to levels of granularity and informal abstraction. As technologies of 
individuation, computational ontologies output emergent universal data structures that 
appear only after a process of informational individuation has occurred which creates 
data entities that did not exist previously. Such emerging forms of media require careful 
inspection and consideration of their application to the social world, among others. 
To understand computational ontologies as technologies of individuation, 
emphasis should be place on their data assemblages (Kitchin, 2014). The apparatus and 
elements that make up a data assemblage include systems of thought, forms of 
knowledge, finance, political economy, governmentalities and legalities, materialities and 
infrastructures, practices, organizations and institutions, subjectivities and communities, 
places, and the marketplace where data are constituted (Figure 5.1). Assemblage is a term 
that comes from the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and should be understood here as 
a structure that emerges from a variety of social entities existing at multiple scales (local, 
national, international) that exert power. A data assemblage is a powerful complex of 
entities that form the underlying production of data at multiple levels and in a plurality of 





Figure 5.1 Apparatus and Elements of a Data Assemblage (Kitchin, 2014) 
 
Data assemblages “frame how data are produced and to what ends they are employed” 
(Kitchin, 2014, p. xvi). Data can be conceived as “the central concern of a complex 
sociotechnical assemblage” that is “composed of many apparatuses and elements that are 
thoroughly entwined, and develop and mutate over time and space. Each apparatus and 
their elements frame what is possible, desirable and expected of data. Moreover, they 
interact with and shape each other through a contingent and complex web of multifaceted 
relations” (Kitchin, 2013, p. 24). Computational ontology as a technology of 
individuation should similarly be approached as consisting of these various categories of 
data assemblage. A critical approach to computational ontologies and their data should 
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focus not only on the data that are generated by the ontology but also the institutions, 
financing, and forms of knowledge that contribute to the technology of individuation so 
as to expose the degree to which such technologies are themselves productive of data 
which are never neutral. Semantic data in particular as the main aim of computational 
ontology should be considered in light of the apparatus and elements presented here. 
Such individuating technologies should be critically analyzed by focusing on each 
apparatus that functions as a condition of possibility for the data assemblage. 
Computational ontologies in particular are suited to such studies since they are comprised 
of multiple histories, groups, institutions, standards, and methods that are often ignored in 
favor of scientific progress. 
Infrastructural inversion (Bowker & Star, 2000) is the practice of foregrounding 
the infrastructures that often remain hidden in scientific research (and ethnographic 
research on scientists). A CDS approach should pay attention to such infrastructures and 
foreground them rather than the content that is produced by technologies. CDS should 
focus in on those structures and infrastructures where data are nested and where they 
emerge as individualized entities. Data themselves sit only at the surface level of the 
individuating structures and technologies of individuation that are formative of data and 
produce stable entities. Informational ontology is another way of thinking about CDS—
critically analyzing the world perceived as consisting of layers of informational 
abstraction. The goal of CDS should be in actualizing or laying bare some part or 
heretofore unforeseen section of informational ontology to expose a new reality. 
Infrastructural inversion “is a struggle against the tendency of infrastructure to disappear” 
(Bowker & Star, 2000, p. 34). Bowker and Star write that  
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Infrastructural inversion means recognizing the depths of interdependence of 
technical networks and standards, on the one hand, and the real work of politics 
and knowledge production8 on the other. It foregrounds these normally invisible 
Lilliputian threads and furthermore gives them causal prominence in many areas 
usually attributed to heroic actors, social movements, or cultural mores (2002, p. 
34). 
 
Methodological themes for infrastructural inversion include ubiquity (how classification 
schemes saturate an environment), materiality and texture (standards are material), the 
indeterminacy of the past (there are multiple times and multiple voices), and practical 
politics (of classifying and standardizing). Bowker and Star’s method of infrastructural 
inversion combined with Kitchin’s approach to data assemblages provides enough 
conceptual framework to enable a critical data study into complex emerging technologies 
of individuation like computational ontologies. Infrastructural inversion can also be a 
generative resource in digital scholarship (Kaltenbrunner, 2015). The concept of 
infrastructural inversion implies that “infrastructure is not a specific thing such as tubes 
and wires, but a relational state that obtains when actors working in different parts of a 
historically grown, cooperative work setting achieve a smooth coordination of their 
individual activities” (Kaltenbrunner, 2015, p. 4). Technologies of individuation like 
computational ontologies are coordinated by not only physical technologies but also 
digital technologies such as email lists, blogs, and message boards. Such organizing 
projects require a deep CDS analysis of digital environments to understand their power 
and the collective way in which such technologies are built and used.  
CDS should specifically provide communication with the following. First, CDS 
offers a new ethical methodology from which to conduct inquiries related to ICTs as an 
empirical endeavor. An individuative methodology would seek to proceed by articulating 
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instances of the modulation of communicative processes themselves, rather than in the 
simple transmission of meaning or data between pre-given, already individuated entities. 
For example, whether studying empirical evidence in doctor-patient health 
communication or the analysis of vast quantities of data in social network analysis, an 
individuative methodology would seek to measure, uncover or understand those 
communicative structures that modulate in the act of communication and that perpetuate 
by virtue of an individuative flexibility. What variable characteristics of the formal 
consultation setting are responsible for trends that develop in interpersonal 
communication? How do reflective properties inherent in the visibility of a wiki edit 
history potentially alter future edits? These are the structural qualities of modulation that 
an individuative methodology would seek to uncover. Second, CDS offers a new 
conceptual toolbox and specialized terminology with which to frame future discussions 
on entirely new communicative phenomena: the language of technologies of 
individuation. Instances of modification in the technical evolution of objects such as 
ontologies, programs, and games or their material effects on social reality can be referred 
to as points of individuation. Moments where once-separate levels of communicative or 
informational properties are linked and give way to something new can be referred to as 
acts of disparation. Third, CDS bypasses a longstanding debate in STS, one that affects 
the future of communication studies also. A CDS view of informational ontology finally 
puts aside the social construction vs. technological determinism deadlock in STS and 
instead considers the human that is present in the informational ontology as an 
assemblage or ensemble. Communication research into interfaces and human-computer 
interaction stand to benefit from a CDS approach to technology and embodied interaction 
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where the point is less about the separation of the human from the technical than it is 
about the successful interoperability of the ensemble. Fourth, CDS shifts the discussion 
from paradigms of closed ecologies to wide-open informational paradigms—
informational ontology as a form of ISR can contribute to communication studies not by 
offering predetermined boundaries of inquiry as in ecology but by recommending an 
open informational realism that is amenable to radical interdisciplinary forms of research. 
This dissertation accomplishes these four goals by treating applied computational 
ontologies (the BFO) as technologies of individuation and by approaching them from an 
ethical framework that seeks to expose the data assemblages that form their ability to 
modulate reality.  
CDS must also be done within a particular context. Following Nissenbaum 
(2011), CDS must study data in social, government, commerce, science, and other 
contexts. Of context, Nissenbaum (2011) writes 
Contexts are structured social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles, 
relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal values (goals, ends, 
purposes). […] [S]ocial life comprises structured, differentiated spheres, whether 
labeled and theorized as “fields,” “institutions,” “structured social (p. 132). 
 
Contexts play an important role in the way that we understand privacy but also in the way 
emerging technologies are nested in the social world and situated among actors in the 
public. Computational ontologies individuate entities and structures as they re-ontologize 
the world, thus they are formative of contexts at the same time that they are embedded in 
them, making them unique in the realm of emerging media. When studying 
computational ontologies emphasis should be placed on the contexts in which they are 
applied.   
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Lastly, CDA needs a framework or rubric to study data and its impact. Steinmann, 
Matei, and Collmann (2016) offer a matrix for ethical reasoning in Big Data that can be 
adapted to research on CDS, ontologies, and their data. Their work combines the ethical 
principles of Beauchamp and Childress (1979/2013) with the contextual approach 
propagated by Nissenbaum (2010), creating a principle-context matrix. The principles of 
Beauchamp and Childress were first formally presented in the context of biomedical 
ethics, however recently there has been an increase in the application of the principle to 
other fields such as engineering. Following the work of Steinmann, Matei, and Collmann 
(2016) and their adoption of Nissenbaum’s (2011) context-dependent approach in the 
ethical reasoning in Big Data, I argue that ethics in CDS should similarly be analyzed in 
context-specific cases. This matrix can be used similarly to study applied ontologies and 
their ethical impact on agents and their environments in different contexts.  
Table 1 Ethics Matrix (Steinmann, Matei, and Collmann, 2016) 
 Social Government Commerce Science 
Nonmaleficence     
Beneficence     
Justice     
Autonomy     
Trust     
 
 
The ethical matrix is useful in considering computational ontology work since ontologies 
are applied in a wide variety of contexts, including social, government, commerce, and 
science contexts. However, there are many circumstances where multiple contexts can 
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exist at once while overlapping each other. For example, in a military context, there may 
be elements of the social, government, commerce, and science overlapping all at once. 
While the ethical matrix does not suggest that each context exists at the exclusion of the 
others, emphasis should be placed on the idea that each context, like each principle, can 
be present at once. Computational ontologies as technologies of individuation span 
several contexts. Rather than being seen as associated only with science and realism, 
computational ontologies must be opened up to the many other domains of application in 
which they are found, including social, government, and commerce contexts, but also in 
specific fields such as natural language processing.   
 
5.3 Ontology in Context and Social Ontology 
I discussed ethics in applied ontology with Peter Yim and we came to the 
conclusion that ethics in applied computational ontology work can be approached at two 
levels. At the technical level, if one were to look at an ontology as being the 
representation of the shared understanding of the meaning of a thing, among members of 
a given community, in a way that can be processed by both humans and machines, then 
ontologies can be viewed as ethically neutral. The question is analogous to asking: “Are 
there ethical problems in applying logic?” or even “Are there ethical problems in 
applying statistics?” Yet, on another level, like all applications of technology made by 
humans, there is almost bound to be ethical issues—the more powerful the technology, 
the more issues will likely exist and need to be addressed. This will be analogous to 
asking: “Are there ethical problems in applying laser technology?” or “Are there ethical 
problems in applying bio-technology?” or even “Are there ethical problems in developing 
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Artificial Intelligence?” The key word is “applying”—what is the application? Who is 
applying? How is it applied? etc.  
 Computational ontologies can be applied in many domains outside of the natural 
sciences, including social domains. We have seen that in the context of natural science 
the method of ontological realism is ideal for success in applied ontology work—such 
ontologies depend on the realism of universal scientific laws and processes. Yet, the 
method of ontological realism embodied in the BFO has been applied in areas outside of 
the natural sciences, in fields such as military, intelligence, social planning, and 
economics, where arguments appealing to the universality of ontological realism become 
harder to defend. At the time of writing, BFO is currently applied to roughly 166 
ontologies. Many of these ontologies are in fields outside of the natural sciences. I 
created a list of the ontologies that use the BFO, looked up their purposes and definitions, 
and applied them to the contexts provided by Steinmann, Matei, and Collmann’s (2016) 
ethical matrix. Out of the 166 ontologies using BFO and its underlying ontological 
realism-based principles, 27 are or can be applied to a social context, 22 are or can be 
applied to a government context, 22 are or can be applied to a commerce context, and 155 
are or can be applied to a science context (the vast majority in the natural biological and 
chemical sciences). Many of these contexts overlapped, and if the ontology was related to 
a technical method then I marked it as applied to all contexts. I did not attempt to apply 
the principles (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice) to these ontologies. Yet, 
one can see by the Bank Ontology, the Military Ontology, the Ontology of Social 
Participation, and the Spatiotemporal Ontology for the Administrative Units of 
Switzerland that there are ontologies that follow BFO principles that exist outside of the 
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domain of natural science and more in the social or government contexts. In such 
contexts, BFO might encounter some ethical difficulties that are not present in the natural 
science ontologies. What I mean by this is that if the main benefit of the BFO over other 
ontologies is supposed to be (and indeed likely is given the astounding success of the 
BFO method) its commitment to scientific realism in the sense of adhering to the most 
accurate universal laws, facts, and patterns identified by science, then the application of 
this ontology in fields that are not explicitly and uniquely scientific may encounter 
problems. 
A number of the ontologies that use BFO fall in the category of what has been 
referred to by the philosopher John Searle as social ontology (Searle, 2006). Searle first 
began thinking about social ontology in The Construction of Social Reality (1995) where 
he sought to provide the invisible structure of social reality—things like institutional 
facts, social phenomena, and social facts. Searle writes that social ontology “is both 
created by human actions and attitudes but at the same time has an epistemically 
objective existence and is part of the natural world” (2006, p. 12). The fundamental 
concepts that are needed to explain the existence of social ontology include: the 
distinction between observer-relative and observer-independent phenomena, the 
distinction between the epistemic and the ontological senses of the objective–subjective 
distinction, the notions of collective intentionality, the assignment of function, and 
constitutive rules. Perhaps the most important notion is that of status functions in 
institutional ontology, which Searle describes as “the glue that holds society together 
because they create deontic powers, powers that work by creating desire-independent 
reasons for action. Thus, social ontology locks into human rationality” (2006, p. 12). If 
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the ontological realism endorsed by Smith and the BFO is dependent on the universal 
laws and structures of science, social ontology is the dependent on the invisible rules and 
laws that society follows—the former individuates scientific entities (natural kinds) while 
the latter individuates social entities (social kinds). 
Smith is an adherent of Seale’s social ontology and has continued the practice, 
developing and extending Searle’s work through his own ontological work on the 
aforementioned document acts (2014), which take a social ontology perspective on things 
like institutional systems to which documents belong, positional roles within such 
systems, the production of documents, the connection of documents to reality through 
things like evidence, authentication and security documents, etc. The entities represented 
by social ontology (and its kinds that are represented in subfields such as document acts) 
are certainly real in the sense that they carry purpose in the world and exist as actual 
entities (there are things like presidents, mothers, deeds, decrees, documents, and so 
forth). Social kinds are said to be different from the natural kinds produced by science in 
that they are subjective and depend on mental attitudes (Searle, 1995)—social kinds are 
interactive and are malleable. Yet, social ontology as practiced in things like the Military 
Ontology depend on the ontological realism presented in the BFO while identifying 
entities that belong in the realm of social ontology. The methodological realism of the 
BFO and its relations might need to be ethically analyzed when applied to the types of 
data that belong to the realm of social kinds. A femur is_a bone—such statements should 
be uncontroversial in an ontology using the BFO in that they are universally true and not 
contested.  But بد صر ع نا  Abdul-Nasir) is_a leader is obviously not the same type of) ال
statement in that it is not universally true and is the product of collective intentionality (of 
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the military) and fiat. Such social ontological commitments should be subject to ethical 
review when expressed in computational ontologies. The Personal Name Ontology is 
used by the Military Ontology and is an example of social ontology (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Personal Name Ontology 
 
Does the ontology make sound and ethical definitions in terms of its entities and 
relations, has the data that will be processed by the ontology been ethically gathered, how 
do the well-honed principles of autonomy, beneficence, maleficence, and justice apply to 
the computational ontology and data? Some social kinds might be understandably taken 
as permanent—father, child, group, etc. Others, however, are born of fiat—things like 
money and terrorist are whatever hold the conditions that we ascribe to such entities. 
Computational ontologies should be subject to ethical review when the individuations 
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that they create are related to social or other contexts outside of the natural sciences 
(though science itself should not be immune from similar ethical commitments). When 
بد صر ع نا  Abdul-Nasir) is individuated as a leader in the Military Ontology using) ال
BFO principles, there should be some extra ethical step before processing the name as a 
leader in an ontology that may produce any number of other (potentially negative) 
consequences based on that action. Similarly, something as seemingly benign as the 
Email Ontology should be reviewed according to the ethical ontology matric with 
principles to see if the potential individuations that may be produced in the ontology will 
lead to potentially negative consequences.  
 
5.4 Military Ontology 
Military ontology has been practiced by armies since the beginning of organized 
warfare. In On War (1832), Carl von Clausewitz begins by describing the mereology of 
war and the need for situational awareness and understanding:  
I propose to consider first the various elements of the subject, next its various 
parts or sections, and finally the whole in its internal structure. In other words, I 
shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other 
subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than 
elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together (1989, p. 
75). 
 
Similar to how the OBO Foundry operates in the domains of biology, medicine, and 
health sciences, BFO principles are being put to use to create similar globally unified 
ontology standards in intelligence for entities such as the United States Military, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence agencies (Figure 5.3). I spoke to one 
ontologist about their work with the military and their involvement in military 
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intelligence and work with the United Nations on development ontologies. “The area 
where I’m probably being most influential now is military intelligence,” they said. The 
ontologist worked on projects for the Intelligence and Information Warfare Directorate 
(I2WD) which consisted of an attempt to address the following problem: There is a large 
amount of data, for instance data pertaining to terrorists or something similar. This data 
comes from many different kinds of sources. Some of it is human intelligence data, some 
of it is signals intelligence data, and so forth. The intelligence analysts have to use this 
data to answer questions and there are various rules they use to get answers to questions. 
Typically, each intelligence analyst will understand the structures of the databases that he 
or she has to work with only superficially, except for a small number of databases, where 
they are experts. The intelligence analysts thus have good access only to a small fraction 
of the entire data available and do not have a quick way of gaining access to all the rest. 
This is a simple kind of problem and the reason for it was because the data in all of those 





Figure 5.3 Military Ontology Website Information about Basic Formal Ontology 
 
There was a lot of data about persons and in some of the databases the data about persons 
was organized with a column headed person. Then, under that heading, you would have 
the names of the person, in Arabic, for example. In other databases, the person data 
would be organized using a word like human, or human being, or target of interest, or P, 
or some acronym, which some people knew the meaning of, but some people did not. 
Which meant that there was no way of creating a single index of all the persons about 
whom data was available. Similarly, there was no way of creating a single index of all the 
data about places that people had data about, or about meetings, or about explosions. The 
data were created, like databases typically are, by using incompatible data labels. This 
tradition in database design has to do with the fact that you use acronyms because you 
want to squeeze as much data onto a single screen as you can. But every database 
engineer creates his or her own acronyms. The ontologist suggested that they should 
create a simple ontology and describe all the person-related acronyms with the single 
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word, Person, and all the place-related acronyms with the word Place, and so on. It 
turned out to be a very useful thing—amazingly, useful. It changed the way the 
intelligence analysts worked, the ontologist was told, as they were not physically present 
when this happened. But they were told that it changed the way the intelligence 
community were able to use the data. Overnight they came back and said they wanted 
more ways in which they could use ontologies. This was a very simple but also a very 
successful first step within that particular community. 
The Military Ontology website uses language that is very similar to ontological 
realism and describes military ontology as “devoted precisely to the representation of 
entities as they exist in reality” and as “a shared resource for disparate communities to 
communicate with each other.” The website further states that the Military Ontology 
contains extensive material on ontology, BFO, and ontological realism and states that the 
purpose of the site is to   
Facilitate the rapid exploitation of the methods of ontology by the U.S. Military, 
for the purposes of: Providing an ontological resource to support representing, 
defining, and relating constituent elements in various military domains; 
identifying best practices in ontology development and creating a repeatable 
process; creating interoperable and consistent semantics in a modular fashion; 
facilitating the Horizontal Integration of Warfighter Information. 
 
The Horizontal Integration of Warfighter Information is contained in a paper with the 
same title written by Smith and several coauthors (Smith is the first author) which was 
first presented at the Seventh International Conference on Semantic Technologies for 
Intelligence, Defense, and Security October 23-15 2012 at George Mason University in 
Fairfax, Virginia. The published conference proceedings describe “a strategy that is being 
used for the horizontal integration of warfighter intelligence data” which “rests on the 
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development of a set of ontologies” that are meant to bring about semantic 
interoperability. The project was a direct response to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Instruction (CJCSI) entitled “Horizontal Integration (HI) of Warfighter 
Intelligence.” The CJCSI states that HI is the “set of processes and capabilities to acquire, 
synchronize, correlate, and deliver national security community data with responsiveness 
to ensure success across all policy and operational missions.” The Military Ontology is 
supported by the National Center for Ontological Research at the University at Buffalo 
and Smith’s BFO has become the main ontology in use by the military to answer the 
question posed by the CJCI document.  
 Like the example of Bob’s hyperthyroidism which was described at the beginning 
of this dissertation, the Military Ontology states that the “fundamental problem is that 
while there is only a single reality, stovepipe systems represent this single reality as if 
there were multiple realities by using disparate terminology and process descriptions.” 
Unlike ontological realism in the natural sciences however, the Military Ontology is 
applied to data that represent a form of social ontology which are not quite the same as 
scientific ontology. For example, the Military Ontology uses BFO terms like independent 
continuent, dependent continuent, and processual entity and contains adapted SNAP and 






Figure 5.4 SNAP and SPAN in the Military Ontology 
 
The Military Ontology seeks to apply BFO ontology work in multiple areas that exist 
outside of the domain of science, including the Ontology of Counterinsurgency, which is 
described as a “stratified phenomenon consisting of physical and cognitive strata” 
(Mandrick, 2008). Counterinsurgency is waged for “control of the cognitive stratum” and 
“to influence the population to reject the insurgent movement and to gain their support of 
the government” which requires “focusing upon the collective psychology of the 
population in order to develop the correct strategy” (Mandrick, 2008). Now, while there 
can certainly be SNAP and SPAN entities in an ontology like the Ontology of 
Counterinsurgency, the data in the ontology will be about entities that are defined using a 
social ontology rather than a scientific one. This is not wrong in itself, however such 
entities need to be thoroughly reviewed before being included in an ontology that uses the 
BFO principles, if the BFO principles are said to rest on the universality of scientific 
evidence—it is difficult to see how terms like insurgent are purely scientific.  
There are other ontology projects in the military that are similarly based on a 
combination of BFO and social ontology—many of these are discussed at Semantic 
Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and Security which is a series of conferences 
dedicated to ontology work in the military. The Intelligence Ontology is a resource for 
representing intelligence data concerning “foreign nations, hostile or potentially 
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hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations” and is applied to 
organizations, groups, and individuals. The Joint Intelligence Ontology Baseline, Military 
Intelligence Ontology, Intelligence Disciplines Ontology, Intelligence Organizations 
Ontology, Intelligence Activities Ontology, and the Intelligence Products Ontology are 




Figure 5.5 The Military’s Intelligence Ontology Suite (Smith et al., 2012) 
 
The overall aim of such ontology suits is reminiscent of the work that Ceusters produced 
with Manzoor (2010) in “How to Track Absolutely Everything.”  Systems of ontologies 
will allow for semantic interoperability of intelligence data and will eventually produce 
McConnell’s vision of a globally networked and integrated intelligence enterprise. For 
example, the National Security Agency (NSA) is similarly involved in ontology work, as 
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listed under the Computer & Information Sciences Research section of their website and 
Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing. The High-Level Military Ontology, in its ability to 
individuate items like Establish Civil Control Activity, Insurgent Cell, Criminal Gang, 
Social Organization, Mullah, Tribal Elder, and Key Leader Role (Figures 5.6 and 5.7) are 
examples of the BFO being put to use in the context of social and government ontology 
and thus necessitate ethical review and validation. 
 
 





Figure 5.7 Organization and Person Role Ontologies 
 
The types of ontologies that are being developed by the military are also being developed 
by agencies such as the NSA and are similarly integrating elements of social ontology 
into computational ontology while using the methods of ontological realism. Such 
practices, which concern data about things like people, places, criminal organizations, 
religious affiliations, political organizations, and other personal details are likely to create 
massive problems for citizens and the social world if such ontologies are not ethically 
reviewed before being applied to the social. As technologies of individuation that have 
the power to individuate entities and relations, those in charge of the black art of ontology 
building wield not only a power that can be used for the benefit of scientific progress in 
the domains of health and medicine but also one that can be used to potentially threaten 
the security and privacy of citizens.  
 
5.5 Virtual Science 
One ontologist mentioned that the end goal of building ontologies is to approach 
something they referred to as virtual science. They explained to me that the easiest way 
of understanding this is to think of clinical trials. At the moment, when you carry out a 
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clinical trial, you use subjects, which may be animals, but they may also be human 
beings. Increasingly, it is possible to carry out clinical-trial-like processes which just use 
data. There are huge amounts of data already about biological phenomena, both in 
humans and in other organisms. It is already possible to do virtual clinical research using 
this data. It is already happening and part of that possibility rests on the existence of 
resources like the Gene Ontology, which used ontologically based ways of creating the 
combinability of data deriving from different kinds of sources. 
There have been certain publications that have talked about data-driven science as 
being the end of theory. How should such provocations be read? Do we still need theories 
for virtual science and for data-driven science? One ontologist explained to me that they 
thought about this a lot. In their view, it is an empirical question. They stated that we 
have two different approaches to doing science or doing search on the Web, for instance. 
It is clear that statistically based approaches are ahead of theoretically based approaches 
for some kinds of problems. Google demonstrates this. Google now does use some 
ontology components in its work, but it is primarily still statistical and it is very 
successful. It works. On the other hand, when it comes to natural language understanding, 
the computer based on statistical approaches or computers based on semi-manual 
approaches to natural language understanding are still behind human beings’ capacity to 
understand language. To the question of science, there is a considerable amount of 
evidence now that computers are indispensable to many kinds of science. That does not 
mean that computers can do science without any kind of theory, without any kind of 
human input.  
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A computer can be programmed to extract the theoretical knowledge from a 
scientific paper but the computer will not do a good job. People like Smith and Ceusters 
are working on this problem intensely. There is a lot of funding being thrown at the 
problem of machine-readable science. We have not cracked this problem, even in spite of 
a considerable effort. We are making small steps. Some people claim that we do not need 
the theoretical step at all. We can do science without having something like a scientific 
paper with a scientific hypothesis and scientific evidence, which would then test this 
hypothesis and lead to improvements in the hypothesis. Some people say that we can do 
science in the same way that Google does search. One ontologist questioned if this could 
be achieved. “Whether we ever reach that point, I do not know. I think it’s an empirical 
question. I am sure that we’re nowhere near that point now, in spite of all the energy 
which has been invested in moving to that situation. We are near that point in small 
aspects of science, but those small aspects of science are part of science only because 
they are tied very closely to theory.” It is likely the work of ontological realism will 
continue towards achieving those aims. 
One ontologist I spoke to had a different view of statistics. They told me that “In a 
hundred years from now we will look upon statisticians as we are now looking upon 
alchemists.” I wondered to what degree the same could be said of today’s emerging 
ontologists who are growing in numbers. Will we one day look back at the work of 
ontologists as one of the most important inter-scientific technologies that revolutionized 
the way we understand materially and informational ontology, or will they too be 
considered by the scientists of the future as our current alchemists engaged in the black 
art of ontology.  
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5.6 Final Remarks 
 This dissertation has served as a springboard into the critical study of applied 
computational ontology research and has provided CDS as a foundation for the future 
critical study of emerging technologies of individuation such as computational 
ontologies. The dissertation has discovered the systems of thought that inform the BFO to 
provide an example of how to study the theories that inform technologies of individuation 
and has shown how the BFO contributes to science and the engineering of social reality. 
The Military Ontology is only one example of applied computational ontology being put 
to use in domains outside of the natural sciences. In these domains, applied 
computational ontologies should be studied by qualitative and critical researchers and 
their ethical impact must be evaluated.  
Preliminary Conclusions. There is a direct connection between philosophical 
ontology and computational ontology. The BFO’s ontological realism works as shown by 
its widespread use. Communities of practice are important to shaping the BFO. The BFO 
is also applied in social, government, and other contexts. 
Significance. Informational ontology has influenced scientific knowledge 
production and changed scientific practice and communication. Ontologies are a new way 
to communicate data. As technologies of individuation, applied computational ontologies 
like the BFO require ethical review in social ontology contexts. 
Looking forward in terms of general future research, I plan on refining the theory 
of technologies of individuation and developing case studies based on Steinmann, Matei, 
and Collmann’s (2016) ethical matric to measure the ethical impact of applied 
computational ontologies that operate in various contexts, particularly in social, 
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government, and commerce contexts. Lastly, I plan on conducting more ethnographic 
field work with members working on specific iterations of the BFO such as the Military 
Ontology to conduct future work into applied ontology. 
The communities that form around applied computational entities like the BFO 
observe what Slayton (2013) describes as disciplinary repertoires, which are 
the quantitative rules, codified knowledge, and habits of problem solving that 
enable experts to structure, estimate, and quantify uncertain technological futures. 
Disciplinary repertoires allow experts to rhetorically distinguish subjective, 
politically controversial aspects of a problem from putatively objective, technical 
realities (p. 2). 
 
Such disciplinary repertories are most clearly visible in applied computational 
technologies like the BFO when they are put to use in individuating social reality and the 
individuals who make it up. The rhetorical move of labeling realism-based ontology as a 
purely scientific problem ignores the way in which technologies of individuation stand to 
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Appendix A Interview Questions 
1. What is the difference between an ontologist and a philosopher who studies ontology? 
2. What is ontology (in philosophy and computers)? 
3. Can you think of any philosophers in history who engaged in ontology? 
4. Historically, which philosophers or books would you consider as important to 
ontology? 
5. Is computational ontology related to philosophical ontology? 
6. What are some of the unique problems in big data that philosophy can help solve? 
7. Why is ontology important to biomedical informatics? 
8. What other fields is ontology important to? 
9. What is virtual science? 
10. Are we entering a stage of data driven science and the end of theory? 
11. What is the New York State Center of Excellence in Bioinformatics & Life Sciences? 
12. Can you tell me about the National Center for Ontological Research? 
13. Can you tell us a little about contemporary ontology work? 
14. What is Basic Formal Ontology? 
15. Can Basic Formal Ontology be applied in any domain? 
16. Is ontology a matter of organizational communication? Is it philosophy? 
17. What is the Open Biomedical Ontologies consortium? 
18. What is the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations? 
19. What is the Information Artifact Ontology? 




21. How do computer scientists work with philosophers? 
22. How the actual ontologies constructed and who builds them? 
23. How are ontology research teams set up? 
24. What do you view as the biggest challenge to ontology today? 
25. What is the future of ontological research? 
26. Have you encountered any resistance or critics of ontology? 
27. What areas are underdeveloped in ontology? 




Appendix B BFO Ontologies and their Contexts 
Ontology Social Government Commerce Science 
ACGT Master Ontology    x 
Adverse Event Ontology    x 
Adverse Event Reporting Ontology    x 
AFO Foundational Ontology x x x x 
Actionable Intelligence Retrieval System x x   
Bacterial Clinical Infectious Diseases Ontology    x 
Behavior Perspective Model x  x  
Bank Ontology   x  
Beta Cell Genomics Application Ontology    x 
BioAssay Ontology    x 
Bioinformatics Web Service Ontology    x 
Biological Collections Ontology    x 
Biomedical Ethics Ontology    x 
Biomedical Grid Terminology    x 
BioTop: A Biomedical Top-Domain Ontology    x 
BIRNLex    x 
Blood Ontology    x 
Body Fluids Ontology    x 
Bone Dysplasia Ontology    x 
Cancer Cell Ontology    x 
Cancer Chemoprevention Ontology    x 
Cardiovascular Disease Ontology    x 
Cell Behavior Ontology    x 
Cell Cycle Ontology    x 
Cell Expression, Localization, Development and 
Anatomy Ontology 




Cell Line Ontology    x 
Cell Ontology    x 
Chemical Analysis Ontology    x 
Chemical Entities of Biological Interest    x 
CHRONIOUS Ontology Suite    x 
Cigarette Smoke Exposure Ontology    x 
Clusters of Orthologous Groups (COG) Analysis 
Ontology 
   x 
Cognitive Paradigm Ontology x   x 
Common Anatomy Reference Ontology    x 
Communication Standards Ontology x x x x 
Conceptual Model Ontology x x x x 
Coriell Cell Line Ontology    x 
CPR Ontology     x 
Document Act Ontology x x x x 
Drug Interaction Ontology    x 
Drug Ontology    x 
Drug-drug Interaction Evidence Ontology    x 
Drug-drug Interaction Ontology    x 
Dynamic Earth Sciences Ontologies   x  x 
Eagle-I Research Resource Ontology    x 
Economics Ontology x  x  
Email Ontology x    
Emotion Ontology x    
Environment Ontology  x  x 
Epidemiology Ontology x   x 
Epilepsy and Seizure Ontology    x 
Evolution Ontology    x 




(EXperimental ACTioins) Biomedical Protocoll 
Ontology 
   x 
Exposé: An Ontology for Data Mining 
Experiments 
x x x x 
Flybase Drosophila Anatomy Ontology    x 
Fission Yeast Phenotype Ontology    x 
Flower-Visiting Domain Ontology    x 
Ontology and Observation-Date Application 
Ontology 
   x 
Foundational Model of Anatomy    x 
Gastrointestinal Endoscopy Ontology    x 
Gene Regulation Ontology    x 
General Information Model x x x x 
Genomic Feature and Variation Ontology    x 
Gestalt    x 
Health Data Ontology Trunk    x 
Human Interaction Network Ontology    x 
Human Physiology Simulation Ontology    x 
Infectious Disease Ontology    x 
Information Artifact Ontology x x x x 
Informed Consent Ontology    x 
Interaction Network Ontology    x 
Interdisciplinary Prostate Ontology Project    x 
Intracranial aneurysm Ontology    x 
Knowledge Base Of Biomedicine    x 
Lipid Ontology    x 
Materials Ontology    x 
Mental Disease Ontology    x 




miRNAO    x 
Middle Layer Ontology for Clinical Care    x 
Military Ontology x x   
MIRO and IRbase    x 
Model for Clinical Information    x 
Mouse Pathology Ontology    x 
Nanoparticle Ontology    x 
NeuroPsychological Testing Ontology    x 
Neuroscience Information Framework    x 
Neuroscience Information Framework Standard 
Ontology 
   x 
Neural Electromagnetic Ontologies    x 
Neuroscience Information Framework    x 
Neuroscience Information Framework 
Subcellular Ontology 
   x 
New Upper Level Ontology x x x x 
Non-Coding RNA Ontology    x 
NMR-Instrument Component of Metabolomics 
Investigations Ontology 
   x 
Ocular Disease Ontology    x 
OncoCL-KB    x 
OntoAlign++ x x x x 
OntoForInfoScience    x 
Ontologized Minimum Information About 
BIobank data Sharing 
   x 
Ontology for Autism Spectrum Disorder    x 
Ontology for Biomedical Investigations    x 
Ontology for Dengue Fever    x 




Ontology for Energy Investigations  x x x 
Ontology for General Medical Science    x 
Ontology for Genes and Genomes    x 
Ontology for Genetic Interval    x 
Ontology for Genetic Susceptibility Factor    x 
Ontology for Guiding Appropriate Antibiotic 
Prescribing 
   x 
Ontology for Laparoscopic Surgeries    x 
Ontology for Microbial Phenotypes    x 
Ontology for MIcroRNA Target Prediction    x 
Ontology for Newborn Screening and 
Translational Research 
   x 
Ontology for Next Generation Sequencing 
Experiments 
   x 
Ontology for Pain and Related Disability, Mental 
Health and Quality of Life 
x   x 
Ontology for Periodontitis    x 
Ontology of Clinical Research    x 
Ontology of Biobanking Administration    x 
Ontology for Parasite LifeCycle    x 
Ontology for Rehabilitation    x 
Ontology of Biological and Clinical Statistics    x 
Ontology of Data Mining   x x 
Ontology of Medically Related Social Entities x   x 
Ontology of Social Participation x    
Ontology of Vaccine Adverse Events    x 
Ontology-Based Data Access   x x 





Driven Scenario Generator 
   x 
Oral Health and Disease Ontology    x 
Parasite Experiment Ontology    x 
Patient Safetry Categorial Structure    x 
Petrochemical Ontology    x 
Phenotypic Quality Ontology    x 
Plant Ontology    x 
Population and Community Ontology x    
Proper Name Ontology x x x x 
Protein-Ligand Interaction Ontology    x 
Proteomics data and process provenance ontology    x 
Protein Ontology    x 
RNA Ontology    x 
Schistosomiasis Process Ontology    x 
Saliva Ontology    x 
Semantic EHR Model from Linked2Safety    x 
Senselab Ontology    x 
Sequence Ontology    x 
Semanticscience Integrated Ontology    x 
Sleep Domain Ontology    x 
SMART Protocols x x x x 
Spatiotemporal Ontology for the Administrative 
Units of Switzerland 
 x   
Special Nuclear Materials Detection Ontology    x 
Statistics Ontology x x x x 
Subcellular Anatomy Ontology of NCMIR    x 
Suggested Ontology for Pharmacogenomics    x 




Time Event Ontology x x x x 
Translational Medicine Ontology    x 
(Microbial) Typing Ontology    x 
United Nations SDG Ontology Framework  x   
Universal Core Semantic Layer x x x x 
Vaccine Ontology    x 
Xenopus Anatomy Ontology    x 
YAMATO x x x x 
yOWL    x 
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